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INTIMATE HOMICIDE: GENDER AND CRIME
CONTROL, 1880-1920
CAROLYN B. RAMSEY*
The received wisdom, among feminists and others, is that historically
the criminal justice system tolerated male violence against women.
This article dramatically revises feminist understanding of the legal
history of public responses to intimate homicide by showing that, in
both the eastern and the western United States, men accused of kill-
ing their intimates often received stern punishment, including the
death penalty, whereas women charged with similar crimes were
treated leniently. Although no formal "battered woman's defense"
existed in the late 1800s and early 1900s, courts and juries implicitly
recognized one-and even extended it to abandoned women who
killed their unfaithful partners. In contrast, when men were accused
of intimate murder, the provocation doctrine and other defenses were
applied narrowly, and men were held to higher standards of self-
control. Paternalistic efforts to curb male abuse of women did not go
uncontested; indeed, competing norms contributed to a deplorable
failure to prevent the occurrence and escalation of intimate violence.
Nevertheless, the research presented here undercuts the common
view that, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a
hegemonic gender ideology tolerant of extreme violence against
women controlled public responses to intimate homicide.
INTRODUCTION
In New York City in 1892, a jury convicted John Osmond of first-
degree murder for the death of his unfaithful wife.) He was executed in
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I would like to
thank Lawrence Friedman for commenting on an early version of this article at the 2004 An-
nual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History. I am grateful to Joshua Dressier,
George Fisher, Cynthia Lee Haramoto, Clare Huntington, Dan Klerman, Sarah Krakoff, Mi-
chael Radelet, Elizabeth Rapaport, Kevin Reitz, Pierre Schlag, and Phil Weiser as well as to
other colleagues who participated in my research workshop at the University of Colorado
School of Law. The staffs of the New York Municipal Archives, the Colorado State Archives,
the Stephen H. Hart Library, and the University of Colorado Law Library greatly facilitated
my research. Last but not least, this article benefited from the diligence of my research assis-
tants: Keely Ambrose, Amanda Ayres, Olivia Denton, Tucker Katz, and Edward Veronda.
1. See People v. Osmond, 33 N.E. 739, 740 (N.Y. 1893) (describing alleged infidelity
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the electric chair the following year.2 By the time Osmond fired the fatal
bullets at his wife and her lover, he had known of their affair for several
months. His wife previously alleged in divorce papers that he had
"beaten and bruised" her and "savagely bitten... her right breast."' 3 The
year before Osmond's trial, Pasqualina Robertiello shot her lover, Nicolo
Pierro, to death in a New York City street because he got her pregnant
and then refused to marry her.4 In contrast to the Osmond case, the press
criticized New York prosecutors for bringing Robertiello to trial,5 and
the jury acquitted her in the face of damning prosecution evidence.
6
and fatal shooting); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Osmond, Folder 4180, Box 454, N.Y.
COUNTY DISTRICT ATT'Y INDICTMENT PAPERS, N.Y. Mun. Archives [hereinafter DA
PAPERS] (1891) (recording that Osmond was convicted of first-degree murder on April 14,
1892). The New York Municipal Archives maintains an extensive collection of New York
County District Attorney indictment papers, which often contain Police Court records, the
Coroner's Inquisition, and the indictment, as well as miscellaneous affidavits and sometimes
even a trial transcript. The coversheet of the indictment typically contains handwritten notes
on the final disposition of the case. Copies of all cited material from the DA Papers collection
are on file with the author.
2. See Osmond Dead, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 12, 1893, microformed on DISTRICT
ATT'Y NEWSPAPER CLIPPING SCRAPBOOK (N.Y. Mun. Archives) [hereinafter DA
SCRAPBOOK) at Roll 15 (reporting electrocution of Osmond at Sing-Sing Prison on June 12,
1893). The New York Municipal Archives houses a collection of newspaper scrapbooks com-
piled by the Office of the New York County District Attorney. The scrapbooks have been pre-
served on forty-nine rolls of microfilm. Because the scrapbooks do not always provide accu-
rate citations for the clippings, the footnotes in this article can give only approximate dates and
probable newspaper sources for some reports. For this reason, researchers using these foot-
notes are encouraged to rely on the microfilm roll numbers and the article titles. Copies of all
cited news reports and editorials from the DA Scrapbooks are on file with the author.
3. Divorce Petition of Mary Osmond, People v. Osmond, Folder 4180, Box 454, DA
PAPERS, supra note I (1891). Prior to the homicide, John and Mary Osmond lived in the home
of a bachelor named John Burchell. Burchell took Mary on excursions, for which he paid, and
John Osmond caught them in bed together. See Osmond, 33 N.E. at 740 (stating that heat-of-
passion defense would have been inappropriate because evidence showed "long-acquired
knowledge of his wife's improper relations with Burchell"). Osmond killed both his wife and
her lover, but he was only indicted for his wife's murder. See Osmond Guilty of Murder, N.Y.
DAILY TRIB., April 15, 1892, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 12. This
result was entirely consistent with social norms and even statutory law in a few jurisdictions
that exculpated men for killing their wives' paramours. See infra notes 224, 254 and accom-
panying text (discussing honor-killing doctrine).
4. See Indictment and Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box
431, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891). The District Attorney's office erroneously indicted
Pasqualina as "Pasqualina Lubertiello." See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Robertiello,
supra. However, all other sources indicate that her surname was Robertiello. I will refer to
her as "Robertiello" throughout this article. For information about the relationship between the
killer and the deceased, see Charged with Murder, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1891, microformed
on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 11.
5. See, e.g., A Good Square Look at New York's District Attorney, PRESS, May 30,
1891, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 11.
6. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891).
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A similar disparity in the treatment of men and women who killed
their spouses, lovers, or relatives occurred in Denver, Colorado in the
late 1800s and early 1900s. 7 Male defendants were often convicted on
serious charges. But juries, which by law were composed solely of men
until the mid-twentieth century, 8 acquitted women from all social classes
or found them guilty of lesser-included offenses, crediting their stories of
physical abuse or dishonor. Based on close analysis of New York and
Colorado intimate homicide cases, this article suggests that in such cases,
lenient treatment of female defendants and harsher treatment of their
male counterparts constituted a typical pattern in both the eastern and the
western United States between 1880 and 1920. Both men and women
faced murder charges. However, while prosecutorial zeal to convict
male defendants accorded with public opinion, juries showed their aver-
sion to the severe punishment of women, many of whom had been se-
duced, physically abused, or trapped in dire economic straits. Although
acquittals and convictions for lesser-included offenses sometimes exem-
plified jury nullification, appellate courts also crafted rulings that rein-
forced ideals of protectiveness toward women.
This article thus calls into question prevalent views of the criminal
justice system's response to intimate homicide. Nineteenth-century
feminists assumed that juries routinely exonerated men of passion kill-
ings but proved reluctant to do so when women stood trial.9 Similarly, in
recent decades, feminist scholars have complained that the criminal law,
and especially the heat-of-passion and self-defense doctrines, justify or
excuse men's aggression.1 0 A number of histories of wife-beating ex-
7. Compare infra text accompanying notes 97-100, 154-57, 171-79, tbl.2, and app. E
(presenting data related to female defendants in Colorado) with infra text accompanying notes
221-23, 228, 256, 281-83, tbl.3, and app. F (presenting data related to male defendants in
Colorado).
8. New York amended its laws to allow jury service by women in the late 1930s. See
1938 N.Y. LAWS 684; 1937 N.Y. LAWS 1171; see also Gerry v. Volger, 298 N.Y.S. 433, 436
(N.Y. App. Div. 1937) ("[P]rior to September 1, 1937, women were uniformly ineligible as
jurors throughout the state."). In 1944, Colorado amended its constitution to provide that "the
right of any person to serve on any jury shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex."
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 23 (amended 1944); 1945 Colo. Sess. Laws 424-25. Even when
adopted, however, such provisions often proved illusory.
9. See, e.g., Robert M. Ireland, Frenzied and Fallen Females: Women and Sexual Dis-
honor in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 3 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 95, 102 (1992) (describ-
ing nineteenth-century feminist view that unwritten law embodied a double standard that
treated female avengers of sexual dishonor more harshly than male defendants accused of
comparable crimes).
10. See CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 157, 163 (2000); CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE,
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 31-49 (1989); JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
192-94 (1992); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 7 (2003); Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the
2006]
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ist, ll but there are few academic studies of the legal history of intimate
homicide and, except for this article, no multi-state analyses of the topic
that rigorously explore public responses to both men's and women's
cases. 12 The relative lack of historical research on intimate homicide, as
Abused Woman Who Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
229, 325 (1996); Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/ Men
Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 128-29 (1992). See also Laura E. Reece,
Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel:
The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 53, 56 (1991) ("The substan-
tive criminal law mirrors male homicide patterns and consequently discriminates against fe-
male criminal defendants. Unless a female criminal defendant commits a crime like a man, she
may be stripped of substantive doctrine to mitigate or excuse her crime, unlike a male defen-
dant who fits the paradigm on which the law was based."); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Pro-
voked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense,
33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1681 (1986) (examining sex-bias inherent in heat-of-passion defense
"developed by male common-law judges, codified by male legislators, enforced by male police
officers, and interpreted by male judges and juries").
11. Indeed, historians helped lay the groundwork for the view that American police and
prosecutors have done little to prevent intimate violence and that the state has shown reluc-
tance to reach behind the veil of family privacy to punish male perpetrators. See LINDA
GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE,
BOSTON 1880-1960 at 7, 20 (1988); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING
OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 6
(1987); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117-18 (1996). See generally DAVID PETERSON DEL MAR, WHAT TROUBLE I
HAVE SEEN: A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1996) (analyzing history of wife
beating in Oregon in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); OVER THE THRESHOLD:
INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN EARLY AMERICA (Christine Daniels & Michael V. Kennedy eds.,
1999) [hereinafter OVER THE THRESHOLD] (offering collection of fourteen essays that present
case studies of intimate violence prior to 1865).
12. The most complete historical treatment of intimate homicide that I have encountered
deals exclusively with England. See generally MARTIN J. WIENER, MEN OF BLOOD:
VIOLENCE, MANLINESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND (2004). Several
scholars have written about individual cases in the United States. See generally, e.g., Cara W.
Robertson, Representing "Miss Lizzie ": Cultural Convictions in the Trial of Lizzie Borden, 8
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 351 (1996) (analyzing nineteenth-century trial of Lizzie Borden, who
was charged with killing her father and stepmother). Other researchers have limited their in-
quiries to a single city or region. See generally, e.g., Jeffrey S. Adler, "My Mother-in-Law is
to Blame, But I'll Walk on Her Neck Yet ": Homicide in Late Nineteenth-Century Chicago, 31
J. Soc. HIST. 253 (1997) (discussing nature and incidence of murders committed by men in
Chicago). Finally, the presumption that throughout history, women received harsh punishment
for challenging patriarchy has been undercut by a few earlier studies of female murderers,
which show that juries often acquitted them. See generally ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL
(1980) (presenting case studies of women suspected of murder, including intimate murder);
see also Jeffrey S. Adler, "I Loved Joe, But I Had to Shoot Him ": Homicide by Women in
Turn-of-the-Century Chicago, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 883-884 (2002) (stating
that Chicago juries applied "new unwritten law" to acquit women who killed abusive hus-
bands); cf Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 874-
78 (1990) (documenting societal aversion to executing female criminals and explaining such
aversion in terms of chivalry or gender bias). Still, to my knowledge, there are no comprehen-
sive treatments of the legal history of public responses to intimate homicide in the United
States-a deficiency that this article seeks to remedy.
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opposed to non-lethal wife-beating, has generated incomplete and even
erroneous views of the way gender norms affected public responses to
violence among lovers, spouses, and other family members. The hasty
assumption that, in the past, female defendants received severe punish-
ments for avenging infidelity or defending themselves against abuse,
whereas men were given a virtual license to kill, remains common.
13
Challenging this orthodoxy without rejecting feminist aims, this ar-
ticle will suggest that although no formal "battered woman's defense"
14
existed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts and ju-
ries implicitly recognized one and even extended it to abandoned women
who killed their unfaithful partners. Female defendants charged with
murdering their children could also expect mercy, especially if the evi-
dence showed that an abusive male drove them to violence. In contrast,
men who killed intimates, particularly those who killed to avenge separa-
tion or suspected infidelity, had a more difficult time obtaining mitiga-
tion due to rigorous scrutiny of their provocation or insanity claims. This
article goes beyond a simple explanation of the salient disparities in
terms of chivalry or paternalism toward female offenders. 15 Instead, it
contends that verdicts in intimate murder cases in the late 1800s and
early 1900s not only policed ideals of civilized masculinity, but often
tacitly recognized a factor similar to one emphasized by domestic-
violence researchers today-past abuse that might lead a woman to kill
13. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 10, at 157-58, 197-98; LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 221 (1993); ELIZABETH M.
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 113-114 (2000); LENORE E.
WALKER, TERRIFYING LOvE 236-37 (1989); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for
Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 121-23, 139-40
(1985); Ireland, supra note 9, at 95. See also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN
KILL 165-66 (1987) (implying that Blackstone's commentary trivializing wife-killing but
equating husband-killing to treason continued to be influential in nineteenth-century America).
Cf Laura L. Crites, Wife Abuse: The Judicial Record, in WOMEN, THE COURTS AND
EQUALITY 39, 45 (Laura L. Crites & Winifred L. Hepperle eds., 1987) ("While judges seem
unwilling to view wife abuse as a serious crime, they appear to exercise little leniency toward
women who kill their husbands in self-defense or after years of abuse."). Even Cynthia Lee's
otherwise excellent book on the modem heat-of-passion defense seems to assume that, in the
past, female defendants were usually convicted of murdering their partners. See LEE, supra
note 10, at 22-23 ("The law expected a dutiful wife to accept her philandering husband's mis-
behavior. If a wife killed her unfaithful husband or his lover she was a murderer.").
14. The battered woman's defense allows consideration of violent incidents and expert
testimony on the battered woman's syndrome in cases involving women who killed their abus-
ers. For a discussion of this defense under modem criminal law, see infra text accompanying
notes 200-03.
15. Cf Frances Bernat, Gender and Law, in WOMEN, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
ORIGINAL FEMINIST READINGS 212, 216-18 (Claire Renzetti & Lynne Goodstein eds., 2001)
(mentioning criminological theories that suggest that judges treat women chivalrously at sen-
tencing); Meda Chesney-Lind, Women and Crime: The Female Offender, 12 SIGNS 78, 88
(1986) (same).
2006]
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her loved ones.16 Hence, the historical analysis presented here indirectly
allows for reflection on two modem developments in the criminal law:
the battered woman's syndrome defense and the extreme emotional dis-
turbance ("EED") doctrine. 
17
Part I of this article demonstrates that, from 1880 to 1920, juries and
occasionally courts considered an expanded time frame surrounding le-
thal violence in women's cases, but not in men's, acknowledging that
past abuse by a male victim might justify or excuse homicide committed
by a woman. Gradually escalating anger or terror operated to spare fe-
male defendants without offering a reliable defense for men. These dis-
parate results were underpinned by aspects of civility condemning seduc-
tion, abandonment, and extreme violence toward women that endured as
Victorianism shifted to a more strenuous masculinity at the turn of the
century.
Rather than revealing a monolithic gender ideology, intimate mur-
der cases in New York and Colorado between 1880 and 1920 show that
such killings implicated a struggle to define American manhood. In this
struggle, the jury, the press, and even the judiciary urged male self-
restraint and expressed sympathy for women's suffering at the hands of
physically or emotionally abusive men. The cultural values that helped
spare women charged with homicide underestimated female rationality,
resourcefulness, and autonomy. Hence, defense strategies based on such
values offered female defendants a double-edged sword. In addition to
condemning the behavior of the men who abused or abandoned them,
female defendants often perpetuated stereotypes about their own weak-
ness and irrationality to secure acquittal.
Part II addresses the question of why the criminal justice system re-
sponded harshly to intimate killings perpetrated by men but failed to pre-
vent these brutal murders from occurring. This article concurs with
prevalent feminist views that police and prosecutors failed to control in-
timate violence and that the lack of deterrent policies or socioeconomic
16. See infra text accompanying notes 106-09.
17. The EED doctrine frees provocation arguments from traditional common-law catego-
ries and eliminates cooling-time limitations in a minority of modem jurisdictions, including
New York. The Model Penal Code and several states refer to "extreme mental or emotional
disturbance." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962). However, for the sake of brevity, I
use the shorter label throughout this article. For further discussion of the EED doctrine see
infra notes 231, 234, 262 and accompanying text. EED in the domestic context also plays a
role in capital sentencing today, allowing men who commit separation murders to escape the
death penalty. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of
Capital Domestic Murder in the post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1521, 1528 (1996).
[Vol. 77
INTIMATE HOMICIDE
support for abuse victims placed such victims in an untenable position. 18
However, the persistence of homicide in the home and in sexual relation-
ships, despite laws against wife-beating and the killing of intimates,
shows dissonance, rather than uniformity, in cultural attitudes shaping
male behavior. As Part II suggests, the ineptitude of the state in curbing
intimate violence was attributable to this dissonance, as well as to the de-
ficiency and corruption of early public law enforcement. It was not the
product of a hegemonic gender ideology that endorsed or even accepted
male brutality toward women.
1. THE OUTCOME OF INTIMATE HOMICIDE CASES IN NEW YORK AND
COLORADO
A. Definitions and Sources
In this article, the term "intimate violence" refers to violence against
a family member, a spouse, or a person who is (or has been involved) in
a romantic or sexual relationship with the defendant. Family members
include both in-laws and blood relations, such as children and siblings.
A romantic or sexual relationship is a non-commercial relationship that
at least initially involved the consent of both parties. This definition ex-
cludes sex between prostitutes and johns and some stalking cases, but it
is broader than the term "domestic violence," which often refers to bru-
tality between spouses only. 19 The term "intimate homicide" describes
the killing of a person connected with the defendant by any of the rela-
tionships mentioned above. Violence between lovers or spouses often
embodies different power dynamics than that between other family
members; I nevertheless cast a wide net in researching this article to see
what patterns might emerge and to provide contrast to the marital or ro-
mantic partner cases. However, even though I defined intimate homicide
broadly, the overwhelming majority of the cases that I found involved
opposite-sex spouses or lovers, and the murder of such persons predomi-
nated among the intimate homicide cases that led to death sentences or
life imprisonment for men.
20
18. See supra note 11. See also SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 18 (discussing untenable
choice faced by abused women due to refusal of state to intervene in violent households, aside
from sporadically punishing perpetrators).
19. Christine Daniels, Intimate Violence, Now and Then, in OVER THE THRESHOLD, su-
pra note 11, at 4-5. Unlike Daniels, I have not included assaults on servants.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94, 97 and apps. A-F (noting high numbers of
homicides involving spouses and lovers among total intimate homicides in New York and
Colorado). In addition to finding that cases involving spouses or lovers predominated over
other types of intimate homicides that police and prosecutors pursued, I did not locate any
2006]
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The blood of ordinary people killed in the intimate context stains
the pages of appellate opinions, trial court records, indictments, coroner's
inquisitions, and newspapers in New York and Colorado in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. This article attempts not only to tell
some of these victims' stories, but also to analyze data revealing how in-
timate violence was viewed and how the fledgling public criminal justice
system 21 responded to the problem. This article relies in part on case
files preserved by New York County prosecutors, whose jurisdiction was
coextensive with New York City for most of the nineteenth century, and
emphasizes a very complete and searchable sub-set of these records for
the years 1879 to 1893.22 Where feasible, I have supplemented the
prosecutors' files with information from published appellate opinions
and newspaper reports covering the entire forty-year period from 1880 to
1920. For the sake of convenience, the terms "New York County" and
"New York City" are used interchangeably throughout the article, even
though this nomenclature sacrifices some historical accuracy. The Den-
ver data comes from the scrapbooks of police detective Sam Howe, who
kept a record of Denver homicides prior to 1921 in a special book.23
Most of Howe's cases can also be found in the records of the Denver and
Arapahoe County District Courts,24 but some were dismissed before in-
cases that clearly involved gay or lesbian relationships. Legal scholars belatedly have devoted
attention to the problem of intimate violence in homosexual communities. See, e.g.,
SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 66 (stating that definition of domestic violence must be ex-
panded to include battering in gay and lesbian relationships); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Im-
ages of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49-53 (de-
scribing how battered women's movement has excluded lesbians and failed to address
problems of lesbian battering); see generally NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT
LESBIAN BATTERING (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986) (providing accounts of lesbian battering inci-
dents). However, due to a lack of data, this article only considers non-marital heterosexual
relationships and family bonds based on marriage or blood.
21. For details on the late advent of public law enforcement in both the eastern and west-
ern United States, see infra note 312 and text accompanying notes 312-19, 349-63.
22. These records are housed in the New York Municipal Archives. See supra note 1
(describing the DA PAPERS collection). New York County included only Manhattan Island
prior to 1898; after that date, it encompassed the other boroughs as well. See Carolyn B. Ram-
sey, The Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, Discretionary Power].
23. Sam Howe served as a detective in Denver from 1874 to 1921. The newspaper clip-
ping scrapbooks that he maintained, describing many crimes committed in Denver between
1883 and 1920, are located at the Stephen H. Hart Library, which is run by the Colorado His-
torical Society. The Sam Howe Murder Book-a separate volume that preserves the detec-
tive's notations, along with a few press articles, about Denver homicides prior to 1921-is
available on microfilm at the Stephen H. Hart Library. See SAM HOWE MURDER BOOK
(Stephen H. Hart Library, Colo. Hist. Soc'y) [hereinafter SHMB]. Copies of all cited materi-
als from the SHMB are on file with the author.
24. The Colorado State Archives in Denver houses the criminal case records of the
Arapahoe County and Denver County District Courts for the period encompassed by this arti-
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dictment. Impeccable data on American executions compiled by M.
Watt Espy25 and Michael Radelet 26 facilitates a discussion of capital
punishment in intimate murder cases. Combined with published appellate
decisions from 1880 to 1920, this death-penalty material completes the
picture by yielding statewide impressions for both New York and Colo-
rado.
This rich collection of sources reveals that, although police and
prosecutors in the east and the west responded erratically to non-lethal
intimate assaults, they approached homicide cases with vigor by pursuing
severe charges against intimate killers of both sexes. Such a response
primarily had punitive, rather than preventive effects. Moreover, anti-
violence norms were not equally applied at trial. This article will dem-
onstrate that intimate homicide cases in New York City and Denver
shared common features of stem charging and gender-based jury leni-
ency toward female defendants. Furthermore, while the cases often illu-
minated tensions between bench and jury box, some decisions by Colo-
rado and New York appellate courts also underscored values that
condemned men (whether defendants or decedents) for brutalizing and
dishonoring women.
In short, a comparison between the two states and their urban cen-
ters will reveal their remarkably similar treatment of intimate homicide.
Despite vast differences in population and culture, New York and Colo-
rado both resolved these cases in a gender-biased way that benefited fe-
male defendants. Nevertheless, the two locales did show regional varia-
tion in one phase of the legal process-sentencing. Whereas surprisingly
large numbers of men convicted of murdering their intimates died on the
gallows or the electric chair in New York, such convicts in Colorado
cle. Intimate homicide cases were found, using the Sam Howe Murder Book as the primary
source of defendants' names. These names could then be traced to criminal cases located
among the Arapahoe County and Denver County District Court records. Quantitative portions
of this article only count Sam Howe cases for which a disposition could be ascertained from
the court records, newspapers, or some other source. In addition to excluding cases with un-
clear outcomes, this article also omits the murder-suicides that Sam Howe recorded.
Prior to 1902, crimes committed in Denver were prosecuted in the Arapahoe County Dis-
trict Court. In 1902, the City of Denver became part of Denver County. See
http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/arcgov (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). Throughout
this article, I usually refer to Colorado's urban center as "Denver," rather than using the un-
wieldy and changing county designations.
25. See generally M. WATT Espy & JOHN ORTIZ SMYLKA, EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1608-1991: THE ESPY FILE (Inter-University Consortium for Pol. & Soc. Res. ed.,
1994) [hereinafter ESPY & SMYLKA] (database on capital punishment containing such vari-
ables as defendant's name, occupation, race, and execution date).
26. See generally Michael L. Radelet, Capital Punishment in Colorado: 1859-1972, 74
U. COLO. L. REv. 885 (2003) (describing and analyzing history of death penalty in Colorado
and providing appendix of capital cases resulting in execution between 1859 and 1972).
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were almost always sentenced to a prison term.27 Part I(E) will suggest
why this was so.
B. Prosecutorial Charging Decisions: A Preference for Severity
Prosecutors charged both John Osmond and Pasqualina Robertiello,
the Italian seamstress who shot her faithless lover,28 with first-degree
murder.29 Indeed, the District Attorney was so convinced of his chances
for success in the Osmond case and of the inevitability of public outrage
if he did not seek the death penalty that he refused to allow Osmond to
plead guilty to the lesser offense of first-degree manslaughter. 30 Such
charging decisions represented the rule, not the exception in intimate
homicide cases.
Relatively few individuals were charged with manslaughter or sec-
ond-degree murder. For example, cases from the 1879-1893 sub-sample
reveal that New York County District Attorneys during this time period
indicted only 208 defendants for manslaughter and thirty-one for second-
degree murder, compared to 405 first-degree murder indictments. Of the
208 manslaughter indictments, the vast majority involved construction
and railroad mishaps,3 1 saloon fights in which the aggressor's violence
27. See infra tbls.4-5 and text accompanying notes 298-99.
28. See Affidavit of Pasqualina Robertiello, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Robertiello,
Folder 3975, Box 431, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) (noting defendant's occupation).
29. See Indictment, People v. Osmond, Folder 4180, Box 454, DA PAPERS, supra note 1
(1891); Indictment, People v. Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA PAPERS, supra note 1
(1891).
30. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1365-66. Evidence from the
New York County District Attorney's files strongly suggests that prosecutors more often ac-
cepted pleas to lesser offenses from men charged with murdering other men than they did from
male defendants who allegedly killed their intimates. The District Attorney's office was espe-
cially likely to plea bargain with men whose ethnicity, gang membership, or political connec-
tions gave them a modicum of influence. See id. at 1383-90.
31. See, e.g., Indictment, People v. Rood, Folder 929, Box 84, DA PAPERS, supra note 1
(1882) (recording that train conductor George Rood was indicted but acquitted of manslaugh-
ter in case involving fatal train crash); Indictment, People v. Indelli, Folder 4912, Box 539, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1893) (indicting two defendants for manslaughter because they "will-
fully and recklessly, with gross and culpable negligence" blasted rock through wall of Mary
Posey's room, killing her).
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was partially justified, 32 illegal abortions in which the pregnant woman
died,33 and accidents between horse-drawn vehicles and pedestrians.
34
Intimate homicides constitute but a small fraction-about ten per-
cent-of the manslaughter indictments, and their numbers only rise from
nineteen to twenty-one cases if infanticides are counted. 35 In most of the
intimate manslaughter cases, a male defendant allegedly killed his female
spouse or lover. 36 Only one manslaughter indictment involved a woman
who lethally assaulted an intimate over the age of one year. 37 Prosecu-
tors charged intimate killers with second-degree murder even less fre-
quently than manslaughter. In the 1879-1893 sub-sample, only two of
thirty-one second-degree murder indictments targeted a defendant who
allegedly killed an intimate. In both of these cases, the defendant was a
32. For example, in 1886, bartender Thomas Thompson was acquitted of manslaughter
for killing a disorderly patron, Morris Slattery, with a sword. See Indictment Coversheet, Peo-
ple v. Thompson, Folder 2171, Box 221, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1886) (noting defendant's
acquittal); Affidavit of Thomas Thompson, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Thompson, supra
(stating that defendant was barkeeper by trade); Affidavits of Francis Doody, Mathew
O'Connor, and William Richardson, People v. Thompson, supra (describing details of lethal
incident).
33. See, e.g., Indictment, People v. Chase, Folder 4687, Box 514, DA PAPERS, supra note
1 (1893) (recording that Sarah Chase was indicted and convicted of first-degree manslaughter
for causing death of Margaret Manzoni during illegal attempt to procure miscarriage of fetus).
34. See, e.g., Indictment, People v. Josephs, Folder 886, Box 80, DA PAPERS, supra note
1 (1882) (recording that Samuel Josephs was indicted but acquitted of manslaughter for run-
ning over Joseph O'Brien with horse-drawn wagon). Careening carriages and wagons contin-
ued to trigger angry newspaper editorials despite the arrest and criminal charging of many
"rough-shod drivers." Our Streets Full of Peril, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., March 25, 1888, micro-
formed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 5.
35. I have not included infanticides in my quantitative data for this article because, in an
era before reliable birth-control or legal, affordable abortions, the killing of children under the
age of one year often served as a brutal means for desperately poor women to limit family size.
However, the murders of children over the age of one year have been counted. My decision
accords with the research practices of other scholars studying homicide in the nineteenth cen-
tury. See ROGER LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CITY: SUICIDE, ACCIDENT, AND MURDER IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 100-01 (Ohio State Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter
LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CITY]; ERIC MONKKONEN, MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY 69
(2001).
36. Fourteen of the nineteen manslaughter indictments returned against intimate killers
between 1879 and 1893 involved the death of a spouse or lover. The victim in thirteen of
these cases was female. See infra app. A.
37. See Indictment, People v. Quinquinet, Folder 1047, Box 97, DA PAPERS, supra note
1 (1883) (charging defendant with first-degree manslaughter of Desire Houvet and containing
notes indicating that defendant was acquitted); Affidavit of Detective Max F. Schmittburger,
Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Quinquinet, supra (stating that defendant wanted to end inti-
mate relations with her lover, Houvet, because her husband learned of illicit affair, but that
Houvet grabbed and insulted her); Done in Self-Defence, JOURNAL, May 1, 1883, microformed
on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 1 (reporting that Quinquinet was acquitted because
she killed illicit lover in self-defense).
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drunken, working-class man who fatally stabbed a male relative. 38 Thus,
the District Attorney's office rarely chose either second-degree murder
or manslaughter as a milder, non-capital charge for a female defendant.
By contrast, we will encounter a relatively large number of first-degree
murder cases involving women who killed; the vast majority of these
killings were of male spouses or lovers.
39
Under New York's criminal sentencing regime from 1880 to 1920,
the prosecutorial preference for murder indictments preserved the possi-
bility of very severe penalties for individuals who committed intimate
homicide. New York statutes provided for two degrees of murder.
40
First-degree murder carried a mandatory death sentence throughout the
period discussed in this article.41 In the 1880s and 1890s, life imprison-
ment was the required sentence for second-degree murder, which cov-
ered intentional but not premeditated or deliberate killings.42 By 1908,
the penalty for this crime had been changed to a prison sentence of no
fewer than twenty years and no more than the offender's natural life.
43
In contrast, penalties for lesser types of homicide ranged from a one-
thousand-dollar fine to as many as twenty years in prison.
44
38. In 1884, fish-seller Julius Hart got into a drunken quarrel with his brother and stabbed
him to death with a fish knife. See Indictment, People v. Hart, Folder 1533, Box 149, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1884) (recording that defendant was indicted and tried on second-
degree murder charges but convicted of first-degree manslaughter); Stabbed by his Brother,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1884, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll IA (re-
porting details of homicide). In the second case, Thomas Dunphy killed his brother-in-law,
Thomas Murphy, by breaking a glass pitcher over his head and cutting him with one of the
shards. See Indictment, People v. Dunphy, Folder 1859, Box 184, DA PAPERS, supra note I
(1885) (recording second-degree murder indictment and describing manner of killing); A Mur-
derer at Twenty, N.Y. HERALD, July 22, 1885, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2,
at Roll 2 (noting relationship between defendant and victim).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 93-96 and app. B. For Colorado murder cases
involving female defendants, see infra text accompanying notes 97-100 and app. E.
40. In New York, first-degree murder encompassed killings "from a deliberate and pre-
meditated design"; homicides evincing a "depraved mind, regardless of human life"; and kill-
ings perpetrated during the commission of a felony. See N.Y. PENAL LAW ch. 41, art. 94, §§
1044, 1046 (Cahill 1923); N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 183-184 (Parker 1908) (1881 N.Y. LAWS ch.
676, as amended by 1882-1908 N.Y. LAWS); N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4., ch. 1, tit. 1, § 5 (Throop
1882).
41. See N.Y. PENAL LAW ch. 41, art. 94, § 1045 (Cahill 1923); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 186
(Parker 1908) (1881 N.Y. LAWS ch. 676, as amended by 1882-1908 N.Y. LAWS); N.Y. REV.
STAT. pt. 4., ch. 1, tit. 1, § 1, 2 (Throop 1882).
42. See N.Y. REv. STAT. part 4, ch. 1, tit. 1, § 5 (Throop 1882); see also N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC., § 187 (Parker 1905) (1881 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 676, as amended by 1882-1905 N.Y.
Laws).
43. See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 187 (Parker 1908) (1881 N.Y. LAWS ch. 676, as amended by
1907 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 738).
44. See N.Y. PENAL LAW ch. 41, art. 94, §§ 1051, 1053 (Cahill 1923) (providing penal-
ties for manslaughter); N.Y. PENAL CODE, §§192, 202 (Parker 1908) (1881 N.Y. LAWS, as
amended by 1892 N.Y. LAWS ch. 662) (same); N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, §§
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Colorado's sentencing laws were not quite as draconian. Nonethe-
less, with the exception of a four-year period during which the death
penalty was abolished, murder charges still had the potential to result in
capital punishment in Colorado.45 Whereas a murder defendant might
face legal execution or a long prison term, the two forms of manslaughter
(voluntary and involuntary) carried much lighter penalties. 46 The Dis-
trict Attorney's office usually pursued tough charges in Denver between
1880 and 1920, where at least sixty-nine out of seventy-five intimate
homicide cases gleaned from detective Sam Howe's scrapbook and other
sources resulted in the filing of an information or indictment for "mur-
der," "murder in the first degree," or "murder in the second degree."
47
20-21 (Throop 1882) (same). In the early 1880s, the four degrees of manslaughter included
both inadvertent killings and killings committed in the heat of passion. See N.Y. REV. STAT.,
pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 6-19 (Throop 1882). In 1887, the definitions of first- and second-
degree manslaughter were altered so that the first-degree crime now encompassed heat-of-
passion killings done in a cruel or unusual manner or by a dangerous weapon; second-degree
manslaughter included killings done "[ln the heat of passion, but not by a dangerous weapon
or by the use of means either cruel or unusual;" and the other two degrees of manslaughter
were eliminated. See N.Y. PENAL CODE, §§ 189, 193 (Parker 1908) (1881 N.Y. LAWS ch.
676, as amended by 1887 N.Y. LAWS ch. 23). Prosecutors sometimes charged defendants un-
der the umbrella term "manslaughter," rather than specifying the degree. See, e.g., People v.
Caporella, Folder 648, Box 57, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1882).
45. Penalties for first-degree murder in Colorado fluctuated during the four decades dis-
cussed in this article from a mandatory death penalty in 1883, to a four-year period in which
the state abolished capital punishment, and, finally, to a choice on the part of the jury between
death and life imprisonment. For the mandatory death penalty provision, see COLO. GEN.
STAT., ch. 25, div. 4, § 709 (1883). For the repeal of the death penalty in 1897, see 1897 Colo.
Sess. Laws 135. The death penalty was restored in Colorado in 1901. See 1901 Colo. Sess.
Laws 154. Colorado statutes divided murder into two degrees, specifying similar elements to
those that appeared in the New York murder statute. The statutory provisions for first-degree
murder remained unchanged, with the exception of the penalty, from 1883 to 1921. See COLO.
GEN. STAT., ch. 25, div. 4, §§ 707-709 (1883); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 35-3-1622 to 1624
(1908); COLO. COMP. LAWS, ch. 153, div. 4, §§ 6663-6665 (1921).
46. Colorado statutes provided for voluntary manslaughter, which was a heat-of-passion
killing arising from provocation, and involuntary manslaughter, which encompassed uninten-
tional homicides. See COLO. GEN. STAT., ch. 25, div. 4, §§ 710-713 (1883); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 35-3-1625 to 1628 (1908); COLO. COMP. LAWS, ch. 153, div. 4, §§ 6666-6669
(1921). Punishments for manslaughter ranged from between one and eight years in the peni-
tentiary for voluntary manslaughter to a term not exceeding one year in county jail for involun-
tary manslaughter. These penalty provisions remained static over time. See COLO. GEN.
STAT., ch. 25, div. 4, § 714 (1883); COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-3-1629 (1908); COLO. COMP.
LAWS, ch. 153, div. 4, § 6670 (1921).
47. See infra app. E, F. Both men's and women's cases illustrate the tendency of Denver
prosecutors to use language in the information that made a first-degree murder conviction pos-
sible, but simply to designate the crime as "murder" on the coversheet. See, e.g., Information
(filed Sept. 19, 1902), People v. Edwards, No. 15649 (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct. 1902)
(charging male defendant with murder); Information (filed Sept. 10, 1913), People v. Pum-
phrey, No. 21565 (Denver County Dist. Ct. 1913) (charging female defendant with murder).
This practice seems to have been followed in the nineteenth century, as well as the early twen-
tieth. See, e.g., Information (filed July 30, 1892), People v. Butler, No. 8277 (Arapahoe
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Prosecutors seem to have reserved the manslaughter category for
cases in which they anticipated legal problems in proving intent to kill.
For example, twelve out of nineteen manslaughter indictments in New
York County from 1879 to 1893 targeted defendants who had beaten or
kicked their victims to death, whereas none involved the use of a gun.
48
The prevalence of weaponless homicides among intimate manslaughter
indictments likely stems from the fact that a jury could infer intent to kill
from the use of a firearm,49 whereas when the defendant pummeled an
intimate with his fists or feet, he might make a convincing argument that
corporal punishment inadvertently turned into homicide. Problems of
proof in fatal beating cases were exacerbated when the only witness to
the assault was a small, distraught child, such as little Norah Whitelaw,
who testified that her father beat her mother with a pair of shoes, 50 but
could not remember the precise date.
51
Moreover, as Roger Lane notes, juries might regard victims who
died from beatings or kickings as losers in a Darwinian lottery-weak or
degenerate individuals who succumbed when a stronger person would
have survived.52 In several cases, medical experts found that the victim
suffered a pre-existing condition that was the most direct cause of her
death. One decedent, Julia Weldon, had a brain tumor.53 Similarly, in
People v. Whitelaw, the prosecutor concluded that "the cerebral haem-
morrhage [sic] which was the cause of death was not produced or in-
duced by violence but was the result of a diseased condition of the
brain." 54 Some evidence of past beatings existed in these cases;
55 how-
County Dist. Ct. 1892). It was also prevalent in other cities, including Philadelphia. See
LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CITY, supra note 35, at 66.
48. See infra app. A.
49. See People v. Rogers, 13 Abb. Pr. 370, 371 (n.s.) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872) ("The infer-
ence of intent to kill is to be drawn by the jury from the facts of the case, and may arise from
the use of a deadly weapon, directed at a vital part of the body."). About half of all intimate
killers executed in New York County between 1880 and 1920 shot their victims with a gun.
Another ten cases involved killings committed with a knife, hatchet, or razor. Only one inti-
mate killer executed in New York City during this time period fatally beat the decedent. See
infra app. C. Data on New York state executions reveals a similar pattern. See infra app. D.
50. See Testimony of Norah Whitelaw, Coroner's Inquisition at 23-27, People v. White-
law, Folder 4049, Box 439, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891).
51. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Whitelaw, Folder 4049, Box 439, DA PAPERS,
supra note 1 (1891) (containing Assistant District Attorney's notation that "[tihe only witness
to the alleged assault is the daughter of defendant and deceased, a little girl scarcely old
enough or competent to testify and she is unable to the fix the date").
52. See LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CITY, supra note 35, at 66.
53. See Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Weldon, Folder 217, Box 17, DA PAPERS, supra
note 1 (1880).
54. Indictment Coversheet, People v. Whitelaw, Folder 4049, Box 439, DA PAPERS, su-
pra note 1 (1891).
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ever, the District Attorney's office ultimately decided to discharge both
defendants on the ground that causation could not be proved.
56
Many intimate homicides occurred in hard-drinking families in
which the victim habitually consumed liquor. In such cases, alcohol-
related problems of the liver and kidneys often loomed large in the coro-
ner's analysis. 57 Autopsies blaming the victim's death on her intemper-
ance reflected the Victorian tendency to link health with morality and to
appoint doctors as "moral monitors" of their patients' behavior. 58 Such
determinations did not go uncontested. For example, in one Colorado
case, a newspaper criticized Denver doctors for attributing a young
woman's "foul murder" to alcohol-related Bright's disease despite evi-
dence that her lover had kicked her to death.59 Yet, faced with an au-
55. For instance, Julia Weldon's son stated, "The prisoner was always abusing my
mother, knocking her about and kicking her." Unsigned Statement of George Heubich, Notes
on Facts, People v. Weldon, Folder 217, Box 17, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1880). See also
Affidavit of Alice Murphy, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Weldon, supra (reporting that
family friend had seen Julia Weldon with black eyes and lump on her head, which she (Julia
Weldon) attributed to beatings from Thomas Weldon). In the Whitelaw case, the victim's sis-
ter, Norah McCarthy, indicated that, on various occasions, she had witnessed Thomas White-
law attack his wife with a razor, a broomstick, and his feet. See Notes on Interview with
Norah McCarthy, People v. Whitelaw, Folder 4049, Box 439, DA PAPERS, supra note 1
(1891).
56. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Weldon, Folder 217, Box 17, DA PAPERS, su-
pra note 1 (1880) ("The cause of death of the [deceased] can't be traced to the agency of the
prisoner. I think he may be discharged on his own recognizance."); Indictment Coversheet,
People v. Whitelaw, Folder 4049, Box 439, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) ("[S]uch vio-
lence as is alleged to have been inflicted upon the deceased on March 13th cannot be consid-
ered as having accelerated her death. I therefore recommend the dismissal of the indictment
herein.").
57. See, e.g., Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Cometta, Folder 153, Box 12, DA PAPERS,
supra note 1 (1880) (stating that victim's "death was accelerated by her habits of intemper-
ance"); People v. Stewart, Folder 761, Box 68, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1882) (stating that
victim's death was "accelerated by the use of intoxicating liquors"). For a more detailed
analysis of two additional cases involving alcoholic victims, see People v. Whittel, Folder
3989, Box 432, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891), and People v. McLaughlin, Folder 3333,
Box 353, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1889) and text accompanying notes 65, 337-38, 348.
58. PETER N. STEARNS, BATTLEGROUND OF DESIRE: THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-
CONTROL IN MODERN AMERICA 60-61 (1999).
59. SHMB, supra note 23, at No. 760 (preserving newspaper article, Shame on Denver's
Chivalry to Women, GRAND JUNCTION SENTINEL, June 2, 1911). The newspaper opined:
It was a foul murder, a devilish deed, kicking to death this unprotected girl who fell
to the wiles of the bartender [Mike] Whalen and who repaid her love and devotion
by kicking her to death. It matters not who the physicians are who rendered such a
shameful verdict, let them be held up to the contempt of the people in their effort to
shield Whalen, for, if ever a man committed foul and brutal murder upon an inno-
cent young woman, this man Whalen did on the night of April 27 [1911], practically
kicking her to death, as she remained unconscious from the results of the booting he
gave her for thirty-two hours.
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topsy that did not clearly link the victim's death to the defendant's ac-
tions, prosecutors often refused to bring murder charges 60 and sometimes
even recommended dismissing the manslaughter indictments that they
obtained.
In People v. McLaughlin, for instance, the victim's alcohol-related
maladies, combined with her failure to perform her duties as wife and
mother, led to the dismissal of manslaughter charges against her hus-
band. 6 1 Witnesses testified that Bernard McLaughlin pushed his wife
Mary out of the apartment and dragged her across the yard.62 But Assis-
tant District Attorney Vernon Davis noted on the indictment coversheet:
"It cannot be made to appear that defendant inflicted the injuries from
which she died."' 63 He further implied that Bernard's good character and
his wife's drunken neglect of their four children posed insuperable hur-
dles to prosecution. 64 A woman like Mary McLaughlin made an unsym-
pathetic victim because she monstrously inverted the nineteenth-century
image of the wife as "guardian angel"-a pure, nurturing pillar of moral
strength upon whom a husband and his offspring could depend.6 5
Id. Interestingly, Roger Lane notes that Bright's Disease can be caused by either physical
trauma or alcohol abuse. See LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CITY, supra note 35, at 57.
60. In People v. Whittel, the District Attorney's office charged George Whittel with man-
slaughter, rather than with the first-degree murder of his wife, Catherine, whom he beat so
badly that he dislodged her eye from its socket. See Indictment, People v. Whittel, Folder
3989, Box 432, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) (charging Whittel with manslaughter in fatal
beating of his wife Catherine); Testimony of Julia Driscoll, Trial Transcript at 11, People v.
Whittel, supra (stating "[h]er face was black and her eye hanging on her cheek"). The autopsy
attributing Catherine's death to numerous ailments including "Bright's disease of the kidney
[and] fatty degeneration [and] enlargement of the liver, hastened by some external violence"
arguably precluded a first-degree murder charge. Autopsy, Coroner's Inquisition, People v.
Whittel, supra.
61. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. McLaughlin, Folder 3333, Box 353, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1889) (recording dismissal of case on May 9, 1889, and containing
prosecutor's notes explaining decision to dismiss); Coroner's Inquisition, People v. McLaugh-
lin, supra (attributing Mary's death to "Fatty Degeneration of the Liver and Chronic Bright's
Disease, accelerated by injuries received at the hands of her husband."); Affidavit by Defen-
dant, People v. McLaughlin, supra (alleging that "frequently upon deponent's return home at
night from his work he would find [Mary] helplessly drunk and his house and children aban-
doned and neglected").
62. See Testimony of Mary E. Anthony, Mary O'Donnell, Rosanna Cunningham, and
Peter Cunningham, Coroner's Inquisition at 1-4, People v. McLaughlin, Folder 3333, Box
253, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1889). The defendant admitted to dragging his wife, but
claimed that he was "exasperated at her misconduct." Affidavit By Defendant, People v.
Mclaughlin, supra.
63. Indictment Coversheet, People v. McLaughlin, Folder 3333, Box 353, DA PAPERS,
supra note 1 (1889).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD: TRANSFORMATIONS IN
MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA 107 (1990) (describing men's
images of women in nineteenth century).
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However, while extra-legal gender norms played some role in
charging decisions, prosecutors usually brought murder charges against
people who killed their intimates, even if the victims drank, were sexu-
ally unfaithful, or neglected gender-specific duties like breadwinning or
child care.66 Moreover, appellate courts supported such prosecutorial
decisions, especially in cases where juries convicted men. For instance,
the New York Court of Appeals reminded Richard Leach, who was sen-
tenced to death for the fatal stabbing of his inebriated lover: "That the
defendant may have been influenced to the commission of his atrocious
crime by resentment at the woman's habits of drunkenness and immoral-
ity, does not tend to relieve the case of its brutal features."
67
Of course, defendants could claim provocation, self-defense, or in-
sanity, but prosecutors usually left such strategies to opposing counsel.
68
As we shall see, despite public criticism of prosecutors for being soft on
crime, 69 leniency toward female defendants in intimate homicide cases
more often came from juries than from the District Attorney's office.
This article does not suggest that prosecutorial charging decisions
were sound. Indeed, a one-size-fits-all approach that designated the ma-
jority of intimate homicides as "murder" may have resulted in over-
punishment in some cases, and under-punishment in others, where
muddy issues of causation or intent prompted prosecutors to avoid risk-
ing embarrassment at trial. Nor does this article contend that the District
Attorney's office followed an idealistic agenda. As I have argued else-
where, prosecutors brought severe charges against intimate killers be-
cause they perceived trying such cases to be more feasible and less po-
litically dangerous than fighting against public corruption or attempting
to quell street violence perpetrated by powerful gangs.70 By prosecuting
66. See infra text accompanying notes 67, 74-78, 132-34, 255-56, 271-78.
67. People v. Leach, 40 N.E. 865, 867 (1895) (affirming capital conviction of Richard
Leach).
68. The New York County records do contain a few cases in which prosecutors incorpo-
rated a provocation or self-defense analysis into their charging decisions. For example, when
seeking a first-degree manslaughter indictment against Richard Scanlan for throwing a lighted
oil lamp at his wife, the District Attorney's office may have considered that Scanlan found his
wife in his brother's bed. See Indictment, People v. Scanlan, Folder 4369, Box 477, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1892) (charging Scanlan with first-degree manslaughter for burning
death of his wife); Affidavit of Officer Samuel H. Waitzfelder, Coroner's Inquisition, People
v. Scanlan, supra (stating that Scanlan said "he found his wife in his brother's bed with his
brother"); Unsigned Statement of Richard Scanlan, Police Court Records, People v. Scanlan,
supra ("I found her in bed with my brother."). Nevertheless, prosecutors typically left such
defenses for the defendant's lawyer to make.
69. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1336-38.
70. See id. at 1369-73, 1388-91, 1392. Cf Allen Steinberg, The "Lawman" in New
York: William Travers Jerome and the Origins of the Modern District Attorney in Turn-of-the-
Century New York, 34 U. TOL. L. REv. 753, 754-55 (2003) (arguing that New York District
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criminals who lacked ties to the political machine, District Attorneys in
New York City and Denver sought to adopt legal strategies that appeased
public demands for tough law enforcement.
71
The choice of intimate killers seemed like a safe one. Prosecutors
undoubtedly believed that bringing severe charges against such defen-
dants would be palatable to the public because these charges harmonized
with social values urging both sexes to display self-restraint and civility
in the domestic sphere. 72 However, sometimes the District Attorney's
office miscalculated, as the discussion of women accused of first-degree
murder will show.
C. Jury Verdicts, Paternalism, and Leniency Toward Female
Defendants
1. Expanding Time Frames to Acquit Abused Women
When twenty-year-old Pasqualina Robertiello shot Nicolo Pierro on
March 2, 1891, 73 she carried Pierro's future child in her womb. 74 Testi-
mony at the coroner's inquisition focused on her excited and nervous
Attorneys prior to 1900 were "machine loyalists" who furthered "the private ends of Tammany
[Hall] and its members"). In Denver, as in New York City, corruption, vote-buying, and even
armed conflict characterized the political process in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. See STEPHEN J. LEONARD & THOMAS J. NOEL, DENVER: MINING CAMP TO
METROPOLIS 70-71, 106-07, 132-36 (1990). Political accountability remained an elusive
ideal in Denver in part because governors and legislators directly controlled various municipal
bureaus and made alliances with the providers of electric, gas, and tram services. See CARL
UBBELOHDE, MAXINE BENSON, & DUANE A. SMITH, A COLORADO HISTORY 274 (1973).
71. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1355, 1380, 1391-92.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 106-09, 123-27, 241-52. Although civility was
often associated with public interactions, or with etiquette observed when visiting close friends
and acquaintances, conduct manuals also emphasized the importance of good manners and
self-control among family members. One author reminded her readers, for example:
Good manners, it has been said, are too often a cloak that is flung aside like a bur-
den, as soon as the threshold of the home is crossed. Yet, surely there is no spot on
earth, where kindness and consideration for others-the foundation of etiquette-
are better displayed, or more appreciated ....
MARY SIMMERSON LOGAN, THE HOME MANUAL: EVERYBODY'S GUIDE IN SOCIAL,
DOMESTIC, AND BUSINESS LIFE 21 (1889).
73. See Indictment, People v. Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA PAPERS, supra note
1 (1891); see also Affidavit of Pasqualina Robertiello, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Rober-
tiello, supra (containing defendant's statement as to her age); Shot Her Lover Twice, MAIL
AND EXPRESS, March 2, 1891, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 10 (re-
porting that Robertiello shot "faithless lover" with pistol).
74. See Loath to be Jurymen, WORLD, May 19, 1891, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK,
supra note 2, at Roll 11.
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state, as well as her fixed, staring eyes at the time of the shooting. 75 The
coroner's jury found that Robertiello killed Pierro, a blacksmith who was
seven years her senior,76 "while laboring under temporary aberration of
the mind."'77 Nevertheless, the District Attorney's office charged her
with first-degree murder, and a grand jury returned an indictment on
March 11, 1891.78
Newspapers hanging on every detail of the sensational case reported
that "[t]he selection of the jury was slow work."'79 Defense attorneys
weeded out talesmen who held prejudices against Italians, while prosecu-
tors attempted to eliminate those who "would hesitate to bring in a ver-
dict against a woman under such circumstances as surrounded the
case." 80 After interviewing forty potential jurors on May 18, the lawyers
only managed to find three "who felt sure that they could view the evi-
dence dispassionately." 81 Indeed, the World speculated that "it would
probably take three days to fill the jury box, the talesmen evinced so
manifest a reluctance to sit in judgment upon the pitiful ruined little
woman at bar."
'82
At trial, the defense lawyer outlined a web of falsehood emanating
from the seducer's family and argued that Robertiello suffered from tem-
porary insanity precipitated by her agonizing circumstances. 83 There
was no question that she fired the fatal shots at Pierro: two eyewitnesses
saw her do so, and Pierro identified her as the killer in his dying declara-
tion.84 Nevertheless, a "big crowd of people in the courtroom rose to
75. See Testimony of Pasqualo Padulo, Coroner's Inquisition at 10, People v. Robertiello,
Folder 3975, Box 431, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891).
76. See Indictment, People v. Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA PAPERS, supra note
1 (1891) (indicting defendant for pistol shooting of Pierro); Coroner's Inquisition, People v.
Robertiello, supra (noting that Pierro was twenty-seven years old); Loath to be Jurymen, supra
note 74 (reporting that Pierro was prosperous blacksmith who emigrated to America and that
Robertiello followed him to New York, based on his promises to marry her).
77. Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA PAPERS, su-
pra note 1 (1891). See Charged with Murder, supra note 4.
78. See Indictment, People v. Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA PAPERS, supra note
1 (1891).
79. Charged with Murder, supra note 4.
80. Id.
81. Loath to be Jurymen, supra note 74.
82. Id.
83. See Insanity Will Be the Plea, PRESS, May 23, 1891, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 11 (describing defense strategy); see also Pasqualina Ac-
quitted, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 28, 1891, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at
Roll 11 (same).
84. See Insanity Will Be the Plea, supra note 83; see also Antemortem Statement of
Nicolo Pierro, Antemortem Inquisition, People v. Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) ("Pasqualina Robertiello came behind me and shot me in the
back."); Testimony of Officer Patrick Corcoran, Coroner's Inquisition at 2, People v. Rober-
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their feet and cheered" when the jury announced on May 27 that Rober-
tiello was not guilty.
85
While the defendant formally relied on an insanity defense, news-
paper editorials and other cultural evidence surrounding the case suggest
that her acquittal stemmed from norms that condemned Pierro for deceiv-
ing and dishonoring her, rather than from careful analysis of whether her
mental state corresponded to the legal definition of insanity. Accounts of
Robertiello's betrothal conjured a pastoral romance set in old Italy;
sparks from Pierro's anvil corresponded to "the sparks of love which
burned within his breast."' 86 This romance turned into a tragedy of epic
proportions when Pierro-"intoxicated by his success" in the New
World-ravished and then "grew weary of the girl."'87 Journalistic narra-
tives of Robertiello's seduction, pregnancy, and descent into murder con-
sistently depicted her as a naive girl-"half child, half woman." 88 At the
same time, they vilified the "dirty dog," Pierro, who would not have died
young if he had honored his engagement to his sweetheart. 89 One writer
even justified the murder under natural law, contending that:
Certainly she killed the man, and she should have killed the man.
According to the strict letter of the law the little girl was guilty of
murder in the first degree, but according to the broad tenets of that
high law by which communities are guided and nations governed, she
was as guiltless as the purest angel floating above in the ambient air.
Suppose that jury had brought in a verdict of murder in the first de-
gree, or any other degree. How the community would have risen as
one man to protest against such barbarism, such cruelty-aye, such
infamy.90
This commentator criticized the District Attorney for bringing
Robertiello to trial, arguing that prosecutorial insensitivity toward
"common sense and public opinion and human nature" resulted in harm
tiello, supra ("I saw her then when I got there fire a shot... I kept running hard and.. . when
I was within five or six feet she fired another shot at him .... "); Testimony of Pasqualo Pa-
dulo, Coroner's Inquisition at 7, People v. Robertiello, supra ("I seen the shooting; this lady
was shooting the man.").
85. Pasqualina Acquitted, supra note 83.
86. Loath to be Jurymen, supra note 74.
87. Id.
88. Id. (also referring to defendant as "[t]he childish prisoner").
89. A Good Square Look at New York's District Attorney, supra note 5. See Loath to be
Jurymen, supra note 74 ("If Pierro had married Pasquinelina [sic] at once he would doubtless
be alive to-day, and his little sweetheart would be as free as when they played together under
the skies of Sicily.").
90. A Good Square Look at New York's District Attorney, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
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to defendants even if juries refused to convict. 91 Indeed, he concluded,
the District Attorney's outrageous presumption that Robertiello was
guilty until proven innocent demonstrated that "[t]he whole system needs
revision."
92
Table 1: Women Accused of Intimate Homicide in
New York County, 1879-1893
Outcomes Number
Acquittals 8
Manslaughter Convictions/Guilty Pleas 4
1st Degree Murder Convictions 1
2nd Degree Murder Convictions I




The outcome of the Robertiello case was not unusual. From 1879 to
1893, prosecutors obtained thirty-one first-degree murder indictments
against female defendants in New York County. Fourteen of these were
intimate killings, not counting infanticides. The vast majority of the
murdered intimates-eleven out of fourteen-were the male spouse or
lover of the defendant. 93 Only three cases involved a woman's killing of
her children.94 Trial juries ultimately acquitted seven of the fourteen fe-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See infra app. B.
94. For the child killings, see Indictment, People v. McCluskey, Folder 1755, Box 173,
DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1885); Indictment, People v. Lebkuchner, Folder 2924, Box 304,
DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1888); Indictment, People v. Kom, Folder 4780, Box 525, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1893). See also infra app. B.
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male defendants who allegedly murdered intimates. 95 Four of these ac-
quittals rested on insanity grounds.
96






1 st Degree Murder Convictions 1
2 nd Degree Murder Convictions 1
Court Ordered Dismissal 1






Acquittal rates for female defendants accused of murder in Denver
were similarly high. Research for this article unearthed twenty-seven
cases involving Denver women who allegedly killed intimates between
1880 and 1920; all of the victims, except one, were husbands or male
lovers. 97 In more than half of these cases, juries acquitted the defen-
95. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. McCluskey, Folder 1755, Box 173, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1885) (recording that defendant was acquitted of murder); Indictment
Coversheet, People v. Lessmann, Folder 1811, Box 179, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1885)
(same); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Lebkuchner, Folder 2924, Box 304, DA PAPERS,
supra note 1 (1888) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Cordes, Folder 3252, Box 345,
DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1889) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Nelson, Folder
3949, Box 428, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v.
Robertiello, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) (same); Indictment
Coversheet, People v. Kom, Folder 4780, Box 525, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1893) (same).
See also infra app. B.
96. The insanity acquittals occurred in the McCluskey, Robertiello, Lebkuchner, and Korn
cases. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. McCluskey, Folder 1755, Box 173, DA PAPERS,
supra note 1 (1885) (noting that defendant was "[t]ried and [a]cquitted on the ground of
[i]nsanity" at time of commission of offense); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Lebkuchner,
Folder 2929, Box 304, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1889) (same); Indictment Coversheet, Peo-
ple v. Kom, Folder 4780, Box 525, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1893) (same); Pasqualina Ac-
quitted, supra note 83 (indicating that Robertiello was acquitted on grounds of temporary in-
sanity). See also infra app. B.
97. See infra app. E. Ida Mercer was convicted of first-degree murder for killing her son-
in-law. See infra text accompanying notes 146, 154-55 (discussing Mercer case).
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dant.98 Five others resulted in no charge at all, a nolle prosequi, a court-
ordered dismissal, or a refusal by the grand jury to indict.99 The trial
jury returned a guilty verdict in only eight cases, six of which resulted in
convictions for less serious offenses than murder.
100
Although jurors may have demonstrated special solicitude toward
Pasqualina Robertiello due to her youth and beauty, 10 1 difficulty empan-
elling a neutral jury afflicted other murder cases featuring female defen-
dants. For example, when Johanna Lessmann was tried in New York
City for poisoning her third husband, the Morning Journal reported:
"Some time was consumed in getting a jury, many of those summoned
having the usual scruples about the death penalty, especially in the case
of a woman."
102
Once empanelled, juries in both Denver and New York City often
proved inclined to distinguish between their own values and the legal
rules imposed upon them by the court. They rendered verdicts that justi-
fied the killing of "bad" men by "wronged" women, even when the facts
of the case did not comport with self-defense, provocation, or insanity
doctrines. 103 Moreover, such verdicts were based on consideration of an
expanded context or time frame around the killing that anticipated some
aspects of the battered woman's syndrome defense. Several scholars
discuss insanity acquittals in women's cases, but juries' tendency to take
98. See infra app. E.
99. See id.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 146, 154-56 (discussing the only two Denver
cases resulting in murder convictions).
101. See Loath to be Jurymen, supra note 74.
102. Borgia in Widow's Weeds, MORNING J., Oct. 16, 1885, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 2. Lessmann claimed that her hard-drinking mate commit-
ted suicide during an episode of depression over business setbacks, and she ultimately pre-
vailed. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Lessmann, Folder 1811, Box 179, DA PAPERS,
supra note 1 (1885) (recording Lessmann's acquittal on October 16, 1885); On Trial for Mur-
der, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1885, microforned on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 2 (de-
scribing defense theory). However, in Lessmann's case (unlike Robertiello's), the prosecutor
conceded the inappropriateness of a conviction after the defendant testified, and the judge in-
structed the jury that, "although a chain of suspicious circumstances had been woven around
the prisoner ... there was no evidence that she had administered the poison." No Poison in
His Potion, MORNING J., Oct. 17, 1885, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at
Roll 2. Doing as they were told, the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty." Id. Few cases rep-
licated the harmony among judge, prosecutor, and jury (not to mention the procedure used) in
acquitting Johanna Lessmann.
103. Although judges typically served as the mouthpieces of legal doctrine, newspaper
accounts occasionally offered glimpses of judges' less formalistic side. The New York Daily
Tribune described the reaction from the bench to the acquittal of Pasqualina Robertiello:
"Judge Van Brunt, who usually insists upon preserving perfect decorum in the court over
which he presides did not even rap for order [to quiet the cheering crowd]. He even smiled as
if he were pleased at both the verdict and the demonstration." Pasqualina Acquitted, supra
note 83.
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the history of the relationship into account, rather than focusing narrowly
on the incident during which the homicide occurred, and to blame male
victims for failing to meet standards of manliness has gone largely unno-
ticed. 10
4
This sympathy for female defendants in the late 1800s and early
1900s is all the more notable, considering that at English common law,
mitigating doctrines often embodied biases against women. For exam-
ple, under the early law of manslaughter, one of the chief provocation
categories-adultery-was defined to protect a husband's exclusive sex-
ual access to his wife without reproaching a man's infidelity toward his
spouse or lover. 105 Despite the sexist pedigree of criminal doctrines bor-
rowed from England, however, American cases from the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries reveal a shift towards the condemnation of
men who abused or abandoned female intimates and corresponding leni-
ency toward women who killed abusive men. This article contends that
such legal outcomes owed much to prescriptive notions of manliness.
In the mid-nineteenth century, influential social values, especially
among the middle-class, associated manliness with sobriety, industry,
and control over the passions. These ideals of male self-restraint came
under attack toward the end of the nineteenth century, when American
men increasingly were urged to embrace their animal instincts in sports,
sex, and battle. 10 6 Nevertheless, at least up to 1920, the model white
man remained protective of women and displayed reverence for their
104. For instance, Evan Stark states that "[t]he insanity defense was premised on the
stereotypical belief that aggression and violence were unnatural in women." Evan Stark, Re-
presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB.
L. REV. 973, 994 (1995). However, he also contends: "In homicide cases, fearing that prose-
cutors would use evidence of abuse to establish motive, female defendants often hid extensive
histories of injury and suffering." Id. at 986. By focusing solely on the insanity defense, he
misses instances in which courts and juries recognized women's self-defense arguments based
on past abuse. For examples of such cases, see infra text accompanying notes 132-44.
105. Under early modem English law, "adultery" was defined as sex with a married
woman. A married man did not commit adultery if he had sex with a single female. This
definition influenced not only the provocation doctrine, but also seventeenth-century English
and colonial laws that made a married woman's sexual transgressions punishable by death.
See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Sex and Social Order: The Selective Enforcement of Colonial Ameri-
can Adultery Laws in the English Context, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191, 207 (1998). Cf LEE,
supra note 10, at 22 (noting sex bias in early provocation doctrine but too hastily generalizing
her comments to legal outcomes in American cases during nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
106. See GAIL BEDERMAN, MANLINESS AND CIVILIZATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
GENDER AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1917 at 217-39 (1995); see also JOHN
DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 60 (1986) (commenting on increased exaltation of men's "animal energy" in late
Victorian America); ROTUNDO, supra note 65, at 222-46 (making similar observations).
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presumptively greater moral purity. 10 7 He used his aggressive impulses
to conquer beasts, other races, and even white male rivals, but he did not
use violence against females. 10 8 A man who beat a woman, or ruined
her to satisfy his lust, indulged in primal behavior unchecked by the tem-
pering hand of civilization. He failed in his duty to be the protector of
women and children and was thus a wholly "uncivilized" man, rather
than a hero to be celebrated. 109 Such beliefs were, of course, prescrip-
tive ideals that did not reflect the realities of many intimate relationships.
Yet, I will argue that when these societal standards conflicted with the
formal law, juries often took a different course than that suggested to
them by the court, exonerating women to whom no formal defense doc-
trine seemed to apply.
For example, in People v. Gordon, a Denver judge instructed that
"alleged insulting language and alleged vile and ... brutal conduct" by
the victim toward the defendant did not legally justify or excuse mur-
der. 110 Nevertheless, jurors seem to have sympathized with Beatrice
Gordon, a domestic servant who became the lover of her abusive em-
ployer, William Shirey. 111 Despite evidence that Gordon shot Shirey to
death and then fled by train,1 12 the jury acquitted her.1 13 Willingness to
consider past history between Gordon and Shirey in the context of a self-
defense theory, despite the court's instructions, paralleled the appeal of
an extended time period in excusing Pasqualina Robertiello's killing of
her lover. In jurors' eyes, murder cases involving seduction, which was
a crime in the late nineteenth century, 114 called for the same results as
those centering on physical abuse. Paternalistic attitudes militated
against punishing lethal violence by a woman that arose from either a
man's physical or his emotional maltreatment of her.
107. See DEMOS, supra note 106, at 32, 49; STEVEN MINTZ, A PRISON OF EXPECTATIONS:
THE FAMILY IN VICTORIAN CULTURE 33, 143 (1983).
108. Cf BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 227-30 (locating new image of masculinity in Ed-
gar Rice Burrough's character Tarzan, who rescues Jane from the ape that abducts her and then
suppresses his own apelike desire to rape her); Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22,
at 1371-73, 1379-81, 1386-87 (arguing that public admiration for bravado of men who killed
male rivals made prosecuting such cases more difficult than seeking conviction of reviled in-
timate murderers). For a discussion of how Theodore Roosevelt embodied these norms, see
infra text accompanying notes 239-43, 323.
109. See BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 25.
110. Jury Instructions (filed Feb. 17, 1908), People v. Gordon, No. 18325 (Denver County
Dist. Ct. 1908).
111. See SHMB, supra note 23, at No. 236.
112. See id. (stating that "Miss Gordon left on train for Lafayette" after shooting Shirey).
See also Jury Instructions, People v. Gordon, No. 18325 (instructing jury that defendant's
flight was factor to consider).
113. See Verdict (filed Feb. 17, 1908), People v. Gordon, No. 18325.
114. See Ireland, supra note 9, at 109.
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Extra-legal norms might also excuse killings that could not be justi-
fied. The flip side of the ideal woman's moral strength was her weak-
ness, which inhered not only in her lack of physical power, but also in a
"dependence [that] appeals to all that is generous and chivalrous and ten-
der in [a man's] nature." 115 A woman needed someone to provide for
her, both socio-economically and reproductively. Without proper provi-
sion, her "natural" tendency towards emotion and bouts of hysteria" 16
might topple over the brink into insanity. The image of an unfortunate
woman driven mad by hardship and maltreatment at the hands of a man
thus exerted a powerful influence upon jury verdicts. However, while
many observers deemed the killing of an abusive husband or lover to be
justified, the exculpation of female defendants who murdered their chil-
dren typically required an insanity theory.
Insanity arguments often saved female defendants from punishment
in child-killing cases, especially if the defense was paired with a wrench-
ing story of hardship and abuse by a male relative. For example, Wil-
helmine Lebkuchner-a widow who killed two of her small children by
putting rat poison in their tea-claimed that her wealthy in-laws had dis-
owned her, forcing her to take in laundry and cook meals at a brothel to
support her sons. 117 In particular, she vilified her brother-in-law. She
alleged that he turned her husband against her and that, after she became
a widow, he tried to get the children removed from her care.11 8 Her pur-
ported motive for murder was her fear that the Society for Prevention of
Cruelty to Children would take the boys because she could not provide
for them properly. 119 Even though Lebkuchner apparently appreciated
the wrongfulness of her act and asked to "get the highest sentence possi-
115. ROTUNDO, supra note 65, at 106 (quoting Cosmopolitan article from 1901).
116. See, e.g., Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and Role Con-
flict in Nineteenth Century, in DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA 215 (1985) (discussing parallels between symptoms of hysteria and features of mid-
dle-class woman's role in nineteenth century).
117. See Affidavit of Wilhelmine Lebkuchner, Coroner's Inquisition at 4-5, People v.
Lebkuchner, Folder 2924, Box 304, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1888); see also Poison Her
Only Hope, N.Y. STAR, March 26, 1889, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at
Roll 5 (repeating Lebkuchner's story with details about her in-laws' allegedly cruel behavior);
Thinks She Did her Duty, N.Y. HERALD, March 26, 1889, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK,
supra note 2, at Roll 5 (same).
118. See Poison Her Only Hope, supra note 117. In contrast, at least one newspaper took
the in-laws' side, reporting that Lebkuchner was a woman of dubious moral character, who
married a wealthy brewer for his money and then drove him away with her "unbearable dispo-
sition." Poisoned by the Mother, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., March 25, 1888, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 5.
119. See Affidavit of Wilhelmine Lebkuchner, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Lebku-
chner, Folder 2924, Box 304, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1888).
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ble," 120 the defense produced experts opining that she was insane. 12 1 Ju-
rors seemed eager to believe the insanity theory, rather than to view the
defendant as a cold, calculating monster that poisoned her sons to get rid
of hungry mouths. The jury verdict showed compassion for Lebkuchner
and spared her life; nevertheless, her sympathizers partially discredited
her story (as opposed to her male lawyer's argument) about the poison-
ing incident by denying her rationality. 1
22
This tendency to excuse, rather than justify, child-killing may have
been related to changing social roles for mothers and children. Starting
in the nineteenth century, Americans of all social classes began to value
children as precious, innocent individuals, instead of miniature adults
123
or economic assets. 124 Alternate modes of correction, including shaming
and psychological coercion, were increasingly viewed as preferable to
whipping. 125 Private societies turned their attention to the abuse and ne-
glect of children by impoverished or violent parents. 126 At the same
time, the increasing separation of the home from commerce and politics
heightened women's responsibility to nurture the next generation.
127
Various authorities, including ministers and medical doctors, stressed
that motherhood was a woman's destiny and accorded the mother the
primary role in the upbringing of her offspring. 128 Given these prescrip-
tive norms, a woman who killed her children could not hope to claim
moral legitimacy for her actions. The insanity defense offered the only
120. Id.
121. See Judge's Charge at 9-11, People v. Lebkuchner, Folder 2924, Box 304, DA
PAPERS, supra note 1 (1888) (summarizing defense evidence of Lebkuchner's insanity).
122. See Thinks She Did her Duty, supra note 117.
123. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 66-85 (1980).
124. Cf Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV.
2401, 2407 & n.17 (1995) (citing JOHN J. DEMPSEY, THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 3
(1981)); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1037-47 (1992).
125. See DEGLER, supra note 123, at 90-100; DEMOS, supra note 106, at 14; GORDON,
supra note 11, at 33; MINTZ, supra note 10, at 33-38.
126. See GORDON, supra note 11, at 46-52 (describing activities of Massachusetts Society
for Prevention of Cruelty to Children in 1870s and 1880s). Cf PLECK, supra note 11, at 85
(stating that such anti-cruelty societies often fell short of their goals of rescuing physically
abused children).
127. See DEGLER, supra note 123, at 73 ("The domestic role of women, which we have
been calling the separation of the spheres, went hand-in-hand with the new conception of chil-
dren as precious, and different from adults."); DEMOS, supra note 106, at 49 (making similar
observations).
128. See DEGLER, supra note 123, at 55, 77.
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avenue to exculpation, unless she successfully depicted the homicide as
an accident. 
129
Two versions of the "wronged" woman trope thus tended to lead to
acquittal: the wronged woman who avenged herself against a deceitful,
abusive male and the wronged woman who inflicted insane violence on
an innocent victim. Defense attorneys often blended these two images.
They characterized their female clients as weak and hysterical to gener-
ate sympathy for them, even when the women's homicidal acts seemed
to have some moral legitimacy. For instance, the celebrated trial lawyer,
William F. Howe, referred to one defendant as "this little bundle of
nerves sitting here, a poor, frail, fragile little thing, not a tithe of the
woman she was" before the deceased allegedly drugged, raped, and ru-
ined her. 130
When accused women took the witness stand, as they did in many
of the cases analyzed in this article, 13 1 they also made use of stock narra-
tives about their victimization by degenerate and brutal men. People v.
Nelson132 provides an example. The New York press and the jury-so
often unanimous in their sympathy for female defendants-disagreed
over the fate of Ella Nelson, who was accused of the first-degree murder
of her lover, Samuel Post. Post and the defendant had been living to-
gether for several years when Post, who was married to another woman,
decided to leave the defendant and "lead a decent life." 133 Prosecutors
129. For a discussion of a New York law excusing the accidental homicide of disobedient
children during lawful correction, see infra text accompanying note 217.
130. Statement of William F. Howe, Coroner's Inquisition at 6, People v. Southworth,
Folder 3505, Box 375, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1889). For more on the Southworth case,
see infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
131. See, e.g., People v. Barbieri, 43 N.E. 635, 636 (N.Y. 1896) ("The defendant was
sworn as a witness in her own behalf, and it is from her statement alone that we are enabled to
obtain any clear or connected view of the circumstances and events which preceded and pro-
duced the tragedy."); People v. Cignarale, 17 N.E. 135, 137 (N.Y. 1888) (recounting testimony
of defendant Chiara Cignarale); No Poison in his Potion, supra note 10 (reporting that Johanna
Lessmann testified to her husband's suicidal tendencies); Ella Nelson is Not Guilty, N.Y.
RECORDER, June 20, 1891, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 11 (stating
that Ella Nelson gave her evidence "in a low voice, but quite clearly"); Annie Walden Con-
victed, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1892, microforned on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 12
(indicating that Annie Walden took the witness stand); Mrs. Dunne's Story Told, N.Y.
HERALD, March 16, 1894, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 16 (report-
ing that Mary Dunne told her own story at trial).
132. Folder 3949, Box 428, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891).
133. Antemortem Statement of Samuel Post, Antemortem Inquisition, People v. Nelson,
Folder 3949, Box 428, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891). See Unsigned Statement of Nathan
Michaels, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Nelson, supra ("He said he had a good position
down town and as he wanted to lead a straight life he had made up his mind to leave Ella.");
Ella's Shot was Fatal, PRESS, Feb. 21, 1891, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2,




contended that Nelson planned for months to avenge the separation and
that her remorse at Post's death did not negate evidence that she pre-
meditated the killing.134 In contrast, Nelson depicted herself as an hon-
est widow to whom Post lied about his marital status and whom he aban-
doned for the company of other females besides his wife. The defense
centered on the theory that Post was killed with a bullet from his own
gun, which accidentally discharged during a struggle that he started.
135
Several newspapers expressed surprise at Nelson's unanimous ac-
quittal, 136 and the Times snidely commented that the jury was only "an
average one as to intelligence."']37 However, despite receiving some bad
press, Nelson successfully employed the wronged woman narrative to
cast her victim as a deceitful adulterer and an aggressive male who "of-
ten threatened her with ... [the] pistol."'1 38 Her case and others like it
thus demonstrated the potential of stereotypical images to benefit an in-
dividual female defendant, even if they subordinated and proved delete-
rious to women in the long run.
Although the bench and the jury sometimes disagreed about
women's cases, appellate opinions reveal that compassion for abused
females had also begun to influence judicial thinking. Indeed, in several
cases, judges gave the wronged woman narrative legal legitimacy by
emphasizing the appropriateness of admitting past-abuse evidence at
trial. In People v. Taylor, for example, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed the first-degree murder conviction of Kate Taylor, who alleg-
edly shot her husband and decapitated him with an axe.139 The opinion
stated that evidence of prior domestic violence should have been admit-
ted to corroborate the defendant's testimony that "she had reason to ap-
prehend great bodily harm" as she struggled with her husband for pos-
session of a pistol.140 Explaining the ruling, the court suggested that, if
jurors had known about the previous violent conduct of the deceased,
they might have exonerated Taylor completely on self-defense grounds:
[Flor the trial judge to have excluded evidence proving or tending to
prove previous violent conduct of the deceased towards the defen-
134. See Ella Nelson is Not Guilty, supra note 131.
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., More Than She Hoped For, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1891, microformed on
DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 11 ("A verdict of manslaughter was as much as Mrs.
Nelson dared hope fore [sic]."); Acquitted of Murder, Mrs. Nelson Swoons, N.Y. HERALD,
June 20, 1891, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 11 ("The verdict was
received with amazement by every one who heard it.").
137. More Than She Hoped For, supra note 136.
138. Ella Nelson is Not Guilty, supra note 131.
139. 69 N.E. 534, 535, 538 (1904).
140. Id. at 537.
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dant, and his threats against her, or his attempts to take her life upon
other occasions, was an error gravely prejudicial to her defense be-
cause it deprived her of the right to have competent testimony in her
favor considered by the jury. 1
41
Comparable reasoning extended to sexually or emotionally abusive
behavior by a male decedent. For example, in one New York County
case, the appellate court explicitly stated that a longer time frame was
necessary to ascertain Maria Barbieri's state of mind when she cut her
lover's throat in a saloon. 142 Reversing her first-degree murder convic-
tion because the trial judge erroneously excluded corroborating evidence
of her seduction and alleged rape by the deceased, the New York Court
of Appeals stated:
The condition of the defendant's mind was not to be ascertained
solely from what took place in the saloon at the time of the homicide.
The relations of the parties which preceded it were competent for the
consideration of the jury, since they were connected with the tragedy
and were of such a nature and character as to produce a powerful in-
fluence upon the mind when recalled at the moment that the defen-
dant heard the final refusal of the deceased [to marry her], expressed
as it was in the most insulting and provoking language. 143
In an atmosphere charged with feminist allegations that the criminal
justice system discriminated against women, Barbieri stood trial for a
second time and was acquitted. 144 Thus, nineteenth-century activists'
claims of a double standard making it more difficult for female murder
defendants to be found "not guilty" appear overstated when they are
viewed in the light of Barbieri's exoneration and the acquittal of other
women accused of intimate murder during roughly the same time period.
141. Id. The Taylor court further noted: "The case of People v. Druse ... is authority for
the proposition, simply, that a defendant, after giving evidence that the homicide was commit-
ted in self-defense, may follow it by proof of the general reputation of the deceased for quar-
relsomeness and violence." Id. at 538. Although Roxalana Druse received capital punish-
ment, see infra text accompanying note 153, language from her case was invoked to spare
Kate Taylor. Id. (reversing Taylor's conviction and ordering new trial).
142. People v. Barbieri, 43 N.E. 635, 638 (N.Y. 1896).
143. Id. at 638. Marie Barbieri alleged that "the deceased had intercourse with... [her]
by means of either force or fraud" and that he used some violent means to intimidate her into
co-habiting with him. Id. at 637.
144. See Ireland, supra note 9, at 102.
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2. Lesser-Included Offense Convictions
Not all female defendants of dubious respectability fared as well at
trial as Ella Nelson, the New York widow acquitted of murdering her
married lover. 145 In Denver between 1880 and 1920, at least eight
women were convicted of some kind of criminal homicide in an intimate
context 146 and in my sub-sample of New York City cases from 1879 to
1893, six women were found guilty of such crimes.147 Even the jury that
ultimately acquitted Pasqualina Robertiello deliberated for five hours and
"sent a message to Judge Van Brunt wanting to know if they could find a
verdict for manslaughter in the second degree."'
148
In both cities, however, first-degree murder convictions of female
defendants proved very rare, and when juries did treat women with the
utmost severity, gubernatorial clemency usually intervened. For in-
stance, only one female defendant-Chiara Cignarale-was convicted of
capital murder in New York City between 1879 and 1893.149 Supporters
of Cignarale, a woman who allegedly committed adultery as well as
premeditated killing, organized a successful petition to the governor to
reduce her death sentence to life imprisonment; the governor agreed in
part because her deceased husband had abused her. 150 Between 1880
and 1920, only two females were executed in the entire state of New
York: Roxalana Druse, a farmwife who dismembered her husband's
body after shooting him, and Martha Place, a middle-class woman who
threw acid at her stepdaughter and then asphyxiated her. 151 The anoma-
145. See supra text accompanying notes 132-138 (discussing Nelson's case).
146. Ida Mercer and Mattie Lemmons were convicted of first-degree and second-degree
murder, respectively. See supra text accompanying note 97 and infra text accompanying notes
154-56 (describing their cases). Juries found the remaining six women guilty of manslaugh-
ter. See infra app. E.
147. Two of these convictions were for some kind of murder. A jury convicted Chiara
Cignarale of first-degree murder. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (discussing
Cignarale case). A second defendant, Annie Walden, was found guilty of second-degree mur-
der. See infra notes 184-99 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing Walden case).
The remaining four convictions or guilty pleas were for manslaughter. See infra app. B. For a
full analysis of Mary Dunne's manslaughter conviction, see infra text accompanying notes
159-70.
148. Pasqualina Acquitted, supra note 83.
149. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1366.
150. See id. at 1359 nn.288, 1366 (discussing Chiara Cignarale's case); People v. Cigna-
rale, 17 N.E. 135, 137 (N.Y. 1888) (stating that prosecution "sought on the trial to establish
that improper relations existed between the defendant and [Antonio] D'Andrea," who was
jointly charged with murder and with whom defendant lived after leaving her husband).
151. See generally People v. Druse, 8 N.E. 733 (N.Y. 1886) (describing facts of Druse's
case and affirming her first-degree murder conviction); People v. Place, 52 N.E. 576 (N.Y.
1899) (describing facts of Place's case and affirming her first-degree murder conviction). For
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lous death sentences for these female prisoners excited great public sym-
pathy. Indeed, Governor Hill "was petitioned and beseeched from all
parts of the State to commute [Mrs. Druse's] sentence to imprison-
ment." 152 Although Druse was hanged, the outcry against capital pun-
ishment grew so strong in her case that the press expected the few
women later convicted of capital crimes to escape death.
153
Societal aversion to the severe punishment of female defendants
was as strong half-way across the country. My research uncovered only
two instances in Denver between 1880 and 1920 in which a woman was
found guilty of intimate murder, and only one of these women was con-
victed on first-degree charges. A jury found Ida Mercer guilty of first-
degree murder for shooting her son-in-law, whom she allegedly de-
spised. 154 Although she claimed to have fired the first few shots at the
victim in self-defense, she continued to fire after he fell to the ground.
Mercer unsuccessfully raised an insanity defense as to the final bullets,
and upon conviction, she was sentenced to life imprisonment. 155 In the
second case, a thirty-two-year old mulatto housekeeper received a ten-
year sentence, but was discharged from the penitentiary in May 1887, af-
ter being imprisoned for only three years. 156 The state of Colorado did
not execute any women between 1880 and 1920; indeed, all of the 102
legal executions in Colorado between 1859 and 1972 were of male pris-
oners. 15
7
When juries found female murder defendants guilty of any crime,
they typically convicted them of lesser-included offenses. Three features
of such cases are salient. First, the women often transgressed gender
norms by engaging in excessive alcohol consumption or illicit sex, in ad-
dition to lethal violence. Second, such cases involved abusive men who
confirmation that these prisoners received capital punishment, see ESPY & SMYLKA, supra
note 25.
152. Maria Barbieri to Die, N.Y. RECORDER, July 16, 1895, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 19 (comparing Barbieri's case to that of Druse).
153. See, e.g., id, ("Few believe.., that [Maria Barbieri] will ever sit in the death chair.").
The New York Recorder correctly predicted that the appellate court would spare Barbieri, an
Italian woman who shot her lover. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
154. See Verdict (filed Oct. 13, 1914), People v. Mercer, No. 22063 (Denver County Dist.
Ct., 1914) (recording first-degree murder conviction); Order Denying Motion for New Trial,
People v. Mercer, No. 22063 (describing facts of case); But One Woman is Guilty in First De-
gree, SHMB, supra note 23 (noting that victim was defendant's son-in-law).
155. See Order Denying Motion for New Trial, People v. Mercer, No. 22063 (describing
defense theories). See also Jury Instructions, People v. Mercer, No. 22063 (instructing on in-
sanity and self-defense). For information on Mercer's punishment, see Mittimus to Peniten-
tiary (filed Feb. 8, 1915), People v. Mercer, No. 22063 (recording Mercer's life sentence); But
One Woman is Guilty in First Degree, supra note 154 (recording Mercer's life sentence).
156. See Colorado State Penitentiary Records, No. 1138 (Colorado State Archives).
157. See Radelet, supra note 26, at 891.
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deviated from prescribed sex roles. Where both the male victim and fe-
male defendant violated social norms, those standing in judgment usually
extended some mitigation to the woman, even if they did not exonerate
her. Third, as we shall see, convicted females included not only working
women, but also women of elite and middle-class status. The line be-
tween convictions and acquittals was not always a class line. 
158
The killing of George Dunne in New York City in 1893 illustrates
the first two aspects of the pattern. Prosecutors charged Mary Dunne
with first-degree murder for beating George to death with a hammer.
159
Describing the gruesome killing, witnesses and journalists offered wildly
divergent assessments of the defendant's character. There were many
reports that Mary Dunne habitually consumed liquor and that she was in-
toxicated-or, to quote the World, "rum-crazed" 160 and "frenzied by
drink and the sight of blood" 161-when she killed her husband. 162 Ac-
counts taking a critical view of Mary tended to emphasize George's so-
ber nature and his industriousness as an engineer for the Marlborough
Hotel. 163 Any violence on his part was attributed to extreme frustration
with his wife's dissolute lifestyle. 164 In contrast, the defendant and the
158. See infra text accompanying notes 181-99 (discussing People v. Southworth and
People v. Walden).
159. See Indictment, People v. Dunne, Folder 4907, Box 539, DA PAPERS, supra note 1
(1893).
160. She Is a Husband-Murderer, WORLD, Oct. 16, 1893, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 16.
161. A Hammer Her Weapon, WORLD, Oct. 15, 1893, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK,
supra note 2, at Roll 16.
162. See Testimony of Charles McGovern, Trial Transcript at 6-7, People v. Dunne,
Folder 4907, Box 539, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1894) (recording testimony of defendant's
ten-year-old son that defendant drank several pints of beer on day of killing); Testimony of
Celia Chatillion, Trial Transcript at 10-13, People v. Dunne, supra (recording testimony of
neighbor that defendant got drunk, beat her husband, and threatened to kill him). See also His
Wife Killed Him, MORNING ADVERTISER, Oct. 16, 1893, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK,
supra note 2, at Roll 16 (describing defendant's allegedly frequent bouts of drunkenness and
stating that, on day of homicide, "Mrs. Dunn [sic] was intoxicated and her husband reproached
her.").
163. See, e.g., Testimony of Peter J. Brady, Trial Transcript at 14, People v. Dunne, Folder
4907, Box 539, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1893) (stating that deceased was "a sober man al-
ways attending to his work."); A Hammer Her Weapon, supra note 161 ("He bore a good repu-
tation with his associates at the hotel.").
164. See Slew Her Husband, N.Y. RECORDER, Oct. 16, 1893, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 16 (reporting that deceased began to physically abuse his
wife after he learned that she spent his money on liquor); His Wife Killed Him, supra note 162
("Dunn [sic] objected, with only too much reason, it appears, to his wife's habits and conduct.
Whenever he remonstrated with her she flew into a violent passion, and as Dunn [sic] was not
especially meek himself the altercations were usually fierce."); She is a Husband-Murderer,
supra note 160 (describing violent, drunken argument leading to George Dunne's death and
stating that "there have been many such quarrels" between defendant and her husband).
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witnesses on her behalf claimed that George Dunne drank, beat her mer-
cilessly, and called her vile names. 165 Mary Dunne alleged that, on the
day of the homicide, her husband learned that she planned to leave him
and then began to choke and kick her brutally. She depicted the hammer
killing as an act of self-defense. 166 Disagreement also centered on the
pivotal question of whether the deceased, who was found lying across the
bed, had been awake or asleep when his wife attacked him with the
hammer. 1
6 7
On March 16, 1894, a jury rejected the state's premeditated murder
theory, instead convicting Mary Dunne of second-degree manslaughter,
which encompassed heat-of-passion killings. 168 The fact that George
Dunne's "face was battered almost beyond recognition" may have
shocked jurors, but they nevertheless seem to have believed that he en-
gaged in a classic form of provocation-extreme assault and battery.
169
Their choice of a lesser-included offense, as well as the strong recom-
mendation of mercy that they appended to the verdict, expressed con-
demnation for the deceased man's violence toward the defendant. Their
decision to stick with the law of provocation or imperfect self-
defense, 170 rather than acquitting, probably arose from their judgment
165. See Testimony of Mary Dunne, Trial Transcript at 18-22, People v. Dunne, Folder
4907, Box 539, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1893) (presenting her version of facts); Testimony
of David Latimer, Trial Trancript at 23-24, People v. Dunne, supra ("I have seen George
Dunne commit acts of violence against his wife, in 1889, 1890 and 1891. I have seen him
blacken her eyes and kick her downstairs and into the street."); Testimony of Dr. George
Tucker Harrison, Trial Transcript at 22, People v. Dunne, supra (stating that he treated George
Dunne "for symptoms of chronic alcoholism"). See also Mrs. Dunne 's Story Told, supra note
131 (recounting defendant's trial testimony); Mrs. Dunn [sic] Guilty of Manslaughter, N.Y.
TIMES, March 17, 1894, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 16 (reporting
that deceased was also "given to drink," that he "frequently abused his wife," and that he
kicked her before she struck the fatal blow to his head).
166. See Testimony of Mary Dunne, Trial Transcript at 18-22, People v. Dunne, Folder
4907, Box 539, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1893); Mrs. Dunne's Story Told, supra note 131.
167. See Mrs. Dunn [sic] Guilty, MORNING ADVERTISER, March 17, 1894, microformed
on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 16.
168. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Dunne, Folder 4907, Box 539, DA PAPERS,
supra note 1 (1893) (recording verdict); Mrs. Dunn [sic] Guilty of Manslaughter, supra note
165 (reporting jury's recommendation of mercy).
169. See His Wife Killed Him, supra note 162; Mrs. Dunn [sic] Guilty, supra note 167
(speculating that verdict endorsed narrative in which deceased was awake and violent, rather
than "sleeping victim" story). For a complete discussion of traditional categories of provoca-
tion at common law, see, among others, Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 720 (Md. 1991).
New York courts, during the time period discussed in this article, recognized the deceased's
attack on the defendant as a form of provocation. See generally People v. Fiorentino, 91 N.E.
195 (N.Y. 1910) (reversing first-degree murder conviction in case in which deceased threat-
ened to kill defendant and assaulted him with knife).
170. As Joshua Dressier notes, provocation and imperfect self-defense technically consti-
tute distinct mitigating doctrines. See Joshua Dessler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense
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that, due to her drinking, Dunne deserved punishment when measured
against extra-legal standards of femininity.
In Denver, as in New York City, juries that refused to acquit women
who claimed to have been threatened or assaulted almost always reduced
their crimes to lesser-included offenses. The district court records con-
tain several cases in which female murder defendants were convicted of
manslaughter after the judge issued a reminder that threats or violence by
a victim gave the defendant no absolute right to use a deadly weapon.
171
Instructions urging a distinction between the jittery wife and the reason-
able person sometimes convinced the jury not to acquit; however, in such
cases, lesser-included-offense convictions were much more common
than murder convictions. For example, evidence of Norma Pumphrey's
frightening past experience with her former husband, Charles, elicited
sympathy from the jury, even though the court expressly instructed that
such evidence had "no bearing upon the question of self-defense."
' 172
Perhaps influenced by the judge to see Pumphrey as "an excessively
nervous and timid person," rather than a "reasonable" individual who
could not have believed her life was in "imminent" danger, the jury de-
clined to acquit her.173 Nevertheless, she was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter, not murder. 
174
Similarly, in People v. Fiorini,175 a Denver trial judge refused to in-
struct that Carmella Maria Fiorini "was not required to leave her home
and flee for safety but had a perfect right to kill [her husband] if neces-
sary to avoid [his threatened attack on her life]." 176 Still, the jury did not
convict her of murder, preferring the milder verdict of voluntary man-
in Search of a Rationale, 783 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 458 (1982). However, histori-
cally, courts and juries often conflated justification and excuse in their decisions. Cf id. at
443.
171. See, e.g., Jury Instructions (filed Nov. 28, 1892), People v. Butler, No. 8277 (Arapa-
hoe County Dist. Ct. 1892). The Arapahoe County District Court instructed the jury:
[A]lthough they should find.., that the said Albert Butler and the defendant got
into a quarrel and that the said Albert Butler followed the defendant in a threatening
manner, still the defendant would have no right to assault the said Albert Butler with
a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to take life or do great bodily injury unless
the circumstances were such as to lead a reasonable person to believe that such an
assault was necessary... to prevent receiving a great bodily injury herself
Id. The jury found Emma Butler not guilty of murder, but guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
See Verdict (filed Nov. 28, 1892), People v. Butler, No. 8277.
172. Jury Instructions (filed Oct. 18, 1913), People v. Pumphrey, No. 21565 (Denver
County Dist. Ct. 1913).
173. See id.
174. Verdict, People v. Butler, No. 8277.
175. See Information (filed Aug. 11, 1906), People v. Fiorini, No. 17722 (Denver County
Dist. Ct. 1906).
176. Defendant's Instructions Refused (filed Oct. 13, 1906), People v. Fiorini, No. 17722.
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slaughter with a recommendation of extreme clemency. 177 Pumphrey
and Fiorini thus show that the aggressive behavior of deceased men less-
ened sanctions against female defendants in a frontier city, just as in an
eastern metropolis. Indeed, the verdicts in these cases demonstrate the
practical efficacy of imperfect self-defense arguments for abused women
in the early twentieth century.
Although self-defense theories often proved more persuasive to ju-
rors than to the bench, some judges also acknowledged the mitigating po-
tential of past-abuse evidence. For example, in People v. Ray, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court stated that a manslaughter instruction would have
been appropriate in the murder trial of a woman whose husband beat and
threatened her over a long period of time before she killed him.178 The
court only affirmed Ray's second-degree murder conviction because the
defendant had failed to request the manslaughter instruction at trial. 
179
Although compassion for abused women often led to mitigation, if
not complete acquittal, neither the formal law nor extra-legal values
spared all women from being punished for the most heinous type of
homicide-murder. When a female defendant's bad character was com-
bined with a high-status victim and clear-cut evidence of intent to kill,
the jury might return a conviction for a crime more severe than man-
slaughter. Some scholars believe that legal outcomes were instrumental
in distinguishing the reputed purity of white, middle-class women from
the immoral violence of their working-class counterparts. 180 However,
my research suggests otherwise. In fact, class-based stereotypes some-
times had the opposite effect on murder cases. An impoverished Italian
seamstress might appeal successfully to jurors' paternalistic impulses and
be spared from any criminal punishment. Conversely, a white middle-
class woman who led a fast life and shot an influential man could expect
a hostile press and perhaps even a guilty verdict (albeit for a lesser-
included offense). Thus, when the widow of an upstate attorney killed
railroad magnate Stephen Pettus in New York City, alleging that he had
raped and ruined her, 181 the newspapers discounted her tale of woe and
177. See Verdict (filed Oct. 13, 1906), People v. Fiorini, No. 17722.
178. 167 P. 954, 957 (Colo. 1917). See also supra text accompanying notes 142-144 (dis-
cussing Barbieri case in New York).
179. See Ray, 167 P. 954, at 957.
180. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 12, at 416 (analyzing acquittal of Lizzie Borden); cf
Stark, supra note 104, at 989 (remarking on class bias in legal treatment of violent intimate
relationships in England).
181. See Indictment, People v. Southworth, Folder 3505, Box 375, DA PAPERS, supra note
1 (1889) (charging Hannah Southworth with first-degree murder for fatally shooting Stephen
Pettus); Testimony of Officer William Goodwin, Coroner's Inquisition at 10-12, People v.
Southworth, supra (testifying that Southworth confessed to crime and stated that Pettus "ru-
ined her"); Testimony of Capt. William W. McLaughlin, Coroner's Inquisition at 31, People v.
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characterized her as a "vindictive creature" guilty of a "crime which had
not the slightest justification."' 182 Pettus's killer, Hannah Southworth,
died in prison before her trial. 183 But another case, People v. Walden,
184
indicates that if Southworth had faced a jury, she would not have been
completely exonerated. Her "fallen" lifestyle and lethal attack on a pillar
of the business community made it imperative that she suffer an exem-
plary punishment.
Annie Walden, the only female defendant found guilty of second-
degree murder for killing an intimate in New York County between 1879
and 1893, reportedly led a "dissolute life." 185 She left a respectable hus-
band in the dry-goods business for a bookmaker named Len Marshall.
186
While accompanying Marshall to the racetracks of the northeast, she
caught the eye of James Walden, a young racehorse trainer with whom
she engaged in a three-day spree of "wild dissipation."' 187 James still de-
pended upon his father-"a well-known man on the American turf'-for
financial support. 188 He supposedly entered a secret marriage to Annie
while he was intoxicated and later discovered, to his horror, that his bride
Southworth, supra (stating that Southworth claimed Pettus took her to "house of assignation,"
where he drugged her and had sex with her); Statement of Attorney William H. Howe, Coro-
ner's Inquisition at 41, People v. Southworth, supra (indicating that Southworth had illegal
abortion because Pettus impregnated her); Pettus 's Murderess Dead, Too, SUN, Jan. 8, 1890,
microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 9 (describing Southworth as "an attrac-
tive woman of a good Kentucky family, the widow of a lawyer of Geneva in this State," who
was introduced to Pettus by mutual friends); Shot Down by a Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1889, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 8 (recounting Southworth's ver-
sion of events and noting that Pettus was, among other business ventures, "Secretary and
Treasurer of the Union Elevated Railway of Brooklyn").
182. Don't Waste Any Sympathy, N.Y. STAR, Jan. 8, 1890, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 9. Similarly, The World opined:
There were no mitigating circumstances connected with her crime. Pettus had been
devoted to her and had deserted her. From that moment she pursued him, demand-
ing support and protection. He refused to accede to her request and she shot him. It
was simply an act of vengeance.... Whether or not she was entitled to sympathy or
what happened in the early days of her acquaintance with Pettus is a question en-
tirely apart from her crime.
Untitled, WORLD, Jan. 8, 1890, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 9.
183. See Pettus's Murderess Dead, Too, supra note 181 (reporting that Southworth died in
her cell of "heart failure, anemia, general debility, acute bronchitis, and hypostatic pneumo-
nia").
184. See Indictment, People v. Walden, Folder 4219, Box 459, DA PAPERS, supra note I
(189 1) (charging Annie Walden with first-degree murder of James Walden).
185. Walden's Wife Kills Him, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 31, 1891, microformed on DA
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was a "drunkard, also that she had an insatiate passion for opium." 189 A
brief, unhappy marriage followed: "Constant quarrels, fights, threats,
mutual accusations of infidelity had been part of their married life. He
had beaten her; she had threatened to kill him." 190 On October 30, 1891,
Annie Walden shot her husband in a New York City street and immedi-
ately confessed to a police officer. 19 1
At trial, the defendant alleged that the decedent physically assaulted
her immediately prior to the shooting, but the jury did not believe her.
1 92
Although Annie Walden was only twenty-two years old at the time of her
crime, 193 the prosecutor succeeded in depicting her as an immoral, older
woman who seduced and then murdered a foolish boy from an influential
family. Nevertheless, confronted with the defense attorney's warning
that the "poor, frail, fallen creature" would haunt them if they sent her to
the electric chair, the jurors declined to convict her of a capital crime.
194
Instead, they "declared by their verdict that her act, while intentional,
was not deliberate"- finding her guilty of second-degree murder, which
carried a life term.
19 5
The jury's typical reluctance to find a woman guilty of first-degree
murder, paired with allegations that the victim was physically abusive
and unfaithful, 196 softened the result in the Walden case. According to
one newspaper, jurors unanimously agreed that Annie Walden commit-
ted a premeditated killing; indeed, they wanted to convict her of first-
189. Id. See also She Killed Her Boy Husband, N.Y. RECORDER, Oct. 31, 1891, micro-
formed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 12 (reporting that James Walden's friends
said that he was drunk when he married Annie).
190. Id.
191. See Testimony of Officer Griffin H. Merritt, Coroner's Inquisition at 1-2, People v.
Walden, Folder 4219, Box 459, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891); see also Indictment, People
v. Walden, supra.
192. See Annie Walden to Go to Prison for Life, N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 23, 1892, micro-
formed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 12 (stating that "none of the jurymen be-
lieved the woman's story that Walden was beating her when she fired the fatal shots").
193. See Affidavit of Annie Walden, Police Court Records, People v. Walden, Folder
4219, Box 459, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891).
194. Her Sex Alone Saved Her, WORLD, Apr. 23, 1892, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK,
supra note 2, at Roll 12.
195. Untitled, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 23, 1892, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra
note 2, at Roll 12.
196. See Report of Detective Sergeant McCarthy, People v. Walden, Folder 4219, Box
459, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) (reporting his findings regarding various witnesses who
said that James Walden beat his wife); Annie Walden Convicted, supra note 131 (reporting that
prosecutor justified victim's beating of defendant on grounds that she provoked him by associ-
ating, against his wishes, with a black woman "who kept a questionable house next door"); see
also She Killed Her Boy Husband, supra note 189 ("Her friends say that Walden beat her cru-
elly and deserted her for other women."); Walden's Wife Kills Him, supra note 185 ("Scarcely




degree murder with a strong recommendation of mercy. 197 However,
they ultimately "decided that this course would not be safe" because they
"did not want to risk the woman's life." 198 Their verdict stemmed not
only from paternalistic solicitude for female defendants in general, but
also from their belief that Annie Walden "had great provocation by rea-
son of [her husband's] beating her" on previous occasions.
199
3. Conclusions About Female Defendants' Cases
In sum, the sympathetic treatment of women accused of intimate
murder in New York and Colorado calls into question the prevalent
scholarly view that "[t]he unwritten law was ... a law for men only" and
that "[w]omen were not supposed to avenge themselves on hus-
bands ... ."200 The tendency to justify a female defendant, either com-
pletely or in part, for defending her life or her virtue with bloodshed was
common in both regions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. Indeed, while defense strategies often emphasized female weakness
and thus contained elements of an "excuse" doctrine, the degree of moral
denunciation directed at men who allegedly drove women to commit
homicide constitutes the more remarkable aspect of these cases. Female
defendants who defied gender-based social values fared worse than those
who played more decorous and traditional roles. However, on the whole,
women were treated with a paternalistic kind of compassion, whereas
men were judged harshly for disgracing or tormenting them. Perhaps
most importantly, the assessment of a female defendant's guilt or inno-
cence during the time period covered by this article included an ex-
panded time frame that helped reveal the causes of her homicidal fear or
rage.
The task of persuading courts to admit histories of abuse, while jet-
tisoning invidious stereotypes about women's irrationality and weakness,
poses a challenge for modem reformers of intimate violence law. At the
urging of feminist litigators and psychologists, American courts in the
late twentieth century began to make evidentiary rulings that recognized
the battered woman's syndrome-in particular, the "learned helpless-
ness" supposedly produced when a woman becomes trapped in a cycle of
violence and contrition on the part of her abuser.20 1 Some feminist legal
197. See Annie Walden to Go to Prison for Life, supra note 192.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 221.
201. The majority trend leans toward admitting battered woman's syndrome evidence be-
cause it is relevant to show the reasonableness of the woman's lethal response. See, e.g., Peo-
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scholars, such as Martha Mahoney, argue against an analysis that focuses
on particular battering incidents, instead depicting the problem as an on-
going "struggle for power and control. ' 20 2 Mahoney notes that a woman
may face the greatest danger from her violent partner when she resists,
exerts autonomy, and tries to leave the relationship. 203 However, com-
mon to both approaches is the argument that, when judging a battered
woman who kills, the jury should be allowed to take her history of abuse
into account. A third strand of the debate raises valid concerns about the
battered woman's syndrome defense without offering an adequate substi-
tute for it. For example, Anne Coughlin expresses the view that the de-
fense is "the offspring of patriarchal assumptions" that cast women as
feeble, dysfunctional victims.
20 4
The fate of female defendants between 1880 and 1920 simultane-
ously demonstrates the utility of an expanded time frame as a defense
strategy and the danger of relying on a narrative imbued with stereotypi-
cal images. This article offers a historical analysis, rather than advocat-
ing a normative agenda for twenty-first century law. Yet, I do believe
that, when arguing for the admissibility of past-abuse evidence, feminist
scholars and attorneys ought to emphasize a female defendant's long
struggle against the wrong of intimate violence, not her psychological
and emotional disintegration in the face of it. Moreover, I am convinced
that, contrary to the historical pattern revealed here, the criminal law
must distinguish between serious physical abuse, which should at least
partially justify a lethal response, and emotional harms like seduction
and abandonment, which should not.
ple v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1086-1087 (1996) (declining to adopt "reasonable 'bat-
tered woman' standard" but admitting syndrome evidence to show "defendant's situation and
knowledge"). See also Mahoney, supra note 20, at 36-39 (explaining and critiquing battered
woman's syndrome defense). Courts have admitted evidence related to financial dependence,
low self-esteem, care for dependent children, and other factors to explain why a woman failed
to leave an abusive relationship. See id. at 38. A key aspect of this actual or perceived inabil-
ity to sever bonds to the batterer is supposed to be a condition known as "learned helpless-
ness," which Lenore Walker associates with submission and passivity. LENORE WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN 47-48 (1979).
202. Mahoney, supra note 20, at 28.
203. See id. at 64-76 (naming and describing "separation assault").
204. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994). A few scholars
have proposed alternate strategies for defending abused women who kill, in lieu of battered
woman's syndrome evidence. For example, Joshua Dressler suggests a duress claim. See
Joshua Dressier, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: Reflections of Main-
taining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY:
DOCTRINE OF THE GENERAL PART 259 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002).
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D. Convicting Men: Passion, Insanity, and Self-Control
In a previous article, I noted the apparent willingness of late nine-
teenth century New York prosecutors, juries, and courts to impose capital
punishment on men who killed female intimates, as opposed to defen-
dants who committed other types of homicides. 20 5 First-degree murder
defendants of both sexes who went to trial during the fourteen-year pe-
riod that I studied were more likely to be found guilty of lesser-included
offenses than of capital crimes. 206 Indeed, confronted with life or death
decisions in the jury box, New Yorkers often faltered in their commit-
ment to tough crime control and returned verdicts that angered at least
one organ of public opinion-the press.207 Nevertheless, juries convicted
thirty-four men (compared to just one woman) of first-degree murder be-
tween 1879 and 1893; more than half of these men had killed female in-
timates. 208 The state executed fifteen of the eighteen intimate murder-
ers. 209 As a group, the intimate killers tended to be marginal men that
"drank heavily and relied on the meager earnings of women."210 In con-
trast to the rough bravery of male gang members, the ne'er-do-wells
convicted of slaying their lovers, wives, or relatives inspired no awe, and
those standing in judgment thus had fewer qualms about inflicting capital
punishment upon them.
211
This article expands upon my earlier research by widening the
chronological scope, placing New York County cases in the context of
statewide data, and comparing this data to the conviction and punishment
of men in Colorado. Evidence from New York state, Denver, and Colo-
rado as a whole supports my hypothesis: Whereas women charged with
murder were treated leniently, men risked not only receiving a guilty
verdict, but also being sentenced to substantial prison terms or even exe-
205. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1366-83. A study of another
city, Chicago, notes that "wife murder was punished quite severely" there during a slightly
later time period, but documents fewer death sentences in such cases than were imposed in
New York. See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Ben Altman, Wife Murder in Chicago: 1910-1930,
92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 739, 789 (2002).
206. Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1364 fig.4.
207. See id. at 1363-65 (discussing jury leniency).
208. See id. at 1366.
209. Id. at 1366, 1368 fig.6, 1371. Seventeen out of the thirty-four male convicts inten-
tionally killed female intimates and another, Daniel Driscoll, fatally shot his girlfriend while
attempting to slay a male rival. See id. In my previous article, I did not count the Driscoll
case as an intimate homicide because it involved transferred intent, but I have decided to do so
here to assemble as complete a record as possible of criminal cases arising from the death of
lovers, spouses, or relatives.
210. Id. at 1375.
211. See id. at 1372 (contrasting cowardice of one such defendant with legendary tough-
ness of Whyo gang leader Michael McGloin).
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cuted. The common-law provocation doctrine mitigated the punishment
of male defendants whose deadly behavior fell within its narrow parame-
ters, but as both a doctrinal and a cultural matter, it offered a smaller
safety net than is often assumed.
Throughout history and across cultures, men have committed homi-
cide more often than women have; this generalization holds true both in-
side and outside the home.212 Yet, contrary to prevalent assumptions
about the nature of sex bias in the criminal law, 213 men's killing of their
spouses and lovers has been illegal for centuries, unless such killings
were deemed to be accidental. Indeed, even the common-law right of
chastisement, which nineteenth-century legal authorities rejected, limited
men to "moderate correction" of their wives, forbidding them from caus-
ing permanent injury. 214 By the 1870s, American judges and treatise
writers agreed in their formal renunciation of a man's right to inflict
physical punishment on his spouse.
215
In contrast, notwithstanding a vocal campaign against child cruelty,
advice-book authors and legal authorities continued to tolerate the beat-
ing and even inadvertent killing of unruly children throughout the 1800s
and early 1900s.2 16 New York's criminal code excused killings commit-
ted "[b]y accident and misfortune, in lawfully correcting a child or ser-
vant" as late as the 1920s, for example. 217 Yet, stem punishment of men
who perpetrated fatal violence in other intimate contexts, especially
marital or romantic relationships, was the typical legal outcome in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, despite lingering
callousness toward the "accidental" death of insubordinate children, the
killing of a child usually resulted in a first-degree or second-degree mur-
der conviction if it occurred during an episode of intimate violence
against the child's mother.
218
212. See WIENER, supra note 12, at 1; see also Adler, supra note 12, at 259 (stating that
most spouse-killers in nineteenth-century Chicago were men); cf MONKKONEN, supra note
35, at 4, 55, 58 fig.3.1, 181 (showing that male murderers vastly outnumbered women who
killed in nineteenth-century New York, but that men's victims were most often other men).
213. Cf supra notes 10, 13.
214. See Siegel, supra note 11, at 2118, 2123.
215. See id. at 2129-30.
216. Even the child protection societies that reached a pinnacle of activity in the 1870s and
1880s endorsed spanking, while seeking to shield children from physical pain that was
"wrongfully, needlessly, or excessively inflicted." PLECK, supra note 11, at 83; see also
DEGLER, supra note 123, at 87-90 (noting that corporal punishment was not abandoned com-
pletely despite advice books' preference for emotional or psychological inducements).
217. CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF N.Y., ch. 41, art. 94, § 1054 (Cahill 1923). It is worth not-
ing that this provision did not apply to the death of a man's wife.
218. See generally People v. Schuyler, 12 N.E. 783 (N.Y. 1887) (affirming first-degree
murder conviction of appellant for smashing his toddler's head during violent altercation with
his wife). For more information about this case, see infra text accompanying notes 342-44.
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The condemnation of men's homicidal attacks on their families or
lovers described in this article has no parallel in the current American
death-penalty regime. Indeed, whereas the miniscule number of women
executed between 1880 and 1920 fits into a broader historical pattern of
leniency toward female criminals,219 the willingness of courts and juries
in the late 1800s and early 1900s to convict men of first-degree murder
for slaying intimates contrasts starkly with the small fraction of death-
sentenced men who committed intimate homicides in the late twentieth
century.2
20
Table 3: Men Accused of Intimate Homicides in
ArapahoelDenver County, 1880-1920
Outcomes Number
1 t Degree Murder Convictions 16
2 nd Degree Murder Convictions/Guilty Pleas 12




Other Convictions as Charged 1
(Assault with Deadly Weapon)
Found Insane Without Trial 1
Case Dismissed 1
Nolle Prosequi 1





Moreover, the pattern of holding men accountable for intimate mur-
der crossed geographical and cultural boundaries. It is evident in both
See also People v. Green, 94 N.E. 658 (N.Y. 1911) (affirming murder conviction of abusive
husband who fatally shot his daughter when his wife and family tried to leave him); SHMB,
supra note 23, at No. 531 (recording that Clarence Perkins was sentenced to life imprisonment
in a Colorado penitentiary after he killed his fourteen-month-old baby during assault on his
wife).
219. See Victor Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine
Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 446 (2002) (stating that women comprised only 4.3% of all
executions in the United States before 1900 and less than 1% of executions thereafter).
220. See Rapaport, supra note 17, at 1517 tbl.2 (showing that only 12% of men sentenced
to capital punishment in six states in the post-Furman era killed intimates).
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the eastern and the western United States from 1880 to 1920. Like their
New York City counterparts, Denver prosecutors typically pressed se-
vere charges against men who killed intimates during this time period.
Out of my sample of forty-eight cases involving male defendants, the
Denver District Attorney's office charged forty-six men with some kind
of murder.221 Many of these men were convicted. Indeed, juries in Den-
ver may have been more likely than those in New York City to find male
defendants guilty of first-degree murder because Colorado law did not
mandate the death penalty for this crime. Table 3 shows that Denver trial
juries returned first-degree murder convictions in sixteen cases and
second-degree murder verdicts in twelve cases. Five men were acquit-
ted; one man was found insane without trial; one case was dismissed; an-
other resulted in a nolle prosequi; and the District Attorney chose not to
re-prosecute two male defendants whose convictions were reversed. 222
Nine men pled guilty to, or were convicted of, lesser-included offenses,
four of which were voluntary manslaughter.223 Thus, about sixty percent
of the male murder defendants in my Denver sample were convicted and
punished for committing murder in either the first-degree or the second-
degree. Voluntary manslaughter verdicts constituted a comparatively
rare outcome for men in the Denver cases, whereas first-degree murder
convictions were the most common type of case disposition.
1. The Narrow Bounds of the Provocation Defense
Although voluntary manslaughter verdicts were uncommon in my
Denver data set, the heat-of-passion doctrine theoretically constituted the
main avenue of mitigation for a man who killed his unfaithful wife. If
successful, a heat-of-passion claim would lead to conviction for man-
slaughter, instead of murder; yet, as we shall see, this defense strategy
often failed. A related doctrine, the so-called honor-killing defense, of-
fered total exculpation for men under formal law in only four states;
221. At least eight of these were first-degree charges; most of the others fell under the ge-
neric "murder" category. See infra app. F.
222. Appellate courts reversed the convictions of two male defendants, John H. Herren
and Theodore Ehrhardt, who had been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and second-
degree murder, respectively, at their first trials. Prosecutors declined to re-try them. See id. I
have not counted their cases as convictions.
223. Juries convicted two defendants, Edward McBride and Joseph E. Bailey, of involun-
tary manslaughter at new trials after their second-degree murder convictions were reversed.
See id. I have counted these cases as convictions for involuntary manslaughter, rather than
second-degree murder. However, like the cases discussed in note 222, supra, McBride and
Bailey further corroborate the willingness of juries to return guilty verdicts against men
charged with intimate murder.
[Vol. 77
2006] INTIMATE HOMICIDE
moreover, this defense was often limited to a husband's killing of his
wife's paramour and did not extend to the death of the wife.
224
Whereas other feminist scholars have criticized the heat-of-passion
doctrine for treating intimate killings less severely than a fatal assault by
a stranger, 225 my research on the west and the northeast offers little rea-
son to think that juries in those regions tilted the facts in favor of male
defendants charged with killing women, or that courts construed provo-
cation categories broadly to overturn men's convictions. In contrast to
some southern states that "expanded the notion of provocation to cover a
broad range of sexual effrontery," 226 Colorado and New York policed
male violence by refusing to depart from common-law categories.
The common law confined the heat-of-passion defense to five types
of provocation: extreme assault or battery on the defendant; mutual com-
bat; illegal arrest of the defendant; injury or serious abuse of a close rela-
tive; and sudden discovery of a spouse's adultery. 227 If sufficient time
elapsed between the provoking incident and the killing for the defen-
dant's emotions to cool, he was not supposed to receive heat-of-passion
224. From the nineteenth century to the 1970s, four American states-Texas, New Mex-
ico, Utah and Georgia-deemed the killing by a husband of his wife's lover to be justifiable
homicide. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 1694-96 & n.87. In Texas, the statutory honor-killing
defense applied only to male defendants in cases where the defendant was charged with the
murder of his wife's lover. See Reed v. State, 59 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933);
Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal Meaning: Spectacular Trials, The Unwritten
Law, and Narratives of Criminal Responsibility, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 393, 410-11 (1999);
see also The 'Equal Shooting Rights' Saga, TEX. OBSERVER, Mar. 19, 1965, at 10 (copy on
file with author) (noting that defense in Texas applied only to killings of men by other men).
New Mexico's law was similar. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1468 (1915) (providing defense for
"[a]ny person who kills another who is in the act of having carnal knowledge of such person's
legal wife"). In Utah, either a male or a female defendant charged with killing a person who
raped or defiled the defendant's female relative could claim the defense. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-30-10 (1953); UTAH COMP. LAWS § 8032(4) (1917); id. at § 4168(4) (1907); id. at §
4168(4) (1898). Finally, Georgia's version of the honor-killing defense extended to both male
and female defendants who killed in defense of their family's honor. See Biggs v. Georgia, 29
Ga. 723, 727 (1860) (stating that man who attempts to kill another man for raping his wife or
daughter does so in defense of his family); Scroggs v. State, 93 S.E.2d 583, 585 (Ga. Ct. App.
1956) ("If a wife kills another woman to prevent sexual relations between such other woman
and her husband, the killing is justified .... "). Martha Umphrey has shown that, in New
York, extra-legal attitudes toward honor-killing shaped perceptions of men who murdered
male sexual rivals. See generally Umphrey, supra (analyzing murder case of Harry Thaw).
However, neither the honor-killing statutes nor unwritten versions of them are inconsistent
with my thesis. As I have argued here and elsewhere, late nineteenth-century cultural values
tended to tolerate or even glorify violence among men, while condemning men's killing of
women and children. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1371-73.
225. See, e.g., supra note 10 (collecting books and articles critical of provocation defense).
226. Umphrey, supra note 224, at 410.
227. Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 720 (Md. 1991); see LEE, supra note 10, at 19; Tay-
lor, supra note 10, at 1693 & n.79 (identifying Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107
(1707), as the "case that first enumerated the categories of adequate provocation").
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mitigation.228 Trial judges in Colorado and New York often refused to
instruct on provocation because the evidence showed cooling time or
other factors precluding the defense as a matter of law.229 Appellate
courts usually affirmed murder convictions in such cases, commenting
on the poor fit between the facts and the elements of voluntary man-
slaughter.
230
Whereas reformist jurisdictions in the late twentieth century jetti-
soned provocation categories and cooling-time limitations,231 courts and
juries in the 1800s and early 1900s were willing to execute male defen-
dants who claimed that simmering jealousy, anger, or fear led them to
commit homicide. This severity was not gender-neutral. Rather, ver-
dicts exonerating women due to their victims' past violence or romantic
inconstancy 232 contrasted with the lack of empathy for similar stories
when a man was on trial. Moreover, in distinction to capital sentencing
in the post-Furman era, the pain arising from romantic or family strife
was generally not considered a mitigating factor that precluded the death
penalty in men's cases.
233
228. See, e.g., People v. Ferraro, 55 N.E. 931, 934 (N.Y. 1900) ("If there had been provo-
cation, there was time to cool off."). See also infra text accompanying notes 257-60 (discuss-
ing application of cooling-time limitation).
229. In many of the capital murders discussed in my previous article, the defendant stalked
the victim after separation, providing evidence of cooling time to preclude a heat-of-passion
argument. Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1378. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 234-39, 264-65, 267.
230. See infra text accompanying notes 235-37, 256-62, 268-70.
231. EED doctrine, in both its statutory and judge-made forms, abolishes the traditional
common-law provocation categories, as well as the cooling-time limitation. Furthermore, with
the creation of the Model Penal Code in the 1960s, this reformist position became the law in a
"substantial minority of jurisdictions" by the early 1980s. Victoria Nourse, Passion 's Pro-
gress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1340 (1997).
For an example of the effect of reformed doctrine on an actual case, see generally People v.
Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976) (reversing first-degree murder conviction of defendant who
lay in wait for twenty hours before killing his wife).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 73-92 (analyzing Pasqualina Robertiello's acquit-
tal on ground that decedent's seduction and subsequent rejection of her rendered her temporar-
ily insane). As noted, some appellate courts acknowledged the relevance of the deceased's
past violence to a female defendant's self-defense theory; others even allowed evidence of past
emotional abuse. See supra text accompanying notes 139-144 (discussing New York and
Colorado appellate cases). But compassion for a woman subjected to provoking or frightening
behavior over a long period of time often came from jury attitudes, not from the formal law.
See supra text accompanying notes 110-13 (discussing Denver District Court cases).
233. For a discussion of the mitigating role, in post-Furman capital sentencing, of emo-




Unlike modem jurisdictions, including New York, that use the EED
doctrine, judges in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries re-
fused to recognize an attempt by a wife or girlfriend to leave a man as
legally adequate provocation. 234 For example, in People v. Youngs, the
murder victim separated from her husband and threatened to seek a di-
vorce when she learned that he had given her "a private disease." 2 35 He
then went to a neighboring house where she and the children were stay-
ing and fatally shot her.2 36 Affirming the capital conviction, the New
York Court of Appeals noted in dicta that the facts showed "the absence
of all . . . provocation ... for the commission of the crime." 23 7 As the
Colorado Supreme Court stated in a Denver case, a man did not have the
right to use force to induce his estranged spouse to return to his house-
hold; jury instructions to the contrary erroneously proclaimed "a doctrine
concerning the relation of husband and wife" that was "nothing less than
monstrous at this period of our civilization." 238 In many such cases, nei-
ther juries nor appellate courts showed qualms about a capital verdict.
Almost half of all intimate murderers executed in both New York County
234. Of the modem EED doctrine's tendency to bind "women to the emotional claims of
husbands and boyfriends long ago divorced or rejected," Nourse argues: "Reform in other ar-
eas of the law has encouraged battered women to leave their victimizers. Reform of the pas-
sion defense, however, discourages such departures, allowing defendants to argue that a bat-
tered wife who leaves has, by that very departure, supplied a reason to treat the killing with
some compassion." Nourse, supra note 231, at 1334. But cf Joshua Dressier, Why Keep the
Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 979-84
(2002) (criticizing Nourse's argument but agreeing that "it is perfectly appropriate to limit the
partial defense to [a defendant] whose lack of self control is the result of adequate provocation
and not just any provocation"). For late twentieth-century New York separation murders in
which the court instructed the jury on EED, see Nourse, supra note 231, at 1419-21, 1427-29
& app. B (collecting cases).
235. 45 N.E. 460 (N.Y. 1896).
236. Id. at 461.
237. Id. at 460-61. This statement constituted dicta because Youngs' defense relied on an
insanity claim, rather than the provocation doctrine. See id. at 460. For a general discussion
of defense claims that jealous men made in lieu of a provocation theory, see infra text accom-
panying notes 255, 268-92.
238. Bailey v. People, 130 P. 832, 834 (Colo. 1913). In this case, the deceased severely
beat the defendant's sister. When the woman took refuge in her mother's house, the deceased
angrily stormed into the yard to claim her. The defendant, who also lived in the house, warned
the deceased not to come any closer and, when he disobeyed, shot him. Id. at 833-34. The
judge erroneously instructed that, in deciding whether the deceased posed a threat to the in-
habitants of the house, the jury should focus on the deceased's state of mind alone. See id. at
834. Moreover, the trial judge misstated the law when he said that the deceased "had a right to
exercise such reasonable control over ... [his wife] as was necessary to conduce to the proper
establishment and maintenance of his household as the head of a family." Id.
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and New York state between 1880 and 1920 committed lethal attacks
when their victims tried to sever romantic or family ties.
239
Whereas judges adhered to fairly rigid doctrinal bounds, juries'
readiness to convict men of murdering their estranged partners can also
be attributed to sources outside the formal law. Recall that William
Youngs's wife left him in the mid-1890s because he gave her a venereal
disease. In Youngs and numerous other cases, separation occurred when
the female victim sought to leave a relationship rendered unbearable by
her male partner's violence, infidelity, alcoholism, or chronic unem-
ployment. 240 In addition to killing, the defendants in these cases trans-
gressed other rules of conduct for men. They failed to embody the Vic-
torian ideal of the Christian Achiever, who succeeded at a business
calling while eschewing prostitutes, liquor, and unrestrained passion.
241
Nor did they adopt the image of rough-riding Theodore Roosevelt that
began to supplant Victorian manliness around the turn of the century.242
Exalting the white rancher who fought Indians and wild animals to estab-
lish the American nation,243 Roosevelt associated rape and baby-murder
with Native Americans and clung to Victorian attitudes about the nearly
asexual purity of females. 244 Moreover, when he addressed Congress in
1904, he expressly advocated corporal punishment for wife-beaters. 245
Although his criticism of the Indians' alleged brutality toward women
and children masked the hypocritical tendency of some white men to en-
gage in the same behavior, Roosevelt's public comments condemning
239. At least thirteen of thirty-three intimate murders punished by death in New York
County during this time period were classic separation assaults in which the victim separated
from the defendant. Approximately thirty-three of seventy-six defendants executed for inti-
mate killings in New York state between 1880 and 1920 committed their crimes under similar
circumstances (Data on file with author). Two New York County cases not counted as separa-
tion assaults above arguably qualify. One case involved a male murder convict who faced the
choice of going to jail or leaving his family and country after the discovery of incest. See Peo-
ple v. Loose, 92 N.E. 100, 101 (N.Y. 1910). In yet another case, the male defendant shot his
sister-in-law, who sheltered his estranged wife. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note
22, at 1376 n.364 (describing facts of People v. Hovey).
240. See id. at 1375-77.
241. See SARAH E. NEWTON, LEARNING TO BEHAVE: A GUIDE TO AMERICAN CONDUCT
BOOKS BEFORE 1900 52-61 (1994).
242. See BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 170-215 (describing how Roosevelt transformed
his image from effeminacy to "quintessential symbol of turn-of-the-century masculinity").
243. Id. at 176.
244. See id. at 181, 205. Edmund Morris argues that Roosevelt's "anti-Indian prejudice"
was "strangely at odds with his enlightened attitude to blacks." EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE
OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 454 (1979).
245. See PLECK, supra note 11, at 119.
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rape and wife-beating arguably reinforced societal aversion to intimate
violence. 2
46
Concern about drink and idleness also remained strong. Some mid-
dle-class men in New York began to imitate the saloon culture of the
working class as a release from the constraints of Victorianism, 247 but
anti-liquor ideologies continued to exert a powerful influence from the
late nineteenth century through the Prohibition Era.248 Finally, while a
series of economic depressions between 1873 and 1896 helped spawn a
new ideal of masculinity that glorified physical prowess, rather than
business achievement, 249 a man who relied on a woman's financial sup-
port still would not have inspired admiration at the turn of the century.
250
Thus, although Roosevelt's virile imperialism tapped into an emerging
recognition of "powerful 'masculine' passions," the new ideology re-
tained vestiges of Victorian self-control.251 Neither code of conduct
provided clear endorsement for drunken binges, economic failure, or vio-
lence towards the so-called "weaker sex," and Victorian mores explicitly
forbade all three.252 Hence, women who left men that broke these rules
did not provoke homicide in a way that inspired empathy for the killer.
Marital separation assaults were only one type of intimate killing
that resulted in murder convictions when men stood trial. Severe treat-
ment, including capital punishment, of male defendants allegedly abused
by those they killed also extended to a few cases involving mothers and
246. But cf DEL MAR, supra note 11, at 110 (indicating that cultural changes identified by
Bederman heightened men's violence toward women in Oregon). After 1910, some prominent
men did begin to celebrate primal sexual instincts and brutality toward non-conformist fe-
males, including woman suffragists. For further discussion, see infra notes 387-88 and ac-
companying text.
247. See BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 17.
248. For a discussion of the strength of anti-liquor forces in Denver and the role of woman
suffrage in achieving Prohibition, see THOMAS J. NOEL, THE CITY AND THE SALOON:
DENVER, 1858-1916 at 109-117 (2d ed. 1996); UBBELORDE, BENSON, & SMITH, supra note
70, at 265-66; see also BARBARA LEE EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICITY: WOMEN,
EVANGELISM, AND TEMPERANCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 102 (1981) (noting that
temperance crusaders associated alcohol abuse with wife-beating and disruption of domestic
harmony).
249. See BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 12-13.
250. Cf. ROTUNDO, supra note 65, at 5-6 (arguing that ideal of passionate manhood that
arose in late nineteenth century glorified male ambition).
251. See BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 217-18.
252. See NEWTON, supra note 241, at 52-61 (discussing prohibitions contained in Victo-
rian conduct manuals); ROTUNDO, supra note 65, at 168 ("If a man was without 'business,' he
was less of a man."); STEARNS, supra note 58, at 296 (discussing late nineteenth-century atten-
tion to drunkenness as a "moral disease" that threatened families); Siegel, supra note 11, at
2129 ("By the 1870s, there was no judge or treatise writer in the United States who recognized
a husband's prerogative to chastise his wife."). Later in this article, I offer some criticisms of
Siegel's larger premise that, despite repudiating the doctrine of chastisement, legal authorities
helped to preserve the wife-beating prerogative. See infra text accompanying notes 374-83.
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even male family members; 253 it was not exclusively limited to the mur-
der of female spouses and lovers. As a practical matter, gradually esca-
lating rage or fear operated as a defense only for women.
254
b. Suspected Infidelity
Legal doctrine and gender norms negated "simmering emotions" de-
fenses raised by men in a variety of factual scenarios, including infidel-
ity. Mere suspicion of adultery---especially suspicion that grew over a
long period of time-was rarely recognized as an adequate basis for a
heat-of-passion argument when a man killed his spouse. Thus, in both
New York and Colorado, male defendants enraged by suspected infidel-
ity often raised insanity, alibi, or accidental death defenses. 255 Those
who did request provocation instructions were frequently thwarted by
adverse rulings from the bench.
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a refusal to in-
struct on provocation where the defendant had "suspicion, or even
knowledge of prior acts of adultery" but had not witnessed his estranged
wife having sex with another man.256 New York courts proved almost as
rigorous. The case law suggests that a homicide following immediately
253. For a case of matricide, see generally People v. Carlin, 87 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1909).
Here, the jury returned a guilty verdict, despite testimony by Bernard Carlin purporting to
show "an utter failure of maternal affection and solicitude for his welfare, physical and moral,
on the part... [of the victim]." Id. at 808. Affirming his first-degree murder conviction, the
appellate court reminded Carlin: "Maternal neglect has never yet been recognized as an excuse
for matricide." Id. After losing his appeal, Carlin (a career criminal who spent much of his
youth in reformatories, id. at 806) received capital punishment for killing his mother. See
ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25. In People v. Brown, the New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed the capital conviction of Bert Brown for fatally shooting his half-brother, despite evi-
dence that "he had been bullied and beaten by the deceased." 96 N.E. 367, 368 (N.Y. 1911).
Brown was electrocuted by the state in 1911. See EsPy & SMYLKA, supra note 25. Based on
the facts recounted in the appellate opinions, Carlin's testimony seems to have been less credi-
ble than Brown's.
254. Even in the few states that deemed a man's killing of his wife's lover justifiable
homicide, a long lapse of time typically precluded invocation of the honor-killing defense. See
Territory v. Halliday, 17 P. 118, 122 (Utah 1888) (stating that husband who "slew defiler of
his wife ... after deliberating upon the defilement for 24 hours" could not claim defense). But
cf Price v. State, 18 Tex. App. 474, 484 (1885) (stating that, although statute required killing
to have occurred "before the parties to the act of adultery have separated," such language did
not mean that "the parties must be physically united.., in the act of copulation").
255. See, e.g., People v. Fornaro, 91 N.E. 542 (N.Y. 1909) (noting that defendant claimed
alibi defense to death of female lover, whom he suspected of consorting with other men in
"house of ill-repute"); People v. Sutherland, 48 N.E. 518 (N.Y. 1897) (stating that defendant
claimed he accidentally shot his allegedly unfaithful wife, even though he fired four times at
point-blank range). For cases where jealous men claimed to be insane when they killed their
wives or lovers, see infra text accompanying notes 265-90.
256. Garcia v. People, 171 P. 754, 755 (Colo. 1918).
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upon an oral report of infidelity might receive mitigation in New York,
but that any lapse of time prevented the defendant from raising a heat-of-
passion defense. In People v. Garfalo, a case that resulted in capital pun-
ishment, the trial judge excluded the defendant's past statements about
the suspected infidelity of his wife.257 Expressing approval of this evi-
dentiary ruling, the New York Court of Appeals noted: "Adultery gives
no licence [sic] to kill either of the offending parties; and if a man delib-
erately, after a lapse of time sufficient for his passion to subside, kills ei-
ther [his wife or her lover], it is murder in the first degree . -258 Simi-
larly, in People v. Wood,259 the appellate court stated:
In this state it has been held that the fact that information of the
wife's adultery had been imparted to the husband can only be proved
when it is shown that such information was given so near the time of
the commission of the crime that the court can see there was not a
sufficient period for the passion it would naturally excite to sub-
side. 260
In short, despite its bad reputation among modem legal scholars, the
traditional heat-of-passion doctrine held men to relatively high standards
of self-control. Rage that fell outside the five provocation categories or
reached the boiling point over a long period of time did not result in
mitigation for men. Rather, courts recognized the basic compatibility of
passion and premeditation in wife-murder convictions261 and rejected ar-
guments that, like the modem EED defense, conflated an instantaneous,
provoked flare of rage with prolonged emotional or psychiatric impair-
ment. 262
257. 100 N.E. 698 (N.Y. 1912); ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25 (confirming that Garfalo
was executed).
258. Garfalo, 100 N.E. at 700.
259. 27 N.E. 362 (N.Y. 1891).
260. Id. at 365.
261. Affirming the first-degree murder conviction of a male defendant for the fatal shoot-
ing of his wife, the New York Court of Appeals commented that "[a] man may deliberate, may
premeditate, and intend to kill after premeditation and deliberation, although prompted, and to
a large extent controlled, by passion at the time." People v. Jones, 2 N.E. 49, 52 (N.Y. 1885).
In People v. Foy, the same court noted:
The defendant was seemingly carried away by his brutal passion of rage, intermin-
gled with jealousy, and indulged such passion to the extent of murdering the woman
who was the cause of his jealousy. There was nothing to bring the case down to
murder in the second degree, or to any of the degrees of manslaughter.
34 N.E. 396, 397 (1893) (emphasis added).
262. Criticizing the Model Penal Code's formulation of the EED defense in the late twen-
tieth century, Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum write: "[Modem] case law applying the Code
is bristling with examples of defendants whose homicidal outbursts cannot be understood at
all, much less understood as expressing appropriate judgments of value.... If the theme of
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Nor could sexual jealousy between unmarried lovers often be shoe-
homed into the adultery category in late Victorian murder cases in which
men did the killing.263 For example, in People v. Foy, trial testimony es-
tablished that Martin Foy lay in wait for his former paramour after he
learned "that she was throwing him out; that she had another
mash .... ,"264 Despite having been jilted by his lover, however, Foy
was convicted. Such jury verdicts harmonized both with the formal law
and with social mores that condemned vengeful conduct by rejected suit-
ors as "cowardly and unmanly." 265 Hence, while newspapers speculated
about Pasqualina Robertiello's marital prospects after her acquittal,
266
the state of New York executed Foy in 1893.267
2. Male Defendants' Unsuccessful Insanity Claims
Men who stalked their victims often sought to claim temporary in-
sanity to make an end-run around the cooling-time doctrine. 268 Yet,
unlike Pasqualina Robertiello, male defendants could not successfully
equate rage with temporary insanity. As the New York trial court stated
in Foy: "[T]he heat of passion, and feeling produced by motives of anger,
common law manslaughter cases is 'virtuous rage,' the theme of the Model Penal Code is 'pa-
thology."' Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 322-23 (1996).
263. There were a few exceptions to this general rule. For example, in the Denver case,
People v. Spurrier, the defendant was allowed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter for
killing his female lover, Jennie Hastings (otherwise known as Lizzie Wright). See People v.
Spurrier, No. 5989 (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct. 1890) (providing information on defendant's
relation to deceased, who resided with another man, and recording his sentence of three years'
imprisonment at hard labor for voluntary manslaughter); SHMB, supra note 23, at No. 590
(noting that Spurrier pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter).
264. Foy, 34 N.E. at 397.
265. DECORUM: A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON ETIQUETTE AND DRESS OF THE BEST
AMERICAN SOCIETY 185 (S.L. Lewis ed., 1881).
266. See Pasqualina's Prospects, N.Y. HERALD, May 29, 1891, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 11 ("So Pasqualina has not found a husband yet. He will
turn up though, no-doubt, ere long.").
267. See ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25 (confirming that Foy was executed).
268. See, e.g., Foy, 34 N.E. at 397 ("The case thus made against... [Foy] was met by him
with an effort to prove a kind of temporary insanity). In one Colorado case, the defendant re-
quested, but was denied jury instructions on both heat-of-passion and insanity. See Defen-
dant's Requested Instructions, People v. Marshall, No. 20196 (Denver County Dist. Ct. 1911).
He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. See Verdict
(filed Sept. 29, 1911), People v. Marshall, supra (recording first-degree murder conviction of
Gus W. Marshall); Mittimus to the Penitentiary (filed Nov. 10, 1911), People v. Marshall, su-
pro (recording that Marshall received life sentence). According to Detective Sam Howe, Mar-
shall shot his wife, Lucille, after she eloped with a lover and opened a restaurant in Denver.
See SHMB, supra note 23, at No. 434.
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hatred, or revenge is not insanity." 269 Denver courts proved similarly
stringent in distinguishing fury from the legally exculpating inability to
tell right from wrong. According to a standard set of Colorado jury in-
structions: "One who does not control his passion is to blame, but an in-
sane man is not to blame."
270
In several cases, a man was found guilty of capital murder, even
though the trial judge admitted evidence that would have persuaded a
jury that the victim's past behavior literally drove the defendant crazy if
the sexes were reversed. When a male inflicted either emotional or
physical abuse on a female, her frenzied killing of him was at least
deemed excusable-and often justifiable. By contrast, when jurors heard
testimony about a deceased woman's illicit sexual activity, they did not
always feel enough sympathy for her husband to spare his life. For ex-
ample, New Yorker Frank Conroy began to suspect that his spouse was
unfaithful to him while he worked as a longshoreman in Montreal.
271
When he returned home, a friend of the family "informed him that his
wife went out riding during the afternoon with a man.., and that she
had not returned. ''272 Indeed, she stayed away from home all night and
the entire next day, appearing "upon the scene about half-past nine in the
evening." 273 Conroy raised an insanity defense at his trial for killing his
wife, presenting evidence that "he was easily excited to anger."274 But,
instead of crediting his theory, the jury convicted him on capital
charges. 275 He was executed in 1897.276 Whether the jury compared
Conroy's mental state with the legal requirements of the M'Naghten in-
sanity test as instructed, 277 or simply faulted him under extra-legal norms
for failing to master his emotions,278 remains open to debate. But it is
269. Foy, 34 N.E. at 397 (quoting jury instructions).
270. Jury Instructions (filed Dec. 9, 1903), People v. Bass, No. 16168 (Denver County
Dist. Ct. 1903); Jury Instructions (filed Oct. 5, 1900), People v. Barager, No. 14520 (Arapahoe
County Dist. Ct. 1900).
271. See People v. Conroy, 47 N.E. 258 (N.Y. 1897).
272. Id. at 258.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 260.
275. Id. at 258, 262.
276. See ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25 (confirming that Conroy was executed).
277. The test for legal insanity established in M'Naghten 's Case requires proof that the
defendant, at the time of the commission of his crime, did not know the nature and quality of
his act, or if he did know it, that he did not know that the act was wrongful. See generally
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). New York courts applied this test around the time
of the Conroy case. See, e.g., People v. Nino, 43 N.E. 853, 856 (N.Y. 1896). Hence, I assume
that when the "question of the defendant's mental condition was submitted to the jury" in Con-
roy, People v. Conroy, 47 N.E. 258, 260 (N.Y. 1897), the M'Naghten instruction was given.
278. See JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS AND CIVILITY: MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY URBAN AMERICA 147-61 (contending that nineteenth-century Americans, especially
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clear that neither formal doctrine nor societal attitudes operated to save
him.
On the whole, men experienced difficulty in sustaining claims of in-
sanity in intimate murder cases. Of seventy-four male prisoners exe-
cuted for such crimes in New York state between 1880 and 1920, almost
one-third raised unsuccessful insanity defenses.279 At least eight of
thirty-three men who received capital punishment for killing intimates in
New York County during the same time period used this strategy, to no
avail, at trial. 280 Of forty-eight Denver cases involving male defendants,
I only found two in which a man was exonerated on insanity grounds.
281
By contrast, of the sixteen male defendants convicted of first-degree
murder in Denver, at least five had raised an insanity defense. 282 In ad-
dition, at least one Denver man unsuccessfully argued that he was uncon-
men, were judged by "exacting standards of emotional control"); NEWTON, supra note 241
(stating that, throughout the nineteenth-century, writers of conduct manuals continued to em-
phasize self-discipline, including "controlling and subjugating the passions"); STEARNS, supra
note 58, at 67-69 (describing Victorian emphasis on emotional control).
279. About twenty-three intimate murderers, all males, who received capital punishment in
New York state during this time period, argued that they were not guilty by reason of insanity.
These sources are on file with the author.
280. See People v. Wood, 94 N.E. 638, 639 (N.Y. 1911); People v. Coleman, 91 N.E. 368,
370 (N.Y. 1910); People v. Furlong, 79 N.E. 978, 981 (N.Y. 1907); People v. Braun, 53 N.E.
529, 531 (N.Y. 1899); People v. Osmond, 33 N.E. 739, 740 (N.Y. 1893); People v. Smiler, 26
N.E. 312, 312 (N.Y. 1891); People v. Packenham, 21 N.E. 1035, 1035 (N.Y. 1889); People v.
Nolan, 21 N.E. 1060, 1061 (N.Y. 1889). For confirmation that all of these prisoners received
capital punishment, see ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25.
281. In the first case, O.J. Haller was acquitted of slaying his unfaithful wife and her lover,
Sam Morris. See SHMB, supra note 23, at No. 258 (recording information about this 1884
case). But cf. STEPHEN J. LEONARD, LYNCHING IN COLORADO, 1859-1919 at 61 (2002) (dis-
cussing Haller's acquittal by reason of emotional insanity). In the second case, the Denver
District Attorney's office filed an information for murder against Ben Wade, Jr., for fatally
shooting his father. See Information (filed April 26, 1905), People v. Wade, No. 16980 (Den-
ver County Dist. Ct. 1905). But a county court judge found Wade to be insane in May, 1905.
See SHMB, supra note 23, at No. 371 (noting that Wade was committed to county hospital).
282. See Jury Instructions (filed Mar. 17, 1911), People v. Murphy, No. 20002 (Denver
County Dist. Ct. 1911) (stating that defendant advanced insanity as excuse); Verdict (filed
Mar. 16, 1911), People v. Murphy, supra (convicting Murphy of first-degree murder); Jury
Instructions (filed Sept. 28, 1911), People v. Marshall, No. 20196 (Denver County Dist. Ct.
1911) (instructing jury on legal test for insanity); Verdict (filed Sept. 29, 1911), People v.
Marshall, supra (convicting Marshall of first-degree murder); Jury Instructions (filed Dec. 9,
1903), People v. Bass, No. 16168 (Denver County Dist. Ct. 1903) (showing that defendant
claimed to be insane); Verdict (filed Dec. 10, 1903), People v. Bass, supra (convicting Bass of
first-degree murder); Jury Instructions (filed Oct. 5, 1900), People v. Barager, No. 14520
(Arapahoe County Dist. Ct. 1900) (indicating that defendant claimed insanity defense); Ver-
dict (filed Oct. 5, 1900), People v. Barager, supra (convicting Barager of first-degree murder);
Defendant's Requested Instructions, People v. Medley, No. 4800 (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct.
1889) (indicating that court gave general instructions on insanity but refused language that de-
fendant specifically requested); Verdict (filed Sept. 28, 1889), People v. Medley, supra (con-
victing Medley of first-degree murder).
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scious due to epilepsy or somnambulism when he killed his victim, and
another failed to prove incompetence to stand trial.283 Thus, a substan-
tial number of men in both east and west ended up on the gallows or in
the penitentiary despite their insanity claims. This fact is significant,
considering that female murderers benefited from the readiness of juries
to excuse their lethal behavior as infirmity of the mind. When a woman
was found to have suffered temporary insanity, she typically received
neither punishment nor institutionalization in an insane asylum.
284
Courts and juries were especially unmoved by men's attempt to link
drunkenness with insanity. Defense lawyers put on expert witnesses to
describe a condition known as delirium tremens, in which the sufferer
manifests physical trembling and delusions due to prolonged alcohol
abuse, 285 but such strategies often failed. For example, the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Mills upheld the refusal to give a delirium
tremens instruction.286 The trial judge had stated that "[i]ntoxicated men
do premeditate and deliberate," and then read portions of the penal code
providing that intoxication did not excuse criminal behavior. 287 Approv-
ing these jury instructions, the appellate court noted that the generic in-
struction given on "any species of insanity which prevented ... [the de-
fendant's] distinguishing between right and wrong.., would include
delirium tremens" and thus that no special discussion of the condition
was needed.288 The State of New York executed Mills in 1885.289 A
283. For the case involving unconsciousness, see Jury Instructions (filed Nov. 13, 1897),
People v. Sanchez, No. 12570 (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct. 1897) (indicating that unconscious-
ness was an issue in the case); Verdict (filed Nov. 13, 1897), People v. Sanchez, supra (con-
victing Sanchez of first-degree murder). For the case involving alleged incompetence to stand
trial, see Affidavit of Defense Attorney (filed May 24, 1904), People v. Waycaster, No. 16390
(Denver County Dist. Ct. 1904) (claiming that "defendant is not in mental condition to be
tried"); Affidavit of Physician (filed May 26, 1904), People v. Waycaster, supra (stating that
defendant was sane); Verdict (filed June 8, 1904), People v. Waycaster, supra (convicting
Waycaster of first-degree murder).
284. For instance, a jury deemed Wilhelmine Lebkuchner insane at the time she poisoned
her children with rat poison, but she subsequently was released to resume work as a laundress
on the grounds that she had recovered her wits. See A Queer Case Throughout, SuN, Jan. 10,
1890, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 9. The same result occurred in
People v. McCluskey, in which a mother faced first-degree murder charges for throwing her
young daughter out of a window. See Insane When She Killed Her Child, WORLD, June 11,
1885, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 12 ("A commission yesterday
reported that... [Annie McCluskey] was insane at the time and she was discharged from cus-
tody.").
285. Cf WIENER, supra note 12, at 272-77 (discussing use of this defense strategy in Eng-
lish courts).
286. See People v. Mills, 98 N.Y. 176, 1885 WL 10544, at *3 (N.Y. 1885).
287. Id. (emphasis added).
288. Id.
289. See ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25 (confirming that Mills was executed).
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similar result obtained in the case of Patrick Packenham, a New York
City wife-killer hanged with three other intimate murderers in 1889.290
Packenham's lawyers analogized a person who killed during an alcoholic
trance to a sleepwalker, 291 but Recorder Smyth charged the jury that,
unless they found that Packenham was insane under the M'Naghten test,
they must convict him of first-degree murder.292
Judicial unwillingness to let intoxication arguments further en-
croach into the concept of legal insanity thus harmonized with jurors'
aversion to drunkenness. Alcohol abuse was a vice that tended to further
inculpate, rather than exculpate the accused, especially when a man faced
murder charges. In women's cases, by contrast, distaste for female
drunkenness competed with squeamishness about convicting women of
severe charges, and in the end, some female defendants prevailed by in-
voking delirium tremens. 293 Perhaps their struggle with the demons of
liquor proved less frightening to society than a frank acknowledgement
that they might kill in cold blood.
E. Why the Wild West Hanged Fewer Intimate Murderers
The discussion above supports the conclusion that intimate homi-
cide cases in New York and Colorado produced strikingly similar results.
In both states, men who killed intimates risked a murder conviction,
while female defendants tended to be acquitted or found guilty of lesser
crimes by juries sympathetic to their stories of physical or emotional
abuse. Yet, as we shall see, New York and Colorado differed dramati-
cally in social and cultural terms in the late nineteenth century, and those
differences produced divergent sentencing patterns. Whereas New York
sentenced a relatively large number of intimate killers to death as a per-
centage of its total executions, Colorado did not. Instead, men who killed
their paramours, spouses, or relatives in this western state most often re-
ceived life sentences.
This article suggests that the disparity in execution rates for intimate
murder in the two states owed much to the slow westward spread of
290. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1365, 1369 & n.33 1.
291. See Was Packenham Insane?, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 11, 1888, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 7 (discussing duel of experts over mental effects of defen-
dant's drunkenness).
292. See New York's Last Hanging, N.Y. STAR, Nov. 10, 1888, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 7.
293. See, e.g., Letter from Dr. William L. Hardy to Judge of Court of General Sessions
(July 6, 1885), in People v. McCluskey, Folder 1755, Box 17, DA PAPERS, supra note 1
(1885) (stating that Annie McCluskey, who was acquitted on grounds of insanity, "killed her
child during an attack of delirium tremens").
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norms of civilized masculinity and distaste for capital punishment. At
the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth,
Colorado's eagerness to shed its frontier image helped fuel revulsion to-
ward male defendants who killed their lovers, wives, or other family
members. Hence, Colorado juries did not hesitate to convict men of in-
timate murder. But ideals of male civility were newer and less deeply
rooted in this western state than in the northeast. Moreover, by the time
Colorado experienced a surge of opposition to the death penalty, New
Yorkers once again embraced it with fervor. 294 Thus, in contrast to their
east-coast counterparts, Coloradoans proved reluctant to use state-
sponsored execution-a form of punishment they increasingly ques-
tioned-to exact retribution or deterrence in intimate homicide cases.
Plagued by adult crime, juvenile gangs, and inadequate law en-
forcement, Denver was a rough and dirty city in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Heatless tent slums rife with disease sprawled on the banks of the
Platte River, into which raw sewage drained until the mid-1880s. Citi-
zens raised chickens and dairy cows on their urban property, and munici-
pal officials characterized stray dogs as the second worst nuisance, aside
from public drunkenness. 295 Compared to New York County's popula-
tion of more than one million residents in 1880, the county in which
Denver was located contained only 38,644 people.296 Denver's dis-
tinctly un-cosmopolitan environment embodied much of the lawless vio-
lence often associated with the American West. For example, in 1880, a
pool-hall dispute between a white man and a Chinese immigrant erupted
into widespread rioting and the looting of many Chinese-owned busi-
nesses. 297
One might expect that, in this setting, the state would have ordered
men convicted of killing their wives, girlfriends, or relatives to swing
from the gallows. Yet, as Tables 4 and 5 show, Colorado and its largest
city executed fewer intimate murderers as a percentage of total execu-
294. See infra text accompanying notes 320-24.
295. See LYLE DORSETT, THE QUEEN CITY: A HISTORY OF DENVER 92-93, 100 (1977).
296. University of Virginia Library Historical Census Browser (reporting census data from
1800), http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). In
1880, the census for New York state showed a population of 5,082,871, whereas only 194,327
people lived in Colorado. Id. Colorado experienced dramatic population growth over the
forty-year period covered in this article; however, in 1920, it still appeared tiny compared to
New York. By 1920, New York state claimed a population of 10,385,227, and New York
County boasted 2,284,103 people. Id. (reporting census data from 1920). In contrast, the cen-
sus still showed less than a million people in Colorado and less than 300,000 in Denver
County. Id.
297. DORSETT, supra note 295, at 102 (recounting events leading to the Hop Alley Fracas
of 1880); see also LEONARD, supra note 281, at 132-35 (providing information on these anti-
Chinese riots); NOEL, supra note 248, at 28-29 (same).
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tions than did New York. During this time period, not a single Denver
prisoner was legally hanged for an intimate homicide, although the state
executed eleven people convicted of crimes in the city.298 Indeed, in the
entire state of Colorado, only about eleven percent of all legal executions
(four of thirty-seven) involved defendants found guilty of intimate kill-
ings. 299 All men, save one, who were convicted of first-degree murder
in Denver for killing their lovers, wives, or relatives received life sen-
tences, many of which were commuted to shorter prison terms.
300
Table 4: Legally Executed Male Prisoners Identified as
Intimate Murderers, 1880-1920
Years New York New York Colorado Denver/
State County Arapahoe
County
1880-1889 17 10 1 0
1890-1899 23 12 1 0
1900-1909 19 7 2 0
1910-1920 15 4 0 0
Total 74 33 4 0
(1880-1920)
% of all 24% 36% 11% 0%
Executions (74 of 307) (33 of 91) (4 of 37) (0 of 11)
(1880-1920)
298. Data about executions in Colorado was gleaned from Radelet, supra note 26, at app.
1; see also ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25. I have only counted legal executions, not lynch-
ings.
299. Only two intimate killers were executed in Colorado before the turn of the century.
See Radelet, supra note 26, at app. 1 (discussing case of Marshall Clements, executed for mur-
dering his brother and sister-in-law, who he claimed had abused his father, and William H.
Davis, who was convicted of killing his foster mother and her paramour). Two more intimate
murderers received capital punishment during the eight years following the reinstatement of
the death penalty in 1901, but none was executed between 1910 and 1920. See id. (providing
details of events leading to capital punishment of Azel Galbraith for fatally shooting his wife
and eight-year-old son, and James Lynn, who was hanged for the murder of girl with whom he
was infatuated). The latter case, People v. Lynn, should not count if Lynn's romantic atten-
tions were never welcomed by his victim. See supra Part L.A (defining "intimate homicide").
However, so far, I have encountered no facts indicating that the Lynn case must be excluded on
these grounds.
300. See infra app. F. Only one of the male defendants convicted of murder received his
sentence during the period when first-degree murder carried a mandatory death penalty. This
defendant, James Medley, was released on habeas corpus. See Order (filed Apr. 16, 1890),
People v. Medley, No. 4800 (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct. 1890) (ordering discharge of James
H. Medley). For more information on the mandatory death penalty provision, see supra note
45 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, New York state executed at least seventy-six intimate
murderers between 1880 and 1920-about twenty-five percent of its total
executions. 30 1 And capital punishment in New York County during the
same period claimed the lives of ninety-one prisoners, more than one-
third of whom had killed their paramours, spouses, or other family mem-
bers.302 Animosity toward wife-killers and support for hanging or elec-
trocuting them ran deep in northeastern society. Indeed, the state-
sponsored capital punishment of men who murdered their wives or lovers
accorded with the blood lust of mobs that sometimes gathered, threaten-
ing to stage a lynching. 30 3
Table 5: Legally Executed Female Prisoners Identified as
Intimate Murderers, 1880-1920
Years New York New York Colorado Denver/
State County Arapahoe
County
1880-1889 1 0 0 0
1890-1899 1 0 0 0
1900-1909 0 0 0 0
1910-1920 0 0 0 0
Total 2 0 0 0
(1880-1920)
% of all .01% 0% 0% 0%
Executions (2 of 307) (0 of 91) (0 of 37) (0 of 11)
(1880-1920)
What accounts for the disparity between New York and Colorado
execution rates in intimate murder cases? The most legalistic answer
301. See infra app. D.
302. Thirty-three intimate murderers were executed in New York County between 1880
and 1920. Wives and girlfriends comprised the vast majority of victims in intimate murder
cases resulting in executions in both New York County and New York state. See infra apps.
C, D.
303. See, e.g., Shoots Girl Who Has a Warrant for Him, WORLD, June 7, 1910, micro-
formed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 35 (reporting that mob kicked, pummeled,
and tore most of clothing from rejected suitor after he shot woman who sought warrant against
him for threatening her); Threats of Lynching, WORLD, July 7, 1895, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 19 (noting that wife-killer James McAvoy was "mobbed by
excited neighbors" and that police had to protect him from "fists, sticks, and stones at the peril
of their own skins"); Wife Fatally Shot, MORNING J., July 7, 1895, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 19 ("Only the clubs of six policemen kept James McAvoy
from being lynched by his frantic neighbors last night.").
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simply looks to the statutes: First-degree murder carried a mandatory
death sentence in New York, whereas in Colorado, for most of the period
encompassed by this article, it did not.30 4 However, going beyond the
statutory explanation, it is possible to identify significant cultural differ-
ences between the two states.
As a general matter, the west lagged behind the east in the reception
of social and cultural change. The separate spheres ideology-which ac-
corded women the duty of keeping house and inculcating the next gen-
eration with religious values, while their husbands sallied forth into the
business sphere3 5-remained impracticable on the frontier through the
mid-nineteenth century. Pioneer women had to perform a wide range of
tasks, including physical labor, in order for the family to survive. 306 Al-
though participation in breadwinning may have given frontier wives
greater strength, the lack of distinct sex roles was paired with the sur-
vival of patriarchal norms that tacitly encouraged men's use of violence
to obtain female submission.30 7 Ironically, the ideal of companionate
marriage arrived late in both Wyoming, the first state to grant woman
suffrage, 308 and Colorado, the second state to give the vote to females.
30 9
Indeed, middle-class values emphasizing self-discipline, morality, and
segregated sex roles did not spread across the country until the late nine-
teenth century, 310 when northeasterners had already begun to rebel
against them.
311
The lack of established legal structures in the west also gave patri-
archy lingering power and legitimacy that it lacked in the northeast.
While public law enforcement developed later in New York than is often
assumed, 312 western legal institutions were even more ad hoc. When
304. See supra notes 40-41, 45 and accompanying text; see also infra note 323.
305. Historical scholarship abounds with descriptions of these sex-segregated roles. See,
e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 125. For a discussion of the separate spheres with refer-
ence to nineteenth-century conduct literature, see NEWTON, supra note 241, at 91-92.
306. See DEL MAR, supra note 11, at 10-11, 16-17, 20 (describing relatively late estab-
lishment of separate spheres in Oregon, compared to the northeast); Jenifer Banks, "A New
Home "for Whom? Caroline Kirkland Exposes Domestic Abuse on the Michigan Frontier, in
OVER THE THRESHOLD, supra note 11, at 143 (describing impossibility of maintaining sepa-
rate spheres in frontier Michigan in the late 1830s).
307. See DEL MAR, supra note 11, at 10-11, 16, 19.
308. See Paula Petrik, Send the Bird and Cage: The Development of Divorce Law in Wyo-
ming, 1868-1900, 6 W. LEGAL HIST. 153, 154 (1993).
309. Colorado gave women the vote in 1893. See NOEL, supra note 248, at 111-12.
310. See, e.g., DELMAR, supra note 11, at47.
311. See BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 12-13; ROTUNDO, supra note 65, at 222-46.
312. New York City's first municipal police force was established in 1845. See WILBUR
R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND LONDON, 1830-1870
x-xi (1973). The New York County District Attorney became an elected official with full-
time responsibilities for managing criminal cases the following year. See Ramsey, Discretion-
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New Yorker Horace Greeley visited early Denver, he reported that it was
full of ruffians "soured in temper, always armed, bristling at a word,
ready with the rifle, revolver or bowie knife. ' 313 Efforts to deal with
criminality were slow, sporadic, and often extra-legal. In the 1860s,
Denver civic leaders unsuccessfully attempted to stamp out gang activity
with vigilance committees, which took part in lynching. 3 14 In fact,
lynching constituted a popular, extra-legal mode of punishing criminals
until the mid-1880s, when respectable Coloradoans began to oppose
it.315
Law enforcement in Denver remained inadequate throughout the
nineteenth century. There was no penitentiary in the Colorado territory
until 1871,316 and as late as 1878, Denver had only one police officer for
every 4,166 citizens, compared to New York City's ratio of one patrol-
man for every 400 citizens. 317 The western city still was making do with
far fewer police per capita than New York or Philadelphia in 1887. 3 18 In
the absence of a sufficiently large and well-trained police force, the au-
thority of the male household head over his family retained political as
well as social importance. 319
Anti-capital punishment agitation also followed a different chronol-
ogy in Colorado than it did in New York. Antebellum New Yorkers ar-
ticulated strong, evangelical opposition to the death penalty during the
1830s and 1840s, and in 1841, they nearly accomplished their objective
of abolishing capital punishment. 320 Yet, by the late nineteenth century,
the attitude that murderers ought to be executed quickly to deter similar
crimes predominated and was expressed vociferously in New York City
newspapers. 321 Despite the greater squeamishness of juries, compared
with the press, men who killed intimates in New York faced a very real
possibility of being convicted and sentenced to death for first-degree
ary Power, supra note 22, at 1327. For criticism of the misleading hypothesis that public
prosecution existed in New York during the colonial period, see id. at 1325-26.
313. DORSETT, supra note 295, at 30.
314. See id. at 8, 30; see also LEONARD, supra note 281, at 23-24 (estimating that Denver
vigilance committees were responsible for more than three hangings in 1859-1860).
315. See LEONARD, supra note 281, at 156, 158; see also infra text accompanying note
324.
316. See ELINOR M. McGINN, FEMALE FELONS: COLORADO'S NINETEENTH CENTURY
INMATES 3 (2001).
317. DORSETT, supra note 295, at 94.
318. LEONARD, supra note 281, at 104 (noting that Denver had only forty-three police of-
ficers in 1887).
319. See Banks, supra note 306, at 138 (making similar observations about frontier Michi-
gan).
320. See David Brion Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America,
1787-1861, 63 AM. HIST. REV. 23,46 (1957).
321. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1353 n.263, 1354 n.264.
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murder. In contrast, nearly two-thousand miles to the west, Colorado
death-penalty opponents increased in strength and numbers in the 1890s,
after New Yorkers had largely abandoned their agitation.
Colorado's movement to abolish capital punishment gained steam
from religious leadership. In 1893, the State Senate passed a bill em-
bodying the abolitionist position.322 Although neither this bill nor a sec-
ond effort in 1895 secured the necessary votes in the State House of Rep-
resentatives, Colorado Governor Alva Adams finally signed legislation
eliminating the death penalty for first-degree murder on March 29,
1897.323 The new law substituting life imprisonment for execution en-
joyed popular support in its early days, and even when the death penalty
was reinstated in 1901, the culture of capital punishment seemed differ-
ent. Proponents now offered the deterrence of lynching-a practice that
supposedly dissuaded respectable settlers and investors from coming to
Colorado-as a sanitized rationale for state-sponsored executions.
324
Coloradoans' opposition to the death penalty in the late 1800s,
combined with the relative youth of social values condemning extreme
violence toward frontier women, may account for the fact that the public
response to men who killed their intimates was not quite as harsh in
Colorado as it was on the east coast. In the late nineteenth century, sev-
eral eastern states experimented with the use of the whipping post to de-
ter wife-beating.325 The campaign for the corporal punishment of wife-
beaters embodied many aspects of the image conveyed by Theodore
Roosevelt and others at the turn of the century. It represented a new
muscular form of masculinity, in which men who failed to protect their
women were beaten, not merely jailed or censured. Indeed, President
Roosevelt advocated whipping post laws in his annual address to Con-
gress in 1904.326
322. See Radelet, supra note 26, at 907-08.
323. See id. at 908.
324. See id. at 910-12. See also LEONARD, supra note 281, at 32, 35 (describing respect-
able Denver's opposition to vigilante justice). The strategy apparently worked, for "[alfter
1902, Colorado counted only three lynchings .... Id. at 8.
325. In 1882, Maryland passed a bill providing for the whipping of men convicted of do-
mestic assault. PLECK, supra note 11, at 111. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Hamp-
shire considered, but ultimately rejected such legislation in mid-1880s, and in 1901, Delaware
followed Maryland by enacting a whipping post law. See id. (describing whipping post legis-
lation in these states).
326. See id. at 118-19. The corporal punishment of wife-beaters may have been intended
to establish social control over blacks, Indians, and immigrants and to distinguish them from
the respectable, white male establishment. See DEL MAR, supra note 11, at 87, 95; see also
PLECK, supra note 11, at 109. Yet, some historians resist drawing a parallel between Roose-
velt's policies and racist efforts at social control. For example, while admitting that Roosevelt
considered blacks to be temporarily inferior to whites, Edmund Morris indicates that he took a
relatively progressive stance toward improving race relations and that he courted black voters.
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Although the whipping post campaign had a few adherents in the
western United States, 327 the state of Colorado did not participate as a
matter of official law and policy. 328 Indeed, unlike New York, it was not
among the twelve states that even considered such legislation.
329 Colo-
rado's reluctance to use either the whip or the gallows to control intimate
violence may have stemmed from its insecure position as a patriarchal,
frontier society that sought to earn a more polished reputation. Until
1870, the state struggled with a gender imbalance that left women out-
numbered six to one in Denver. 330 In the 1860s, the saloon served as the
primary social institution in the city; it was a multi-purpose space where
men lived, did business, took their meals, and even worshipped their
God.331 When more women started to arrive, Denver faced the delicate
task of convincing them that they were coming to a religious, female-
friendly community where it would be safe and comfortable to reside.
With regard to intimate murders, which occurred despite the civilizing
ethos urged by the church and the municipal government, legal authori-
ties weighed two options: they could bow to anti-death penalty forces
(thus risking the appearance of being soft on intimate murder), or they
could hang the culprits (potentially turning the spotlight on the city's
gendered tensions and dangers). They chose the former, and in doing so,
revealed that Colorado had not synthesized solicitude for women with
martial aggression.
The separate spheres ideology, with its accent on controlling the
passions, had reached Denver by the late nineteenth century. However,
the newer image of the impulsive, physically active man who still pro-
tected his woman from violence-an image that increasingly enchanted
New Yorkers and animated their political rhetoric-was not yet ascen-
dant in Colorado. Indeed, there is little reason to think that urban Colo-
radoans shared in the idealization of the violent Western ranchman.
Rather, in the late 1800s, residents of Denver increasingly aped values
See EDMUND MORRiS, THEODORE REx 52-53, 172, 198-200, 425, 455 (2001); MORRiS, THE
RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 244, at 255, 351, 482-83.
327. Whipping post legislation was considered but ultimately defeated in California in the
mid- 1 870s. See PLECK, supra note 11, at 110. Although Oregon adopted a whipping-post law
in 1905, the state only used it two times before it was repealed in 1911. See DEL MAR, supra
note 11, at 77-78.
328. Acting extra-legally, mobs occasionally whipped wife-beaters and lynched wife mur-
derers in late nineteenth-century Colorado. See LEONARD, supra note 281, at 91, 115, 120.
329. See PLECK, supra note 11, at 109 n.4 (listing California, Missouri, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Illinois, Delaware,
and Oregon as states that considered whipping post legislation). The District of Columbia also
debated adopting such a law. See id.
330. See DORSETT, supra note 295, at 50, 90.
331. See NOEL, supra note 248, at 113-14.
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and institutions that, in their eyes, embodied the sophistication of east-
coast cities. To cultivate a more progressive image, they designed sky-
scrapers, expressed their disapproval of lynching, and hid state-
sponsored capital punishment behind the walls of the penitentiary.
32
Theatres, museums, libraries, and churches began to supplant the social
functions of saloons, as Denver grew to be a metropolis. 333 Indeed, the
neighborhood tavern became not only an anachronism, but also a "civic
embarrassment. ' 334 Thus, whereas Roosevelt borrowed buckskin and a
hunting rifle to appear more masculine to New York City voters when he
ran for mayor in 1886,335 Coloradoans wanted their capital city to radiate
manicured urbanity. 336 The strong tendency to impose prison terms,
rather than the death penalty, on men who killed their intimates may
have mirrored Colorado's self-conscious effort to shed the Wild West
image that New Yorkers increasingly saw as an antidote to Victorianism.
To summarize: In the unsettled culture of a western state trying to
change its ways, intimate homicide perpetrated by a man was considered
bad enough to warrant a murder conviction, but insufficiently heinous to
risk the controversy that Coloradoans had begun to associate with capital
punishment. New York and Colorado thus took differing approaches to
sentencing male prisoners convicted of intimate murder. Nevertheless,
the fact that fewer intimate killers were executed as a percentage of total
executions in Colorado than in New York should not distract from the
more important conclusion that the two states pursued a similar course
with regard to condemning lethal intimate violence by men.
332. See DORSETT, supra note 295, at 142-43 (stating that proposal to erect fourteen-story
building in Denver in 1907 provoked controversy, but that newspapers supported it because it
would transform Denver into vertical city like New York); LEONARD & NOEL, supra note 70,
at 80 (noting that Denverites preferred Eastern and European architecture to southwestern or
Hispanic building styles); LEONARD, supra note 281, at 158-60 (arguing that lynching began
to fall out of fashion in Colorado in the mid-1880s because it "was increasingly seen as a foe
of civilization"); Radelet, supra note 26, at 899-901 (discussing motives behind legislation
moving all executions within walls of Caion City penitentiary in 1889); see also CARL
ABBOTT, THE METROPOLITAN FRONTIER: CITIES IN THE AMERICAN WEST xviii (1993) (stat-
ing that "[i]n the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Western cities ... helped to 'civi-
lize' the West" by imitating northeastern values and institutions and that they did not quit
"playing catch up" until the 1940s).
333. See NOEL, supra note 248, at 113.
334. Id. at 115.
335. See BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 176 (describing Roosevelt's successful mayoral
campaign), 177 fig. 12 (reproducing picture showing Roosevelt as "virile Western ranchman").
336. See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 332, at xviii (noting growth of charitable, religious,
and literary organizations in Denver by 1900); DORSETT, supra note 295, at 161-62 (stating
that Mary Elitch Long strove to bring classical music and light opera to Denver in early twen-
tieth century); UBBELOHDE, BENSON, & SMITH, supra note 70, at 263 (contending that Mayor
Robert Speer transformed Denver by expanding parks and adding new boulevards).
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II. THE FAILURE OF PREVENTION
Showing that there was no hegemonic gender ideology protecting
male perpetrators of intimate violence, as Part I does, leaves unanswered
the question of why the public criminal justice system in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries punished intimate murders, but failed
to prevent them from occurring. The problem of intimate violence was
allowed to fester until it produced autopsies, coroner's inquisitions, and
murder trials, in addition to bruises and broken bones. Part II will sug-
gest three reasons for the deplorable lack of a preventive public response.
First, the decline of neighborly and family intervention against intimate
violence thrust the problem upon a police force that was too corrupt and
brutal to handle it effectively. Second, caught in a cycle of violence and
dependence, some victims impeded solutions by refusing to seek or ac-
cept help from the police. Third, whereas Victorian social values and the
ideal of passionate manhood that replaced them generally condemned a
man's brutality against his girlfriend, wife, or family, the same counter-
currents that produced intimate assaults frustrated efforts to curb them.
A. Policing Civilized Masculinity
1. The Decline of Neighborly Intervention
By the late nineteenth century, the network of relatives, neighbors,
and friends who helped shield victims of intimate violence from their
abusers had largely disintegrated. Both Denver and New York had be-
come anonymous cities, in which urban dwellers increasingly maintained
a polite distance from their relatives and treated the family next door as
strangers. Court records and prosecutors' papers abound with evidence
that both neighbors and relatives frequently ignored screams from family
fights and that, if they did attempt to play a peacemaking role, they often
learned a violent lesson about the costs of intervention.
In the world of working-class families who moved from one rented
room to another, there was little hope that neighbors would intercede to
stop a beating. Mary Slattery lived on the same floor as George Whittel,
who beat his wife to death in New York City in 1891. 337 The following
excerpt from her trial testimony illuminates the decline of neighborly in-
tervention against intimate violence:
337. See Testimony of Mary Slattery, Trial Transcript at 1, People v. Whittel, Folder 3989,
Box 432, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) (stating where she lived in relation to Whittel fam-
ily).
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Q: What did you do when you saw [the defendant hitting and
kicking the deceased]?
A: I went and shut my own door, I would not be looking at him
any longer.
Q: You shut the door and left the sick woman to be kicked
around by this husband, did you?
A: I did not know them much.
Q: You never had been introduced to her and therefore you could
not go in and defend her?
A: I did not take much notice of them, I thought it would not be
so bad as this.
Q: You say you saw her afterward?
A: Yes sir, I saw her after when they sent a little boy in for me.
Q: Why did not you go down when you saw this man kicking
this woman, go down on the street a report him to a police-
man?
A: I did not like to.
Q: Why didn't you?
A: I did not do it.
Q: You made no demonstration to stop him?
A: I did not make any remark, I shut my own door, I had no
more to say. 3
38
The inquisition into the death of Catharine Derringer in the same
year as the Whittel case reveals a similar lack of neighborly concern. A
female neighbor and her friend dressed and left their building, without
investigating the loud quarrel and the anguished cry, "Oh, Billy, Oh,
Billy, I am dying" which emanated from the Derringers' room.
339
Such isolation from neighbors was common in less urban areas, as
well. For example, when Frank Conroy and his wife got into a bloody
battle over her alleged infidelity in Ogdensburg, New York, several
neighbors "were attracted to the front door by the screams of the de-
ceased."'340 Conroy answered their knock "covered with blood" and
338. Testimony of Mary Slattery, Trial Transcript at 7-8, People v. Whittel, Folder 3989,
Box 432, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891).
339. See Testimony of Mary Murray, Coroner's Inquisition at 7-9, People v. Derringer,
Folder 3996, Box 433, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891). For other New York City examples,
see People v. Koenig, 72 N.E. 993, 993 (N.Y. 1904) (stating that male lodger started to inves-
tigate when he heard quarreling and "gurgling" noise, but that "his wife told him to mind his
own business"), and People v. Coleman, 91 N.E. 368, 369 (N.Y. 1910) (noting failure of other
inhabitants of dwelling to shield woman from husband's violence).
340. People v. Conroy, 47 N.E. 258, 260 (N.Y. 1897).
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holding "a carving knife in his hand." Yet, "the outsiders did not inter-
fere at this point"; rather, the "defendant was allowed to close the street
door" and slaughter his wife.
34 1
Several factors, besides population growth and urbanization, con-
tributed to the decline of neighborly assistance. First, household heads
increasingly claimed that their troubles with intimates were a private
matter. Second, attempts to stop a spousal beating or quarrel often re-
sulted in escalated violence, including attacks on children, other rela-
tives, or the would-be peacemaker. People v. Schuyler342 provides a
shocking illustration of both factors. A neighbor reproved Schuyler for
striking his wife, whereupon the defendant angrily retorted: "This is a
family affair, and neighbors need not interfere." 343  Schuyler then
grabbed his three-year-old daughter and fatally bashed her head against a
wooden block, claiming later that he would not have killed the child "but
for the neighbors."
344
The few neighbors or bystanders who tried to help risked becoming
victims themselves. For instance, in Denver, Birdie Brown alleged that
William F. Nichols hit her in the stomach and the nose when she told
him to "let [his wife] Ida alone." 345 Sometimes, an individual who at-
tempted to assist the abuse victim paid with his life. In 1898, a nineteen-
year-old New York City resident died after being shot when he attempted
to stop a man from beating his ex-wife.
346
Although some family members shielded battered individuals or
made accusations against the abuser,347 others were too submissive or
apathetic even to call a doctor for the dying victim. For example, in the
Whittel case discussed above, the sister of the beaten woman acquiesced
341. Id. The appellate court described a fierce and prolonged struggle in which the defen-
dant pursued the victim throughout their house and inflicted multiple knife wounds on her
hands, arm, breast, face, and scalp, before finally slicing her jugular vein. See id.
342. 12 N.E. 783 (N.Y. 1887).
343. Id. at 784.
344. Id. at 785.
345. Affidavit of Birdie Brown, Coroner's Inquisition into Death of William F. Nichols
(Aug. 25, 1903), Box 27931, Coroner's Records, City and County of Denver. New Yorkers
who tried to stop intimate violence also risked being attacked. For example, Adrian Braun was
imprisoned for assaulting several men who "rushed in" to break up a quarrel between him and
his wife. See People v. Braun, 53 N.E. 529, 530 (N.Y. 1899). While serving his sentence for
the assault, he killed his wife in the prison visiting area and was convicted of capital murder.
See id. at 533 (affirming first-degree murder conviction).
346. See Wife 's Defender Shot, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 22, 1898, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 23.
347. For example, Thomas Murphy spoke out against the abuse of his wife by his brother-
in-law Thomas Dunphy. As a result of this quarrel, Dunphy killed him. See, e.g., Affidavit of
James Murray, Police Court Records, People v. Dunphy, Folder 1859, Box 184, DA PAPERS,
supra note 1 (1885).
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when the woman's husband said that she did not need a doctor.348 If
neighbors and family members failed to shield the victim, police inter-
vention or stoic endurance constituted the only remaining options.
2. The Corruption and Brutality of Early Public Law
Enforcement
Although the coroner had the greatest responsibility for investigat-
ing homicide, 349 the police broke up fights in private homes, as well as
in the streets and saloons. 350 As the public criminal justice system de-
veloped and neighborly intervention declined, the pofice increasingly re-
sponded to violent altercations among family members. 351 The papers of
the New York County District Attorney contain very few non-lethal in-
timate assault cases, indicating that such matters were processed at a
lower level, either by the discretionary decisions of police magistrates or
by the patrolmen themselves. 352 Extra-legal station-house releases seem
to have been a common way of dealing with a variety of crimes. 353
However, newspaper articles provide anecdotal evidence that officers at
least sporadically hauled men into police court for beating or otherwise
attacking their intimates.354 The criminal records of men convicted of
348. See Testimony of Elizabeth Daley, Trial Transcript at 20, People v. Whittel, Folder
3989, Box 432, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891).
349. See MONKKONEN, supra note 35, at 18 (stating that this was true in New York City
until about 1910); see also ROGER LANE, MURDER IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 112 (1997) (not-
ing that, during early days of public policing, police did not perform detective functions in
homicide cases and that instead coroners, who were "low-caliber elected officials," cursorily
examined dead bodies).
350. Cf id. at 126 (stating that in antebellum Boston, the "biggest single job" of Boston
Watch and Police was breaking up fights, most of which occurred in private homes).
351. For a discussion of such intervention in New York, see infra text accompanying notes
374-75. A comparable situation seems to have existed in the western states. See DEL MAR,
supra note 11, at 65 (describing expanded role of police in attempting to protect abused
women in Oregon). During the 1870s, feminist Lucy Stone catalogued 500 arrests per year for
wife-beating in Boston. See Stark, supra note 104, at 988.
352. Pamela Haag makes similar observations about the disposition of intimate assault
cases during a slightly earlier time period. See Pamela Haag, The "Ill-Use of a Wife: " Pattern
of Working Class Violence in Domestic and Public New York City, 1860-1880, J. SOC. HIST.
447, 449 (1992).
353. See MILLER, supra note 312, at 73.
354. See, e.g., A Wife Beater Held, N.Y. STAR, July 8, 1887, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 4 (reporting that John Irwin was arraigned in police court
for beating and kicking his wife Mary, that she charged him with assault, and that he denied
charges but was held on $500 bail); Tried to Shoot His Wife, N.Y. STAR, Feb. 23, 1889, micro-
formed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 7 (reporting that dissolute stonecutter was
arrested for shooting at his wife and that he attempted to regain her trust by begging her par-
don at station house); Assaulted by Her Mother and Brother, N.Y. STAR, May 13, 1890, mi-
croformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, at Roll 9 (reporting that New York City woman was "beaten,
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murder also reveal arrests and peace bonds from past incidents of domes-
tic violence. 355 Still, such strategies did not solve the problem.
Failure to establish an effective system of intimate-violence preven-
tion owed at least in part to the primitive nature of policing. Law en-
forcement in the age of machine politics was infamously corrupt and in-
efficient. Professionalism barely had begun to reach the police forces of
New York City and Denver in the period covered by this article.
356
Denver police commissioners shielded gamblers and prostitutes, and al-
though the New York force was much larger than its western counterpart,
respectable New Yorkers still viewed officers in their city as partisan
amateurs exercising legal power in the interests of Tammany Hall.
357
Besides gambling, receiving kickbacks for protecting criminals, and
generally doing the bidding of the political bosses,358 the police earned a
well-deserved reputation for brutality. For example, in the early 1890s,
the New York press expressed concern about the shooting of a bartender
by a police officer who apparently believed his political connections
would spare him from prosecution.359 Apropos of the homicide, the Dis-
trict Attorney made a great show of saying, "It is time these police out-
rages should be stopped. The police are the servants of the community,
but sometimes act as if they were its brutal masters." 360 Nevertheless,
kicked, and dragged by her hair until she became unconscious" when she attempted to break
up a fight between her mother and brother and that police arrested both of her assailants).
355. See, e.g., People v. Conklin, 67 N.E. 624, 628 (N.Y. 1903) (noting that New York
County District Attorney produced evidence of criminal proceedings against defendant by his
wife, whom he subsequently shot to death). The court listed the contents of these records:
These records contain the sworn complaints of the wife, charging defendant with
disorderly conduct, threats, and assaults, and also abandonment and refusal to sup-
port or provide for her or her child. Then follow the warrant for his arrest, the re-
turn of the officer, the bail bonds, and other proceedings in detail.
Id. The State of New York executed Conklin in 1903. See ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25.
356. See LEONARD, supra note 281, at 104. Cf LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA 1870-1910 at 77-79 (1981) (describing lack of professionalism and criminal ori-
gins of many Oakland, CA police officers).
357. See LEONARD & NOEL, supra note 70, at 106 (noting connections between Denver
police commissioners and criminal underworld). Of similar problems in New York City, his-
torian Wilbur Miller comments, "One venerable and persistent aspect of New York's police
tradition is corruption." MILLER, supra note 312, at 169. For Miller's discussion of partisan
control of the New York police force prior to 1870, see id. at 16-17, 23, 140-41, 151.
358. See Steinberg, supra note 70, at 764, 771 (discussing District Attorney's exposure of
police corruption in Progressive Era New York City). See also Ramsey, Discretionary Power,
supra note 22, at 1389 (noting that New York police officers were suspected of shielding
criminals from arrest or prosecution, based on ethnic and political loyalties).
359. See, e.g., Trumps with Clubs, MORNING J., Feb. 18, 1891, microformed on DA
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the Morning Journal wondered how long the policeman's "pull" would
last, opining that "[m]any citizens who know these supposed guardians
of the peace only as sources of terror to the community are very much
interested in the question." 361 Around the same time, the New York Trib-
une admitted that the police had made progress in driving gangs of rob-
bers from the streets, but still complained: "Their commonest, most inju-
rious, and inexcusable fault is their readiness to brandish their clubs and
their eagerness to apply them when there is no necessity for menace,
much less violence. '362 Indeed, from the late nineteenth through the
early twentieth centuries, urban law enforcers allegedly clubbed citizens
without provocation, instilling in the public the view that the police per-
petrated violence, rather than prevented it.
363
Although police officers increasingly offered the only hope of out-
side protection from intimate violence, some were wife-beaters and even
wife-murderers themselves. In 1891, for example, on-duty patrolman
William Smith inflicted a fatal head injury on his wife with his truncheon
after she interrupted him at the saloon where he drank and caroused with
another woman.364 Police officers' notorious readiness to lie, cheat, and
assault may have not only reduced their credibility in the eyes of ju-
ries,365 but also deterred victims from seeking their assistance.
3. Non-Reporting and Victim Recantation
Terrified victims often refrained from reporting battering incidents.
They invented fictions to hide abuse from family, friends, and neighbors;
361. Id.
362. Clubs in the Police Force, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 23, 1891, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 10.
363. See, e.g., Trumps with Clubs, supra note 359 (reporting, in 1891, that sixty-year old
man was "clubbed without provocation" by policeman in front of his teenage daughter); More
Policemen in Trouble, SUN, Mar. 24, 1910, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at
Roll 35 (reporting, in 1910, on manslaughter prosecution of police officer for clubbing death
of young Italian man in Bronx saloon).
364. See Testimony of Officer William Gillespie, Coroner's Inquisition at 4-17, People v.
Smith, Folder 3155, Box 429, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891) (testifying to details of events
at saloon); Testimony of John Smith, Coroner's Inquisition at 58-59, People v. Smith, supra
(testifying that his father struck his mother with police truncheon outside saloon). It is signifi-
cant that, unlike most individuals suspected of an intimate homicide, Officer Smith was
charged with manslaughter, not murder. See Indictment, People v. Smith, supra. This fact
tends to corroborate journalists' complaints about police officers evading the punishments they
deserved.
365. Defense attorneys sometimes referred to police misconduct to shake the jury's confi-
dence in an officer's testimony. See, e.g., Murder in the Second Degree, N.Y. STAR, June 18,
1890, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 9 (discussing use of such tactics
in trial of George Spence for murdering his wife).
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they also hesitated to involve the police. Prior to being killed by her
husband, for instance, a New York City woman named Minnie Schultz
told her sister that she had "bumped" herself, rather than admitting to
having suffered a beating.366 If a victim of intimate abuse did call for a
patrolman, she might ask him to leave without making an arrest. Patrick
Conklin's wife made frequent complaints to the authorities about threats
and violence by her husband, who later shot her to death. However, in
describing this New York City couple's past marital strife, the court
noted that, in at least two incidents, criminal "proceedings were with-
drawn at the request of the wife."
367
A violent murder in Westchester County, near Manhattan, offers
another sad example. Oscar Borgstrom "was unjustly jealous of his wife,
frequently quarreled with her, and threatened on several occasions to kill
her."368 His violent attacks finally escalated to such a frightening level
that she "swore out a warrant for his arrest, and placed it in the hands of
an officer to serve." 369  However, when the policeman arrived, Mrs.
Borgstrom "relented, for the reason... that she said she didn't like to do
it on account of its being Easter Eve... and she wanted to go to com-
munion."370 The following Monday, Oscar slit her throat.
371
Two factors seem to have led to non-reporting and victim recanta-
tion. First, as the Borgstrom case demonstrates, a visit from the police
might cause an abuser to become even more violent. A typical New
York City woman was afraid to have her husband arrested for beating her
"as he would murder her if he got out [of prison]. ' 372 Second, many vic-
tims of intimate abuse worried that their family's livelihood would be
destroyed by a criminal case. Battered wives, in particular, might have
faced terrible economic hardship if the men upon whom they depended
financially were imprisoned, fired from their jobs, or shunned by busi-
ness associates for being wife-beaters. The spouse of New York City po-
lice officer William Smith, who clubbed her with his truncheon, at-
tempted to keep the cause of her ultimately fatal injuries a secret. As her
brother testified, "she was shielding [her husband], she was afraid he
366. Testimony of Minnie Schultz, Coroner's Inquisition at 44, People v. Schultz, Folder
3472, Box 370, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1889).
367. People v. Conklin, 67 N.E. 624, 628 (N.Y. 1903).




372. Testimony of Alice Murphy, Coroner's Inquisition at 3, People v. Weldon, Folder
217, Box 17, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1880).
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would be broken off the police" if she reported his attack on her.373 His
arrest would mean the end of the income that put food on the family's
table. Even if the abuser failed in his role as breadwinner, as many inti-
mate murderers apparently did, reporting his violent behavior to the po-
lice threatened to leave the children fatherless. Thus, as mediated solu-
tions brokered by neighbors and family members evaporated, victims of
intimate violence faced a stark choice: stay silent or involve the police.
To many, the latter option seemed as perilous as the former.
B. Countercurrents: Resilient Beliefs in the Wife-Beating
Prerogative
Police officers who attempted to settle violent domestic incidents
met other forms of resistance, besides victim recantation. Some were
shot or faced life-threatening assaults from wife-beaters and their cro-
nies. 374 In New York City, for example, Officer Herrlich got more than
he bargained for when he responded to the entreaties of a woman whose
drunken husband, John Crowley, grabbed her throat and head-butted her:
He found Crowley in the yard of the building in the company of a
gang of thieves, who at once attacked him with stones and huge
pieces of ice. Herrlich, finding his club of no service, drew his re-
volver, and, having grabbed Crowley, he levelled the weapon at the
ruffians.
3 7 5
Such incidents confirm the resilience of beliefs in the wife-beating
prerogative. However, I am less convinced than other feminist scholars
that the white male establishment simply transformed its rhetoric to hide
373. Testimony of Edward Hagen, Coroner's Inquisition at 47, People v. Smith, Folder
3155, Box 429, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1891). Even if the abuser were arrested, indicted,
and brought to trial, his victim still might be reluctant to testify against him, as is shown by the
New York state case, People v. Green, 94 N.E. 658 (N.Y. 1911). Fearing her violent husband,
Emma Green took her children and fled to her uncle's home. Id. at 659. Her husband fol-
lowed with a rifle and opened fire, shooting her non-fatally in the head and killing their teen-
aged daughter. See id. at 659-60. However, instead of assisting with the murder prosecution
of Charles Green, the abused woman testified on his behalf at trial. When asked about the na-
ture of their marital differences, she replied, "I don't want to tell anything that would hurt my
husband." Id. at 659. Although her refusal to testify against Green may have stemmed from
her emotional bonds to him, it is equally likely that she feared losing the family farm if he
were incarcerated or executed. See id. at 659 (stating that defendant lived on small farm in
Albany County, New York).
374. See Wife's Defenders Shot, supra note 346 (reporting that police officer was shot in
April 1898 when responding to domestic fracas involving wife-beater who also killed young
man that intervened).
375. Missiles for the Policeman, EVENING POST, Jan. 2, 1891, microformed on DA
SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2, at Roll 10.
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a firm commitment to the brutal subjugation of women.376 Rather, in my
view, the ice-throwing incident described above377 and the murder cases
analyzed in this article reveal a deep cultural rift over the issue of inti-
mate violence.
Reva Siegel and others have argued that efforts to control wife-
beating in the post-bellum United States primarily targeted working-class
men and ethnic minorities. 378 According to Siegel, elite white men paid
lip service to the repudiation of marital chastisement, but in fact, contin-
ued to beat women behind newly erected walls of family privacy. She
provides some evidence of a tacit conspiracy among upper-class males to
shield elite wife-beaters, while blaming the problem of family violence
on immigrants, poor people, and blacks.379 My own findings, to some
extent, harmonize with Siegel's argument. Among male defendants exe-
cuted for intimate murder in New York state and Colorado, for example,
working-class men, low-earning white-collar workers, and artisans pre-
dominated, and many defendants were unemployed. 380 Moreover, al-
though my racial data is limited, it appears that about twenty percent of
all men who received severe punishment for killing intimates in the two
cities belonged to racial minorities, even though such minorities consti-
tuted a tiny percentage of the total population.
381
376. For an example of such an argument, see Siegel, supra note 11, at 2120.
377. See infra text accompanying note 379.
378. See Siegel, supra note 11, at 2134-41. See also DEL MAR, supra note 11, at 80-81,
87 (arguing that whipping post laws were used to stigmatize marginal men); PLECK, supra
note 11, at 109-110, 116 (discussing racial implications of whipping post campaign and in-
volvement of Ku Klux Klan in punishment of wife-beaters and child-abusers).
379. See Siegel, supra note 11, at 2134-41, 2154-61.
380. See infra app. G.
381. In Denver at least three of the sixteen men convicted of first-degree intimate murders
between 1880 and 1920 were Hispanic, and two were black. See Motion for Continuance
(filed Dec. 16, 1918), People v. Rocco, No. 24538 (Denver County Dist. Ct. 1918) (stating that
Jose Rocco was "a Mexican by birth"); SHMB, supra note 23, at No. 604 (describing Fred
Sanchez, whose life term for killing his wife was commuted to forty-four years, as "a Mexi-
can"), No. 58 (describing Frank Bass, who was convicted of murder in 1903, as "Negro"), No.
648 (stating that William Bruno, who received life sentence in 1917, was "Mexican"), No. 299
(noting that Dennis Humphreys, a "Negro," was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting
Gussie Watson in jealous rage). At least two blacks and one Hispanic numbered among the
fifteen male defendants who pled guilty to, or were convicted of, second-degree murder
charges for killing intimates. See SHMB, supra note 23, at No. 187 (describing Charles Ford,
who pled guilty to second-degree murder for killing his mistress with a flat iron, as "colored"
or "brown skin mulatto"), No. 394 (stating that Phillip [sic] Lopez, who killed Eralia [sic] Ar-
guello in 1910, was "Mexican"), No. 781 (noting that H.D. Davis, a "Negro," pled guilty to
killing his wife and was sentenced to thirty years to life in state penitentiary). In addition, one
of two women convicted of murder for killing a male intimate in Denver between 1880 and
1920 was mulatto. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing Lemmons case). In
both 1880 and 1920, "colored persons" accounted for less than three percent of Denver or
Arapahoe County's total population. See HISTORICAL CENSUS BROWSER (Univ. of Virginia
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem of intimate violence
was not confined to the lower classes or to non-whites. For instance, in
1890, the son of a wealthy and prominent Rochester family faced charges
in New York County for beating his common-law spouse-a woman
"from a good family in Louisiana. ' 382 When family strife turned to
homicide, a few professional men even ended up in the electric chair:
two prisoners executed in New York County for killing their wives were
either doctors or medical students.383 Such cases indicate a couple of
things. First, intimate murder was not exclusively restricted to the work-
ing class. Second, elite intimate violence occasionally resulted in crimi-
nal charges and even severe punishment. Because my research traces
public responses to the killing of lovers, spouses, and other family mem-
bers, rather than the actual incidence of such crimes, I cannot contend
that the sparse number of elite cases I encountered demonstrates that
high-status men generally refrained from murdering or even beating their
intimates. Perhaps the handful of elite abusers who appear in legal re-
cords and newspapers represented the tip of a large, submerged iceberg.
Punishing murderers simply may have reinforced the status regime by
ensuring that the white male establishment did not undermine its claims
to legitimacy by shedding too much intimate blood.
Nevertheless, resilient beliefs in the wife-beating prerogative were
not synonymous with a conspiracy against women. In my view, it is
more plausible that, instead of being controlled by a hegemonic gender
ideology, late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century America
was divided over whether violence had a legitimate place in family gov-
Geospatial & Statistical Data Center), available at http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/census (report-
ing census data from 1880 and 1920) (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
In New York County, seven out of thirty-three men executed for intimate murder between
1880 and 1920 were black, although "male negroes" also comprised less than three percent of
New York County's total population in both 1880 and 1920. See id. The black prisoners'
names were Augustus Leighton, Miguel Chacon, John Lewis, Howard Scott, Lewis, Pullerson,
William Nelson, and Gilbert Coleman. See ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25 (confirming race
and execution of these defendants). At least four of the seven black intimate murderers exe-
cuted in New York County killed black victims. For information on the race of the victim in
these New York cases, see Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note 22, at 1382 n.396 (stat-
ing that victims in the Chacon and Lewis cases were black); People v. Scott, 46 N.E. 1028,
1028 (N.Y. 1897) (stating that murdered wife of defendant was "a colored woman"); People v.
Nelson, 81 N.E. 768, 769 (N.Y. 1907) (describing defendant, deceased, and all of their
neighbors in building where they lived as "ignorant colored people").
382. A Fast Young Man, PRESS, May 12, 1890, microformed on DA SCRAPBOOK, supra
note 2, at Roll 9.
383. It is worth noting, however, that the two elite men executed in New York County
both poisoned their victims (a stereotypically white-collar method of killing), rather than
shooting, stabbing, or battering them to death. See Ramsey, Discretionary Power, supra note
22, at 1374-75, 1379-80 (discussing capital cases of Carlyle Harris and Robert Buchanan).
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eminent. The press and the jury box demonstrated little empathy for
males who killed their intimates, and policemen like Officer Herrlich
even attempted to quell battering before it escalated to homicide. In spite
of such efforts, some American men continued to believe that "a few
thumps once in a while can do no harm."
384
The survival of their viewpoint, in the face of cultural exhortations
to self-restraint, guaranteed a steady supply of blackened eyes, broken
bones, and even corpses. It also ensured a certain amount of tension in
the criminal justice system. Trial juries sometimes acquitted abused or
abandoned women of homicides that coroner's juries deemed unjustifi-
able; 385 judges gave instructions that men in the jury box chose to ig-
nore; and appellate courts failed to articulate a coherent doctrinal justifi-
cation for the disparate treatment of male and female murder defendants.
Furthermore, the same values that promoted protectiveness toward
women contained loose threads that often unraveled in actual intimate
relationships. Frustrated by their inability to achieve success in the pub-
lic sphere, husbands, fathers, and brothers may have struck angrily at
those who loved and lived with them. Told to be sober, restrained, and
industrious, some men rebelled and were none of these things. 386 As
ideals of masculine physicality and passion began to supplant Victorian-
ism around the turn of the century, certain aspects of the new ideal
seemed to resonate with the violent conquest of women. Even though
public figures like Roosevelt denounced child-murder and wife-beating
and placed the American mother on a pedestal, other voices-including
those of eminent scientists-celebrated men's primitive sexual instincts
as a counterweight to the "unnatural" behavior of the woman suffra-
gists. 387 This competing strand of early twentieth-century culture sug-
gested that, if females failed to be modest, refined, and maternal, "all
bets were off... [w]oman must then bear the brunt of unfettered mascu-
384. See Testimony of Alice Murphy, Coroner's Inquisition at 3, People v. Weldon, Folder
217, Box 17, DA PAPERS, supra note 1 (1880) (testifying to statement made by Thomas
Weldon, who was indicted but never tried for the death of his wife).
385. Compare Coroner's Inquisition into Death of Peter Duncan (Aug. 23, 1904), Box
27931, Coroner's Records, City and County of Denver (stating that Rosa Anderson "unjusti-
fiably" inflicted lethal gunshot wound on Peter Duncan) with Verdict (filed Sept. 29, 1904),
People v. Anderson, No. 16628 (Denver County Dist. Ct. 1904) (acquitting Anderson of the
murder of Peter Duncan).
386. Cf Adler, supra note 12, at 266-68 (making complementary argument about domes-
tic homicide in late nineteenth-century Chicago).
387. See supra text accompanying notes 243-46, 326 (discussing Roosevelt's views);
BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 158-62 (discussing scientists' writings on the "primal savage
rapist").
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line violence." 388 In increasingly anonymous urban environments that
were not policed effectively, such tensions and countercurrents killed.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars in recent decades have expressed a great deal of con-
cern about symmetry, or lack thereof, in the criminal law's treatment of
intimate homicide. The most hostile critics of battered woman's syn-
drome evidence label the defense the "abuse excuse" and suggest that it
creates a special rule excusing women's crimes.389 In contrast, many
feminists see the provocation doctrine as a safety net that encourages
characteristically male forms of aggression and perpetuates a standard of
"reasonableness" determined from men's perspective. 390  Victoria
Nourse asks, for example: "If the battered woman must control herself,
why should the cuckolded man be permitted to let his emotions run
free?" 391 Despite their disparate points of departure, however, many of
these critiques of the criminal law share the view that the litigation play-
ing field ought to be leveled so that one sex does not enjoy a monopoly
on exculpating and mitigating doctrines.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, neither the
American male public nor juries drawn from its ranks seemed concerned
about symmetry. However, the asymmetrical attitudes evident in the
cases discussed in this article do not tell the anticipated story of men who
favored other men when called to judge them for committing homicides.
Scholars often assume that male jurors routinely empathized with ac-
cused men's rage at the infidelities and lapses of duty that sometimes ac-
company intimate relationships, but that they did not extend comparable
388. Id. at 159 (discussing views of bacteriologist Sir Almroth Wright and biologist Wil-
liam T. Sedwick); see also id. at 205 (contrasting Roosevelt with Sedgwick and Wright).
389. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE
THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 48-58 (1997) (presenting scathing critique of battered
woman's syndrome defense); Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Bat-
tered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REV. 615, 627 n.55 (1982) (referring to "disquiet-
ing indications of vigilantism in the battered wife setting").
390. See Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of
Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1435, 1447, 1453 (1998) (book re-
view); see also supra note 10.
391. Nourse, The New Normativity, supra note 390, at 1447. Legal scholars have sug-
gested various solutions to this perceived inequality. For example, Cynthia Lee makes the
creative proposal that the jury be asked to imagine that the defendant and the victim are a dif-
ferent sex than they actually are when provocation is an issue in the case. See LEE, supra note
10, at 11-12. Cf Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 262, at 332-33 (contending that courts
ought to relax imminence requirement in cases of battered women who kill because criminal
law in some jurisdictions allows men to use deadly force to defend their honor or property).
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understanding to female defendants. 392 It is true that the traditional
provocation doctrine partially justified or excused one gendered category
of intimate killings: those occurring immediately after the discovery of
adultery. It bolstered patriarchy by making a normative judgment about
the wrongfulness of behavior that infringed the husband's exclusive sex-
ual access to his wife. Yet, by focusing on the potential for the provoca-
tion doctrine to lessen the punishment of violent men, scholars have
overlooked the late Victorian era's greater concern with self-control and
protectiveness toward women.
Although the heat-of-passion defense operated to spare some men
from murder convictions, a substantial number of intimate killers were
executed or sentenced to long prison terms in both the eastern and the
western United States. Most of the intimate killers who received harsh
sentences between 1880 and 1920 were men. The disproportionately
large number of male defendants sent to the gallows, electric chair, or
prison can be attributed in part to the fact that murder is usually a man's
crime. 393 However, such an explanation fails to suffice. Rather, men re-
ceived severe punishment for killing intimates because an influential set
of cultural values in nineteenth-century America emphasized that manli-
ness inhered in self-restraint and that a man's loss of control was often
intolerable. Thus, while instantaneous passion provoked by a narrow set
of circumstances was eligible for mitigation, male defendants who lay in
wait for their victims or whose rage and frustration grew slowly over
time faced the punishments associated with first-degree murder. Held to
a higher standard of self-control than their female counterparts, men in
New York and Colorado were judged rigorously for avenging separation,
and courts refused to accept their efforts to conflate jealous rage with
temporary insanity.
Even as values of Victorian manliness declined and were supplanted
by a more impulsive, violent standard of masculinity around the turn of
the century, the ideal of solicitude for women's supposed weakness and
dependence retained its currency. Indeed, cultural forces that may have
reduced sympathy for women caused no major transformation in public
perceptions of intimate violence until after 1900 or even after 1920.
394
392. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 10, at 1697-98 ("Understanding and sympathy comes
from those who can see themselves in the defendant's situation. Only recently given full par-
ticipation in jury service and still underrepresented on the bench, women may have difficulty
finding sympathy as defendants.").
393. See id. at 1680. See also supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing men's
cross-cultural and trans-historical penchant for committing murder).
394. The decline of paternalistic sympathy for women is beyond the scope of this article.
Cultural forces reflecting or contributing to such a change may have included women's suf-
frage, the entry of women into certain sectors of the workforce, the rise of psychoanalytic
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The exemplary punishment of men who failed to keep their passions
in check contrasted with the relatively lenient treatment of female murder
defendants, almost all of whom were either exonerated or convicted of
lesser-included offenses. Paternalistic sympathy for women often came
in the form of insanity acquittals. But the willingness of courts and juries
to consider evidence of past abuse also meant that a woman's trial might
focus on the history of an intimate relationship scarred by terrifying vio-
lence and a protracted struggle for power, rather than simply on the lethal
moment when she killed the deceased. Hence, some female defendants
prevailed or received mitigation on grounds of perfect or imperfect self-
defense; their options were not limited to insanity claims. Indeed, retain-
ing a modicum of control over their trials, many women took the witness
stand in their own defense and thus helped construct the narratives de-
signed to spare them.
The recognition of long time frames leading to homicide had the
positive potential to justify a woman's choice of violence as a last resort
in a relationship that put her life at risk. Nonetheless, the strategy still
embodied a subordinating attitude toward women. Exculpating traumas
included not only physical blows and death threats, which legitimately
might lead to a defensive killing, but also broken engagements and other
emotional harms that, in my view, responsible adults must learn to bear.
The urge to protect female honor from the dalliances of rakish men may
have harmonized with the claims of a husband who killed his adulterous
wife; both recognized nineteenth-century concerns with reputation, prop-
erty, and sexual exclusivity. Yet, the acquittal of women whose anger at
romantic rejection reached the boiling point or whose past suffering or
even alcoholism allegedly resulted in insanity often went beyond the
bounds of traditional exculpating or mitigating doctrines, as they were
applied to men.
theories emphasizing female masochism, the popularity of rape narratives in books and film,
and the increased tendency of social-work organizations to blame abuse victims. Cf
BEDERMAN, supra note 106, at 232-33; GORDoN, supra note 11, at 21-22, 61, 73; PLECK,
supra note 11, at 159.
The largest spate of legal executions of intimate murderers in New York clustered in the
1880s and 1890s and then, perhaps affected by changing gender norms, slowly began to dwin-
dle in the first two decades of the twentieth century. See supra tbl.4. In keeping with Colo-
rado's tendency to lag behind New York in cultural trends, Colorado began to execute more
intimate killers after 1920. There were sixteen legal executions of this type in the state be-
tween 1920 and 1972; eleven persons who killed intimates in Denver received capital punish-




Men and Women Charged with Manslaughter for Killing Intimates
New York County, NY (1879-1893)
(MS = manslaughter)
Defendant Charge Verdict I Sentence D's V's V's Method
Date Sex Sex RelationshP _
Angelo MS MS 4 2 years in M F Female lover/ Beating
Cometta (guilty plea) prison Domestic
(1880) partner
James MS MS 4 2 years in M F Wife Beating
Powers (guilty plea) prison
1___ (1880) 1 -
Thomas MS Dismissed None M F Wife Fatal beating




Antonio MS Acquitted None M M Brother Blow to head
Caporella (1882) 1
John MS Acquitted None M F Wife Kicking,
Stewart (1882) accelerated by
use of
intoxicating
_________ ______ _____  ________liquor
Theodore MS MS 4 2 years in M M Stepson Blow to head
Gebert (guilty plea) prison
1 ___(1882) 1
Elizabeth MS I Acquitted None F M Male lover Stabbing
Quinquinet _ (1883) 1 _
Henry MS 1 MS 2 8 years in M F Wife Kicking
Brand (guilty plea) prison
(1887)
John MS 1 MS 2 2 years & M M Brother Throat cut
Garvey (guilty plea) 6 months in
(1888) prison
William MS MS 2 2 years & M M Brother Stabbing
Fogarty (guilty plea) 6 months in
(1888) p- son
Bernard MS 2 Dismissed None M F Wife Bright's disease,
McLaughlin (1890) accelerated by
beating
Charles MS 1 MS 2 11 years in M F Wife Beating
Schultz (1890) prison
William MS 1 MS 1 11 years & M F Wife Blow to head
Smith (1891) 6 months in with club; V got
prison tetanus in head
wound and died
_ _of lockjaw
John MS 1 MS 2 7 years & M M Son Blow to head
Harris, Sr. (guilty plea) 6 months in
(1891) prison
George MS 2 MS 2 3 years in M F Wife Bright's disease,




UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
Appendix A (Cont'd)
(MS = manslauehter)
Defendant Charge Verdict / Sentence D's V's V's Method
Date Sex Sex Relationship, _
Philip MS 2 MS 2 12 years & M F Wife Beating









Richard MS I MS 1 7 years & M F Wife Burning
Scanlan (guilty plea) 6 months in
(1892) prison
Michael MS MS 2 5 years & M F Female lover/ Kicking and
O'Connell (1892) 6 months in Domestic exhaustion due
prison partner to effects of
criminal
abortion





Women Charged with Murder for Killing Intimates
New York County, NY (1879-1893)
Defendant Charge Verdict / Date Sentence V's V's
_ Sex Relationship
Bridget Murder I Manslaughter 3 2 years in M Husband
McCabe (1881) prison
Elizabeth Murder I Manslaughter 3 4 years in M Male lover
Coleman (1881) prison
Annie Murder I Acquitted by reason of None F Daughter
McCluskey insanity
(1885)
Johanna Murder Acquitted None M Husband
Lessmann (1885)





Susan Murder I Manslaughter 2 15 years in M Male lover
Hendricks (guilty plea) prison
(1889)
Wilhelmine Murder I Acquitted by reason of None M (2) Sons
Lebkuchner insanity
(1889)
Hannah Murder I Died before trial None M Male
Southworth (Indicted 1889) lover/Seduced
& then rejected
D
Emma Murder I Acquitted None M Husband
Cordes (1890)
Pasqualina Murder 1 Acquitted by reason of None M Male
Robertiello insanity lover/Seduced
(Indicted as (1891) & then rejected
"Lubertiello") D




Annie Murder 1 Murder 2 Life in M Husband
Walden (1892) prison
Fannie Murder I Acquitted by reason of Committed F Daughter
Kom insanity to asylum
(1893)
Mary Murder I Manslaughter 2 6 years & 5 M Husband
Dunne (1894) months in
prison
Sources: DA PAPERS, supra note
published appellate opinions.
1; DA SCRAPBOOK, supra note 2; EsPY & SMYLKA, supra note 25;
Note: For one additional female defendant, Elizabeth Quinquinet, see Appendix A (manslaughter
cases), supra.
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Appendix C
Executions of Persons Convicted of First-degree Murder
New York County, NY (1880-1920)
Defendant Appeal D's V's V's Relationship Method
Date Sex Sex
Pietro Balbo 1880 M F Wife Stabbing
Augustus Leighton 1882 M F Female lover (?) Unclear
Pasquale Majone 1882 M F (2) Wife and Shooting
_Mother-in-law
Edward Hovey 1883 M F Sister-in-law Shooting
Miguel Chacon 1886 M F Female lover Shooting
Daniel Driscoll 1887 M F Female lover Shooting
Patrick Packenham 1889 M F Wife Throat cut
John Lewis 1889 M F Female lover Shooting
James Nolan 1889 M F Female lover/ Shooting
Domestic partner
Ferdinand Carolin 1889 M F Female lover/ Hatchet
Domestic partner
James Slocum 1891 M F Wife Hatchet
Harris Smiler 1891 M F Wife Shooting
Martin Loppy 1891 M F Wife Stabbing
Carlyle Harris 1893 M F Wife Poisoning
John Osmond 1893 M F (1) Wife and Shooting
M (1) Wife's lover
Robert Buchanan 1895 M F Wife Poisoning
Richard Leach 1895 M F Female lover/ Stabbing
Domestic partner
Louis Herrmann 1896 M F Wife Shooting
Charles Pustolka 1896 M F Wife Stabbing/Throat cut
Howard Scott 1897 M F Wife Shooting
Adrian Braun 1899 M F Wife Stabbing/Throat cut
Lewis Pullerson 1899 M F Female lover/ Strangled
Domestic partner
Joseph Mullen 1900 M F Wife Shooting
Aaron Hall 1901 M F Fiancee/ Shooting
Rejected D's
attentions
Antonio Triola 1903 M F Rejected D's Shooting
attentions
Patrick Conklin 1903 M F Wife Shooting
Adolph Koenig 1904 M F Female lover/ Strangled
Domestic partner
Frank Furlong 1907 M F Aunt Blow to head
William Nelson 1907 M F Female lover/ Throat cut
Domestic partner
Gilbert Coleman 1910 M F Wife Stabbing/Beating
Carl Loose 1910 M F Daughter Shooting
Robert Wood 1911 M F Niece Shooting
Gregorio Giordano 1915 M F Wife Beating





Executions of Persons Convicted of First-degree Murder
New York State (1880-1920)
Defendant Appeal D's V's V's Relationship Method
Date Sex Sex
Pietro Balbo 1880 M F Wife Stabbing
Nathan Greenfield 1881 M F Wife Throat cut
Augustus Leighton 1882 M F Female lover (?) Unclear
James Walsh 1882 M F Rejected D's attentions Stabbing
Pasquale Majone 1882 M F (2) Wife and Shooting
Mother-in-law
Edward Hovey 1883 M F Sister-in-law Shooting
George Mills 1885 M F Wife Stabbing
Franz Petmecky 1885 M F Female lover Axe
James Jones 1885 M F Wife Shooting
Peter Otto 1886 M F Wife Shooting
Miguel Chacon 1886 M F Female lover Shooting
Roxalana Druse 1886 F M Husband Shooting/Axe
Daniel Driscoll 1887 M F Female lover Shooting
Asbury Hawkins 1888 M F Mother Shooting
Patrick Packenham 1889 M F Wife Throat cut
Ferdinand Carolin 1889 M F Female lover/ Hatchet
Domestic partner
John Lewis 1889 M F Female lover Shooting
James Nolan 1889 M F Female lover/ Shooting
Domestic partner
William Kemmler 1890 M F Female lover Axe
Domestic partner
James Slocum 1891 M F Wife Hatchet
Harris Smiler 1891 M F Wife Shooting
Martin Loppy 1891 M F Wife Stabbing
Joseph Tice 1892 M F Wife (estranged) Stabbing
Carlyle Harris 1893 M F Wife Poisoning
James Hamilton 1893 M F Wife Throat cut
John Osmond 1893 M F (1) Wife and Shooting
M (I) Wife's Lover
Martin Foy, Jr. 1893 M F Female lover/Rejected D's Shooting
attentions
John Delfino 1893 M F Rejected D's attentions Shooting
Robert Buchanan 1895 M F Wife Poisoning
Richard Leach 1895 M F Female lover/ Stabbing
Domestic partner
Charles Pustolka 1896 M F Wife Stabbing/Throat
cut
Louis Herrmann 1896 M F Wife Shooting
John Hoch 1896 M F (1) Rejected D's attentions Shooting
M (1) and Third-party
(accidentally struck by
I_ _bullet)
Howard Scott 1897 M F Wife Shooting
John Barker 1897 M F Wife Shooting
Frank Conroy 1897 M F Wife Stabbing
Hadley Sutherland 1897 M F Female lover/ Shooting
Domestic partner
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Appendix D (Cont'd)
[Vol. 77
Defendant Appeal D's V's V's Relationship Method
Date Sex Sex
Bailer Decker 1898 M F Wife Shooting
Martha Place 1899 F F Stepdaughter Asphyxiation
Adrian Braun 1899 M F Wife Throat cut/
Stabbing
Oscar Rice 1899 M F Wife (estranged) Stabbing
Lewis Pullerson 1899 M F Female lover/ Strangled
Domestic Partner
Joseph Mullen 1900 M F Wife Shooting
Fred Krist 1901 M F Female lover Shooting
Joseph Zachello 1901 M F Mother-in-law Stabbing
Aaron Hall 1901 M F Fiancee/ Shooting
I I_ Rejected D's attentions
Antonio Triola 1903 M F Rejected D's attentions Shooting
Patrick Conklin 1903 M F Wife Shooting
William Ennis 1903 M F Wife Shooting
Allen Mooney 1904 M F Female lover Shooting
Oscar Borgstrom 1904 M F Wife Throat cut
Adolph Koenig 1904 M F Female lover/ Strangled
Domestic partner
Martin Ebelt 1905 M F Wife Strangled
John Johnson 1906 M F Wife (estranged) Shooting
Frank Furlong 1907 M F Aunt Blow to head
William Nelson 1907 M F Female lover/ Throat cut
Domestic partner
Chester Gillette 1908 M F Female lover Drowning
William Brasch 1908 M F Wife Drowning
Bernard Carlin 1909 M F Mother Shooting
William Scott 1909 M F Stepmother Shooting
Frank Jackson 1909 M F Female lover/ Throat cut
Domestic partner
Gilbert Coleman 1910 M F Wife Stabbing/Beating
Antonio Fornaro 1910 M F Female lover/ Throat cut
Domestic partner
William Gilbert 1910 M F Fiance Shooting
Guiseppe Gambaro 1910 M M Brother Shooting
Carl Loose 1910 M F Daughter Shooting
Samuel Austin 1910 M F Wife Shooting
Sam Ford 1910 M F Female lover/ Stabbing/Cutting
Domestic partner with razor
Robert Wood 1911 M F Niece Shooting
Charles Green 1911 M F Daughter Shooting
Bert Brown 1911 M M Half-brother Shooting
Joseph Garfalo 1912 M F Wife Axe
George Harris 1913 M F Wife Shooting
Robert Kane 1915 M F Female lover Shooting
Gregorio lordano 1915 M F Wife Beating
Walter Watson 1916 M F Wife Stabbing




Women Accused of Killing Intimates
Denver and Arapahoe Counties, CO (1880-1920)
Defendant Charg Verdict / Date Sentence V's V's
_ Sex Relationship
Mattie Lemmons Murder Murder 2 10 years in prison M Male lover
_ (1884) (Discharged in 1887) (?)
Emily Witter Murder Acquitted None M Husband
(1888)
Lucy Swarthout Murder Hung jury - Then None M Male lover
nolle prosequi
1(1892)
Emma Butler Murder Involuntary 1 year in county jail M Husband
Manslaughter
(1892)
Mrs. Whitehead None Released without None M (1) Husband and
charge F (1) Husband's
(1896) lover (?)
Bell Dixon (a.k.a. Murder Acquitted None M Husband
Lizzie Dixon) (1897)
Cornelia Knight Unclear Manslaughter 1 year in county jail M Husband
(1898)
Nellie Gabrin Murder Grand Jury did not None M Husband
indict
(Ignoramous 1901)
Ida Nichols Murder Case dismissed by None M Husband
court order
(1903)
Jennie Davis Murder Acquitted None M Husband
(1903)
Rosa Anderson Murder Acquitted None M Male lover
(1904)
Helen Schmidlap Murder Acquitted None M Husband
(1906)
Carmella Maria Murder Voluntary 2 to 3 years in prison M Husband
Nigri Fiorini Manslaughter
1(1906)
Beatrice Gordon Murder 1 Acquitted None M Male lover/
(1908) Employer
Lottie Webb Murder Voluntary 6 to 8 years in prison M Husband
Pereault Manslaughter
(1909)
Millie Smith Murder Involuntary 1 year in county jail M Husband
Manslaughter
1(1909)
Emma Jett Murder I Acquitted None M Husband
(1910)
Rosa Rubenstein Murder 1 Nolle Prosequi None M Husband
(Indicted 1910)
Gertrude Patterson Murder Acquitted None M Husband
(1911)
Assunta Mollicone Murder Acquitted None M Husband
(1911) 1 1
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Appendix E (Cont'd)
[Vol. 77
Defendant Charge Verdict / Date Sentence V's V's
.... _Sex Relationship
Eleanor Valentine Murder Acquitted None M Husband
_ (19 1)
Rose O'Grady Unclear Acquitted None M Male lover
(19 3)
Norma Pumphrey Murder 1 Involuntary 9 months in M Husband
Manslaughter county jail
(1913)
Ida Mercer Murder Murder I Life in prison M Son-in-law
(1914)
Berta Wright Unclear Acquitted None M Husband
(1915)
Stella Moore Smith Murder Acquitted None M Husband
(1917
Mary Collins Murder Acquitted None M Husband
____________ ______(1920) ____________ _____
Sources: Denver and Arapahoe County District Court Records, supra note 24; SHMB, supra note
23; Colorado State Penitentiary Records, supra note 156.
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Appendix F
Men Accused of Killing Intimates
Denver and Arapahoe Counties, CO (1880-1920)
Defendant Charge Verdict / Date Sentence V's V's
Sex Relationship
O.J. Murder Acquitted by reason of None F (1) Wife and
Haller insanity M (1) Wife's lover
(1883)
Mr. Murphy Murder Voluntary Manslaughter Unclear F Female lover
(Appeal 1887)
James Murder Murder 1 Released on habeas F Wife
Medley (1889) corpus
Charles Murder Voluntary Manslaughter 3 years in prison F Female lover
Spurrier (guilty plea)
(Indicted 1890)
John Murder Involuntary 9 months in county M Son
McGraw Manslaughter jail
(1890)
Edward Murder Involuntary I day in county jail F Wife
McBride Manslaughter
(First convicted of
Murder 2 and sentenced
to life imprisonment,






Charles Murder Murder 2 Life in prison F Female lover
Ford (1894) (Commuted to 53
years to life. Paroled
in 1914)
William Murder Murder 2 21 years in prison F Female lover (?)
Rose (1894)




Frederico Murder Murder 1 Life in prison F Wife
Sanchez (1897) (Commuted to 44
years. Paroled in
1918)
William Murder Murder 2 15 years in prison F Female lover (?)
Baldwin (1898)
Edward Murder Murder 2 Unclear M Father-in-law
Brooks (Appeal 1899)
John Murder Discharged after Originally sentenced F Wife




George Murder Murder 2 10 to 20 years in F Rejected D's
Bond (1899) prison (Paroled in attentions
1 __ _ 1_ _ 1905) 1 1
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[Vol. 77
Defendant Charge Verdict / Date Sentence V's V's
Sex Relationship
William Murder Murder I Life in prison F Female lover
Barager (1900) (Commuted to 35
years to life)
Thomas Assault Assault with a Deadly 10 to 11 years in F Ex-wife







Thomas Murder Murder 2 15 to 16 years in M Son-in-law
Edwards (1902) prison
John Murder Voluntary Manslaughter Unclear F Female lover/
Watkins (1903) Rejected D's
attentions
Frank Murder Murder I Life in prison F Rejected D's
Bass (1903) attentions
Octavius Unclear Dismissed None M Brother
Doram (1904)
Seymour Murder Murder I Life in prison F Wife
Waycaster (1904)
Joseph Murder Voluntary Manslaughter 6 to 8 years in prison M Wife
Bums (1904)
Joseph Murder Acquitted None M Brother
Kotsch (1904)
Henry Murder Murder 2 10 to 15 years F Wife
Wianand (1905) in prison
Ben Murder Found insane None M Father
Wade, Jr. (1905)
Charles Murder Involuntary I day in county jail F Female lover
Pennington Manslaughter
(1906)
Benjamin Murder 1 Acquitted None F (2) Wife and
Wright (1907) Daughter
Eugene Murder Murder 2 10 to 12 years in F Wife
Marugg (1907) prison (Paroled in
1912)
Ernest Murder I Acquitted None F Wife
Rupp (1910) 1
Theodore Murder I Nolle prosequi after Unclear F Wife
Ehrhardt Murder 2 conviction
reversed
(1910) (Appeal 1911)
Clarence Murder 2 Murder 2 Life in prison for F (2) Wife and Child
Perkins (child) (child) death of child
Assault (1910) (Commuted to 17
with years to life. Paroled
Intent to in 1914)
Kill
(wife)
Felipe Murder 1 Murder 2 20 to 30 years in F Female lover
Lopez 1 (1910) prison (?)
2006] INTIMATE HOMICIDE
Appendix F (Cont'd)
Defendant Charge Verdict / Date Sentence V's V's
Sex Relationship
George Murder Nolle prosequi None F Wife
Smith _ (1910)
Michael Murder I Murder I Life in prison F Rejected D's
Henry (1911) attentions
Murphy I
Benjamin Murder 1 Acquitted None F Wife
Beckenstein (1911)
Gus Murder Murder I Life in prison F Wife
Marshall (1911)
Henry Murder Murder 1 Life in prison F Wife
Robitaille (1912) (Commuted to 25
years to life. Paroled
in 1924)
Oscar Murder Murder 2 10 to 12 years in M Brother
George (1912) prison
Joseph Murder I Involuntary 3 months in county M Brother-in-law
Bailey Manslaughter jail
(First convicted of
Murder 2 in 1910;
Retried and convicted of
Murder I in 1911; Tried




John Murder Murder I Life in prison F Wife
Freeze (1914)
Carl Murder Murder I Life in prison F Wife
Eickson (1915)
(Carl Brown)
William Murder Murder 1 Life in prison F Wife
Bruno (1917)
Jose Murder 1 Murder I Life in prison F Wife
Rocco (1919) (Commuted to
deportation in 1926)
Pearl Murder Murder 1 Life in prison F Wife
Centers (1919)
Louis Murder Murder 2 10 to 15 years in F Wife
Novak (1919) prison (Commuted to
5 years 11 months to
life. Paroled in 1922)
Lloyd Murder Murder I Life in prison F Female lover
White (1920)
H.D. Murder Murder 1 30 years to life in F Wife
Davis (1920) prison
Dennis Murder Murder I Life in prison F Female
Humphreys (1920) lover/Rejected
D's attentions
Sources: Denver and Arapahoe County District Court Records, supra note 24; SHMB, supra note
23; Colorado Penitentiary Records, supra note 156.
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Appendix G
Known Occupations of Executed Intimate Murderers,
New York and Colorado (1880-1920)
Defendant's Job Defendant's Name State
Baker Carl Loose New York
Bird-seller John Delfino New York
(former bootblack, barber, and rag picker)
Candy-maker Peter Otto New York
Cigar-maker Miguel Chacon New York
Coachman Joseph Mullen New York
Cook in railroad dining car Gilbert Coleman New York
Day laborer James Lynn Colorado
Driver Louis Herrmann New York
Factory executive Chester Gillette New York
Farmer Nathan Greenfield New York
Farmer & hunter Charles Green New York
(described by witnesses as "a man of the woods")
Furniture manufacturer Fred Krist New York
Leader of Whyo Gang & Daniel Driscoll New York
horse dealer
Gardener Oscar Borgstrom New York
Hamess-maker George Mills New York
Housewife Roxalana Druse New York
Housewife Martha Place New York
Huckster of market produce William Kemmler New York
Jockey Samuel Austin New York
Laborer Gregorio Giordano New York
Laborer William Nelson New York
Laborer William Ennis New York
Laborer Pietro Balbo New York
Laborer (worked for contractors building dams and Sam Ford New York
reservoirs for aqueduct)
Laborer in paint shop James Walsh New York
Longshoreman and day laborer Frank Conroy New York
Mechanic Franz Petmecky New York
Medical student Carlyle Harris New York
Messenger boy (only sporadically employed) Frank Furlong New York
Miner & aqueduct laborer John Lewis New York
Occasional worker Oscar Rice New York
Physician Robert Buchanan New York
Railroad gateman & preacher James Hamilton New York
Railroad laborer & street musician Pasquale Majone New York
Salvation Army lieutenant, Harris Smiler New York
newspaper folder, & printer
Seaman & farmer (irregularly employed) Robert Wood New York
Store clerk Asbury Hawkins New York
Teamster Martin Ebelt New York
Unemployed bartender Aaron Hall New York
Unemployed baseball player James Slocum New York
Unemployed brass polisher John Osmond New York
Unemployed butcher Charles Pustolka New York
Unemployed carpenter Ferdinand Carolin New York
Unemployed expressman James Nolan New York




Defendant's Job Defendant's Name State
Unemployed house painter Howard Scott New York
Unemployed mine manager Axel Galbraith Colorado
Unemployed painter Edward Hovey New York
Unemployed painter Patrick Packenham New York
Unemployed porter Lewis Pullerson New York
Unemployed state prisoner Adrian Braun New York
(formerly cigar-maker)
Unemployed tugboat fireman Martin Loppy New York
Unemployed Robert Kane New York
(had worked as I st-class fireman in U.S. Navy & as
engineer's assistant)
Waiter Augustus Leighton New York
Wood-molding manufacturer Joseph Tice New York
Worker in cutlery manufacting George Harris New York
Sources: DA PAPERS, supra note 1; DA SCRAPBOOKS, supra note 2; ESPY & SMYLKA, supra note
25; Radelet, supra note 26, at Appendix 1; published appellate opinions.
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